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ABSTRACT
Recent tragedies are causing hospitals to more intensively review their strategies and
broaden their approach to emergency preparation. The Gulf Coast storms of 2005 and 2008 and
other catastrophic events nationwide have illustrated the central role hospitals can and should
play in a community’s disaster recovery infrastructure.
Given the unpredictability of the world today, with the possibility of a mass casualty
crisis constantly threatening, there is an urgent need to seek and achieve higher levels of
readiness. If a hospital organization is not investing in emergency preparedness on a continuous
basis, that facility and its community are placed at higher risk.
After bearing the brunt of several major, damaging storms for the past five years,
hospitals along the coast in Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas have heightened their involvement
in their own and their communities’ recoveries, rebuilding their respective facilities and human
resources so they can offer quality healthcare services to their communities.
This study sought to answer the following research question: What strategies are
hospitals in coastal Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas using in their emergency preparedness
plans five years since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to facilitate their ability to respond more
effectively under crisis conditions and to maintain critical patient care operations?
The researcher took an in-depth look at the many lessons learned by nine Gulf Coast
region hospitals during their experiences with Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav and Ike by
interviewing hospital administrators and emergency preparedness personnel. These interactions
revealed strategies that the hospitals have implemented and what has yet to be done. Study
participants provided an evaluation of their emergency policies and plans, practices and
implementation as well as improvements, evacuation versus shelter-in-place strategies, training

xi

and drills, supplies, reimbursement, communication and human resource issues. The study
sought to identify trends and best practices being used by coastal healthcare facilities and to
determine which of these have been put into practice. Finally, the study identified opportunities
for future research in hospital emergency preparedness.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
URGENT – WEATHER MESSAGE
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE NEW ORLEANS LA
1011 AM CDT SUN AUG 28 2005
. . .DEVASTATING DAMAGE EXPECTED. . .
HURRICANE KATRINA. . .A MOST POWERFUL HURRICANE WITH
UNPRECEDENTED STRENGTH. . .RIVALING THE INTENSITY OF HURRICANE
CAMILLE OF 1969.
MOST OF THE AREA WILL BE UNINHABITABLE FOR WEEKS. . .PERHAPS
LONGER. AT LEAST ONE HALF OF WELL CONSTRUCTED HOMES WILL
HAVE ROOF AND WALL FAILURE. ALL GABLED ROOFS WILL FAIL. .
.LEAVING THOSE HOMES SEVERELY DAMAGED OR DESTROYED.
THE MAJORITY OF INDUSTRIAL BUILDINGS WILL BECOME NON
FUNCTIONAL. PARTIAL TO COMPLETE WALL AND ROOF FAILURE IS
EXPECTED. ALL WOOD FRAMED LOW RISING APARTMENT BUILDINGS
WILL BE DESTROYED. CONCRETE BLOCK LOW RISE APARTMENTS WILL
SUSTAIN MAJOR DAMAGE. . .INCLUDING SOME WALL AND ROOF FAILURE.
HIGH RISE OFFICE AND APARTMENT BUILDINGS WILL SWAY
DANGEROUSLY. . .A FEW TO THE POINT OF TOTAL COLLAPSE. ALL
WINDOWS WILL BLOW OUT.
AIRBORNE DEBRIS WILL BE WIDESPREAD. . .AND MAY INCLUDE HEAVY
ITEMS SUCH AS HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES AND EVEN LIGHT VEHICLES.
SPORT UTILITY VEHICLES AND LIGHT TRUCKS WILL BE MOVED. THE
BLOWN DEBRIS WILL CREATE ADDITIONAL DESTRUCTION. PERSONS. .
.PETS. . .AND LIVESTOCK EXPOSED TO THE WINDS WILL FACE CERTAIN
DEATH IF STRUCK.
POWER OUTAGES WILL LAST FOR WEEKS. . .AS MOST POWER POLES WILL
BE DOWN AND TRANSFORMERS DESTROYED. WATER SHORTAGES WILL
MAKE HUMAN SUFFERING INCREDIBLE BY MODERN STANDARDS.
THE VAST MAJORITY OF NATIVE TREES WILL BE SNAPPED OR UPROOTED.
ONLY THE HEARTIEST WILL REMAIN STANDING. . .BUT BE TOTALLY
DEFOLIATED. FEW CROPS WILL REMAIN. LIVESTOCK LEFT EXPOSED TO
THE WINDS WILL BE KILLED.
AN INLAND HURRICANE WIND WARNING IS ISSUED WHEN SUSTAINED
WINDS NEAR HURRICANE FORCE. . .OR FREQUENT GUSTS AT OR ABOVE
HURRICANE FORCE. . .ARE CERTAIN WITHIN THE NEXT 12 TO 24 HOURS.
ONCE TROPICAL STORM AND HURRICANE FORCE WINDS ONSET. . .DO NOT
VENTURE OUTSIDE! (NOAA, August 28, 2005)
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Rationale
When the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) issued this
dramatic, fear-provoking warning the morning before Hurricane Katrina’s landfall in August of
2005, residents of the Gulf Coast knew this could be one of the worst hurricanes this nation had
ever witnessed. Although Katrina’s wind speed did not come close to matching that of
Hurricane Camille’s Mississippi coast landfall in 1969, the incomprehensible damage Katrina
inflicted upon residents of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabamaphysical, psychological, social
and economicwill take many years to overcome.
Southeast Louisiana first began to feel the effects of Hurricane Katrina on Sunday,
August 28, 2005 (Guin et al., 2009). The storm had strengthened to a Category 5 hurricane on
the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale that morning (Guin et al., 2009). By afternoon, the
storm surge was beginning to push inland, and the coastal region had, for the most part,
completed its preparations and evacuations by this time (Guin et al., 2009). Contraflow was
continuous, and westbound traffic along Interstate 10 flowed at a rate of about 2,500 vehicles per
hour (Guin et al., 2009). By approximately 4 p.m., the outer rain bands of Katrina had reached
the city of New Orleans (Guin et al., 2009). Contraflow was discontinued by 5 p.m. due to
worsening weather conditions (Guin et al., 2009). By the time Katrina arrived, more than one
million people had evacuated the New Orleans region, some 12,000 people found shelter in the
Louisiana Superdome and approximately 130,000 people rode out the storm in their homes,
businesses, or with close friends and family (Guin et al., 2009).
The eye of Hurricane Katrina made landfall near Buras, Louisiana, at approximately
6 a.m. on Monday, August 29, with maximum sustained winds in the Category 2 range, or
approximately 105 mph. (Guin et al., 2009) Katrina’s storm surge was enormous, with computer
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models predicting elevations as high as 24 feet above normal and inundating nearly 350 miles of
coastline. A peak surge height of nearly 28 feet was measured near Bay St. Louis, Mississippi
(Guin et al., 2009).
Hurricane Katrina’s destruction has been well documented. The sheer size of her
devastating aftermath made other major U.S. disasters that preceded it pale by comparison,
including the Chicago Fire of 1871, the San Francisco Earthquake and Fire of 1906, and
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (Townsend, 2006).
The total estimated losses for Katrina, as identified by Isidore (2006), according to the
Insurance Information Institute, are estimated to be at $125 billion (est. 2005 USD). The storm
impacted 108,456 square miles, an area the size of Great Britain, (Department of Homeland
Security, 2008), left 80% of New Orleans submerged, caused more than 1,500 casualties,
damaged and/or destroyed more than 200,000 homes, impacted over 71,000 businesses and was
responsible for more than 300,000 job losses in Louisiana alone (Governor’s Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness, 2006).
Just as residents were readying their homes for the storm prior to evacuating the city that
August of 2005, the New Orleans medical community, as well as other healthcare facilities along
the coast who found themselves in Katrina’s potential path, also were engaged in a high level of
preparation. For most of these facilities, this meant immediate implementation of an emergency
plan specific to hurricanes, setting into motion a series of highly complex, detailed steps
designed to ensure that staff were able to deliver the highest level of patient care possible under
the most trying of circumstances. Most hospital facilities, having been through previous storms
successfully, had no reason to think their plans were inadequate. Katrina would put those plans
to the ultimate test (Danna & Cordray, 2010).

3

Hurricane Rita crossed into the Gulf of Mexico and hammered the Louisiana/Texas
coastline with yet another significant blow on September 24, 2005, exacerbating an already
critical situation in a region still reeling from Katrina. Rita, too, had reached Category 5 status
on the Saffir-Simpson scale but weakened to a Category 3 hurricane before making landfall
along the Texas-Louisiana border, with estimated sustained winds of 115 mph and a storm surge
peaking at about 15 feet above sea level (Guin et al., 2009).
Medical facilities in coastal Louisiana, Texas and Mississippi suffered considerable
losses due to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, with many becoming essentially inoperable due to
heavy damage to their physical plants caused by wind and flooding (Danna & Cordray, 2010).
Compounding problems for many of them was loss of communication, security concerns,
managing an influx of people seeking care and shelter, contending with the loss of potable water,
plumbing, electricity and supplies, including food and pharmaceuticals (Danna & Cordray,
2010).
Emergency preparedness in hospitals is a serious concern, not just locally, but globally.
“Natural disasters are becoming more frequent and severe, and the capabilities of the medical
community are increasingly being pushed to the limit. Every disaster brings new challenges”
(Guin et al., 2008, p. 9). Several events in recent years, including the terrorist attacks of 9/11,
the Indian Ocean tsunami, the Gulf Coast hurricanes, earthquakes in Haiti and New Zealand, as
well as the devastating Japanese earthquake and tsunami of 2011, all illustrate the magnitude and
importance of planning and preparing for disaster.
During the past decade, the United States has done much to increase its ability to plan
and prepare for crises, whether natural or man-made. The creation of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), its National Response Framework (NRF), the Federal Emergency
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Management Agency (FEMA) and Stafford Act are but a few of the national investments made
at President George W. Bush’s behest to enhance the country’s ability to successfully respond to
crisis. States, municipalities and private businesses also are placing a greater emphasis on
emergency management, helping to prevent loss of life and property and ensure business
continuity.
The nation’s hospitals have historically done an admirable job of planning and preparing
for emergencies in order to maintain accreditation. Recent tragedies are causing hospitals to
more intensively review their strategies and broaden their approach to emergency
preparationan approach that is less institution-specific and much more community-oriented
(Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, 2003).
Why Hospital Preparedness Is Important
Recent Gulf Coast storms and other catastrophic events nationwide have illustrated the
central role hospitals can and should play in a community’s disaster recovery infrastructure. As
a result of this role and responsibility, hospitals are being asked to increase significantly their
level of emergency preparedness in terms of planning, leadership and participation, all at a time
when resources are becoming more constrained (Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals, 2003). Given the unpredictability of the world today, with the possibility of a mass
casualty crisis constantly threatening, there is an urgent need to seek and achieve higher levels of
readiness. If a hospital organization is not investing in emergency preparedness on a continuous
basis, constantly reviewing plans and procedures for ways to make them more effective, that
facility and its community are placed at higher risk. While the cost of preparing is high, the cost
of not doing so is higher still.
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Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to investigate the current preparation and emergency
response status of nine United States Gulf of Mexico region hospitals to weather-related
emergencies and other hazards.
Significance of the Study
“This is not our world as we once knew it. It is no longer sufficient to develop disaster
plans and dust them off if a threat appears imminent. Rather, a system of preparedness across
communities must be in place every day” (Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations, 2003, p. 4). There is no doubt that disasterstsunamis, earthquakes, floods,
fires, snowstorms, tornadoes, heat waves, not to mention terrorist acts and man-made
calamitiesare becoming more frequent. Are tragedies like Hurricane Katrina the new normal?
Even those who deny the existence of global climate change are having trouble
dismissing the evidence of the last year. In the U.S. alone, nearly 1,000 tornadoes have
ripped across the heartland, killing more than 500 people and inflicting $9 billion in
damage. The Midwest suffered the wettest April in 116 years, forcing the Mississippi to
flood thousands of square miles, even as drought-plagued Texas suffered the driest month
in a century. Worldwide, the litany of weather’s extremes has reached biblical
proportions. The 2010 heat wave in Russia killed an estimated 15,000 people. Floods in
Australia and Pakistan killed 2,000 and left large swaths of each country under water. A
months-long drought in China has devastated millions of acres of farmland. And the
temperature keeps rising: 2010 was the hottest year on earth since weather records began
(Begley, 2011, p. 42).
Scientists disagree about whether climate change will bring more intense or frequent
tornadoes, but there is wide consensus that the 2 degrees Fahrenheit of global warming of
the last century is behind the rise in sea levels, more intense hurricanes, more heat waves,
and more droughts and deluges (Begley, 2011, p. 43).
As reported by Nates and Moyer in October 2005, trends show an alarming increase in
the number of disasters globally.
As we have seen with the Asian tsunami (of 2002) and Hurricane Katrina, as populations
increase in vulnerable areas, the problem is getting worse. The Centre for Research on
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium and
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the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) have collaborated to create a joint
Emergency Disaster Database (EM-DAT) (Figure 1). The trends shown are alarming,
and although the exponential rise in the number of disasters could be biased by overreporting and other factors, the vast and increasing number of people affected demands
our attention (Figure 2) (Nates & Moyer, 2005).

Figure 1: Natural disasters reported, 1900-2004 (EM-DAT, 2005).

Figure 2: Total number of people affected globally by all disaster types,
1900-2004 (EM-DAT, 2005).
As we look at the whole picture, it appears that the poor outcome in many of these
disasters is not the result of lack of knowledge but rather the result of inaction and poor
implementation of the necessary measures to prevent, contain, or mitigate the impact of
natural disasters on the populations exposed; this, of course, after discounting the
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enormity of the catastrophes involved. Memory of previous events in history is short;
George Santayana once said, “He who forgets history is destined to repeat it.” It seems to
us that if we do not react soon with rapid and effective changes to our current emergency
responses and leadership, we will knowingly and sadly be repeating history in many more
opportunities to come (Nates & Moyer, 2005).
After bearing the brunt of several major, damaging storms for the past five years,
hospitals along the coast in Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas have been intensively involved in
their own and their communities’ recoveriesrebuilding their respective facilities and human
resources so they can offer quality healthcare services to their communities. It is now time to
take a closer look at the many lessons learned during the hospitals’ experiences in 2005 to
determine what strategies have been implemented and what is yet to be done. Questions this
study addressed are as follows:
•

Are hospitals prepared for the next Katrina or worse?

•

What critical needs exist that have yet to be addressed?

•

Is hospital emergency planning overall more robust?

•

Are we teaching and preparing our new medical practitionersphysicians, nurses and
otherswho will bear the responsibility of caring for the ill and injured during disaster?
Objectives of the Study
The objectives of this study were:

1. To review and describe major problems and issues experienced by Gulf Coast region
medical facilities before and during Hurricane Katrina.
2. To obtain and describe hospital administrative and operational staff’s viewpoints on
critical emergency plans, practices and implementation, as well as improvements, relative
to evacuation versus shelter-in-place strategies; training and drills; supplies;
reimbursement; policies and plans; communication; and staffing.
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3. To identify trends and best practices in coastal healthcare facilities, tangible and
intangible, in emergency preparedness.
4. To determine the degree to which lessons learned and best practices were put into
practice following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
5. To identify opportunities for future research.
Research Question
What strategies are hospitals in coastal Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas using in
their emergency preparedness plans five years since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to
facilitate their ability to respond more effectively under crisis conditions and to
maintain critical patient care operations?
Much has been written since 2005 regarding “lessons learned” by the medical community
during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, which struck and affected the
Louisiana and Texas coastlines in September 2008, offered an opportunity for further study of
emergency preparation, partnerships and planning. These studies have generated tremendous
progress, informing facilities far beyond the U.S. Gulf Coast about the most recent best practices
and suggestions on long- and short-term preparedness improvements.
Hospitals are a place of safe harbor and refuge for the most vulnerable in the
communitysick patients who are the least able to care for themselves during a disaster. Yet,
hospitals often are also the most vulnerable during a disaster due to their dependence on the
availability of utilities, food, water, medicines, communications, transportation, and a skilled
workforce (Danna & Cordray, 2010).
This study sought to determine what hospitals along the Gulf Coast are doing to continue
their preparedness efforts five years post-Katrina. The researcher sought to determine what nine
selected facilities learned as a result of their experiences during Hurricane Katrina, as well as
Hurricanes Rita, Ike and Gustav. Key questions addressed during this research were:

9

•

Are hospitals still preparing for the next storm with a sense of urgency or has
complacency set in now that no major storms in the Gulf of Mexico have made landfall in
Gulf Coast states during the past three years?

•

Are hospitals making the time and investing in training personnel in the latest emergency
response techniques to allow for the best possible outcome when faced with crisis?

•

Under what conditions should a hospital plan to evacuate or shelter-in-place?

•

If not a total evacuation, which patients should stay and which should be transferred
elsewhere?

By interviewing hospital administrators and emergency preparedness personnel, the study sought
to discover answers to these questions.
Definitions of Terms:
Advanced-Warning Event: “A disaster that decision teams and staff are tracking as they
consider whether it may warrant evacuating their facility” (Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, p. 10).
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ): “The Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality's mission is to improve the quality, safety, efficiency, and effectiveness of health
care for all Americans. Information from AHRQ's research helps people make more informed
decisions and improve the quality of health care services. AHRQ was formerly known as the
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research” (http://www.ahrq.gov/about/budgtix.htm).
All-Hazards: “Describing an incident, natural or man-made, that warrants action to protect life,
property, environment, and public health or safety, and to minimize disruptions of government,
social, or economic activities” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2009, p. 12-1).
Chain of Command: “A series of command, control, executive, or management positions in
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hierarchical order of authority” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2009, p. 12-2).
Contraflow: “A temporary arrangement in which traffic travels in the same direction on both
sides of the road” (http://rox.com/vocab/contraflow).
Critical Infrastructure: “Assets, including physical systems, other support systems, and staff,
that are essential to operate a hospital and provide a standard level of care to patients”
(AHRQ, p. 10).
EMSTAT: “A computerized database to which Louisiana hospitals report status of operations
(open, limited, closed); census and availability of beds by category (Medical/Surgical, Intensive
Care Unit, Pediatric, Psychiatric, etc.); generator information; and other resources that may be
needed by hospitals in an emergency (blood products, fuel, pharmaceuticals, personnel, etc.)”
(Louisiana Hospital Emergency Preparedness and Response Network, 2009, p. 8).
Extra-corporeal Membrane Oxygenation (ECMO): “This system provides heart-lung bypass
support outside of the baby’s body. ECMO is used in infants who are extremely ill due to
breathing or heart problems” (National Library of Medicine http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus
/ency/article/007234.htm).
Emergency Operations Center (EOC): “The physical location at which the coordination of
information and resources to support incident management (on-scene operations) activities
normally takes place. An EOC may be a temporary facility or may be located in a more central
or permanently established facility, perhaps at a higher level of organization within a
jurisdiction. EOCs may be organized by major functional disciplines (e.g., fire, law
enforcement, and medical services), by jurisdiction (e.g., Federal, State, regional, tribal, city,
county, parish), or some combination thereof” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2009,
p. 12-5).
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Essential Employee: An employee essential to a hospital’s operation during a crisis.
Evacuation: “Organized, phased and supervised withdrawal, dispersal, or removal of civilians
from dangerous or potentially dangerous areas, and their reception and care in safe areas”
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2009, p. 12-9).
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA): “The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
is an agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation that supports State and local
governments in the design, construction, and maintenance of the Nation’s highway system
(Federal Aid Highway Program) and various federally and tribal owned lands (Federal Lands
Highway Program). Through financial and technical assistance to State and local governments,
the Federal Highway Administration is responsible for ensuring that America’s roads and
highways continue to be among the safest and most technologically sound in the world”
(www.fhwa.dot.gov/about/).
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): “FEMA’s mission is to support our
citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain, and
improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all
hazards” (http://fema.gov/about/index.shtm).
Hazard Vulnerability Analysis (HVA): “A process to identify hazards and associated risk to
persons, property, and structures and to improve protection from natural and human-caused
hazards” (FEMA, 2009, pp. 12-7 – 12-8).
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA): “HRSA is the primary Federal
agency for improving access to health care services for people who are uninsured, isolated, or
medically vulnerable” (www.hrsa.gov).
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HVAC: “Heating, ventilation and air conditioning (http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/
hvac).
Incident Command System (ICS): “An incident command organization made up of the
command and general staff members and appropriate functional units of an incident command
system organization” (FEMA, 2009, p. 12-9).
Joint Commission: “An independent, not-for-profit organization, The Joint Commission
accredits and certifies more than 18,000 health care organizations and programs in the United
States. Joint Commission accreditation and certification is recognized nationwide as a symbol of
quality that reflects an organization’s commitment to meeting certain performance standards”
(www.jointcommission.org).
Medical Institution Evacuation Plan (MIEP): “The MIEP was developed for hospitalized
patients in light of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita when 37 hospitals were evacuated post-storm for
Hurricane Katrina and 21 hospitals were evacuated pre-storm for Hurricane Rita. The need for
an MIEP was verified in 2008 during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike when, in Louisiana, patients
were evacuated through the Lakefront and Channault Aeromedical Marshalling Points (AMPs).
The plan may be activated only during times of state-declared emergencies and primarily
addresses the three coastal parishes in Louisiana Region 3 that are particularly vulnerable to
hurricanes, e.g. St. Mary, Terrebonne and Lafourche (parishes)” (www.lhaonline.org).
Mitigation: “Activities providing a critical foundation in the effort to reduce the loss of life and
property from natural and/or man-made disasters by avoiding or lessening the impact of a
disaster and providing value to the public by creating safer communities. Mitigation seeks to fix
the cycle of disaster damage, reconstruction and repeated damage. These activities or actions, in
most cases, will have a long-term sustained effect” (FEMA, 2009, p.12-12).
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Mutual Aid and Assistance Agreement: “Written or oral agreement between and among
agencies/organizations and/or jurisdictions that provides a mechanism to quickly obtain
emergency assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, materials and other associated
services. The primary objective is to facilitate rapid, short-term deployment of emergency
support prior to, during and/or after an incident” (FEMA, 2009, p.12-13).
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS): “A federally coordinated system that augments
the Nation’s medical response capability. The overall purpose of the NDMS is to establish a
single, integrated national medical response capability for assisting State and local authorities in
dealing with the medical impacts of major peacetime disasters. NDMS, under Emergency
Support Function #8Public Health and Medical Services, supports Federal agencies in the
management and coordination of the Federal medical response to major emergencies and
federally declared disasters” (FEMA, 2009, p. 12-13 – 12-14).
National Incident Management System (NIMS): “A system that provides a proactive
approach guiding government agencies at all levels, the private sector, and nongovernmental
organizations to work seamlessly to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate
the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location or complexity, in order to reduce the
loss of life or property and harm to the environment” (FEMA, 2009, p. 12-14).
National Response Framework (NRF): “Guides how the Nation conducts all-hazards
response. The NRF documents the key response principles, roles and structures that organize
national response. It describes how communities, States, the Federal Government, and other
private-sector and nongovernmental partners apply these principles for a coordinated, effective
national response. It describes special circumstances where Federal interests are involved and
catastrophic incidents where a State would require significant support. It allows first responders,
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decision-makers, and supporting entities to provide a unified national response” (FEMA, 2009,
p. 12-15).
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR): “The Office of
the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (formerly the Office of Public Health
Emergency Preparedness) was created under the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act in
the wake of Katrina to lead the nation in preventing, preparing for, and responding to the adverse
health effects of public health emergencies and disasters. ASPR focuses on preparedness
planning and response; building federal emergency medical operational capabilities;
countermeasures research, advance development, and procurement; and grants to strengthen the
capabilities of hospitals and health care systems in public health emergencies and medical
disasters. The office provides federal support, including medical professionals through ASPR’s
National Disaster Medical System, to augment state and local capabilities during an emergency
or disaster” (http://phe.gov/about/aspr/Pages/default.aspx).
Office of the Inspector General (OIG): “The OIG develops and distributes resources to assist
the health care industry in its efforts to comply with the Nation's fraud and abuse laws and to
educate the public about fraudulent schemes so they can protect themselves and report suspicious
activities” (http://oig.hhs.gov/about-oig/about-us/index.asp).
Parish: “In Louisiana, a civil division corresponding to a county in other states”
(http://www.dictionary.net/parish).
Post-Event Decision: “The decision whether or not, in the aftermath of an event, to evacuate a
hospital” (AHRQ, p. 10).
Post-Event Evacuation: “An evacuation carried out after an event” (AHRQ, p. 11).
Pre-Event Decision: “The decision whether faced with an impending event to 1) preemptively
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evacuate a hospital or 2) shelter-in-place” (AHRQ, p. 10).
Pre-Event Evacuation: “An evacuation carried out prior to an impending event when the
hospital structure and surrounding environment are not yet significantly compromised; a preevent evacuation is ordered when the anticipated effects of an impending disaster would either
place patients and staff at risk or make an evacuation extremely dangerous or impossible at a
later time” (AHRQ, pp. 10-11).
RallyPoint: “A crisis communication and business continuity system that combines all modes
of standard communication with the web and a touch-tone based phone system”
(www.myrallypoint.net).
Saffir-Simpson Scale: “The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale is a 1 to 5 categorization
based on the hurricane's intensity at the indicated time. The scaleoriginally developed by wind
engineer Herb Saffir and meteorologist Bob Simpsonhas been an excellent tool for alerting the
public about the possible impacts of various intensity hurricanes. The scale provides examples of
the type of damage and impacts in the United States associated with winds of the indicated
intensity. In general, damage rises by about a factor of four for every category increase”
(www.nhc.noaa.gov).
Shelter-In-Place: “Means people inside a building should remain inside until the danger passes.
Shelter-in-place protection is used when evacuating the public would cause greater risk than
staying where they are, or when an evacuation cannot be performed” (WMD (Weapons of Mass
Destruction) Response Guidebook, 2006, p. 34).
Special Needs Populations: “Populations whose members may have additional needs before,
during, and after an incident in functional areas, including but not limited to: maintaining
independence, communication, transportation, supervision, and medical care. Individuals in
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need of additional response assistance may include those who have disabilities; who live in
institutionalized settings; who are elderly; who are children; who are from diverse cultures; who
have limited English proficiency or are non-English speaking; or who are transportation
disadvantaged” (FEMA, 2009, p. 12-20).
Weapons of Mass Destruction: “A chemical, biological, or radioactive weapon capable of
causing widespread death and destruction” (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/weapons
+of+mass+destruction).

17

CHAPTER 2.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
The most detailed description of conditions during the crisis came from Charity Hospital,
the venerable public hospital that was surrounded by waist-deep water. There were
accounts of dozens of critically ill patients being carried up and down dark stairwells
because the elevators were not working, hospital personnel using jerry-rigged ventilators
to physically breathe for patients, family members fanning patients for hours in the
sweltering rooms, workers using buckets or plastic bags as toilets, doctors making rounds
by flashlight, personnel unable to check lab values or use electronic devices for IV
medications, patients occupying stretchers in the halls, the emergency department moving
from the first to the second floor to escape the floodwaters, personnel brushing teeth and
feeding each other with IV fluid after food ran out on Wednesday, people sleeping on the
roof to escape the heat and stench, bodies being stacked in a stairwell because the
basement morgue was both full and inaccessible and personnel feeling that the hospital
had been forgotten after telephones and electronic communication failed
(Gray & Hebert, 2006, p. 6).
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on Monday, August 29, 2005, at approximately 6 a.m. at
Buras, Louisiana. By the time the storm was over, the staff and patients of most New Orleans
area hospitals were hot and tired, but feeling a sense of relief that the worst had passed. Like
they had with most past storms, they began assessing the damage and the tasks associated with
getting their facilities back to normal. However, numerous levee breaches created extensive
flooding in New Orleans, and by Tuesday, August 30, 80% of the city was under several feet of
water. This created a critical problem for the area’s healthcare providers.
In those hours and days immediately after Katrina, affected hospitals, many of them
islands surrounded by water several feet deep, faced the need to totally evacuate their facilities.
There was no power. Elevators were out. Temperatures were at or above 100 degrees in many
facilities. There were no phones. Cell phone communication was sporadic if not nonexistent.
Most had a very limited supply of fuel, and what water and food they did have would eventually
run out. Rumors and misinformation were rampant. How do you take care of patients, some of
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them critically ill, under these dire circumstances, not to mention simultaneously caring for staff,
family members of staff, patients and even pets sheltered in your facility (Danna & Cordray,
2010)?
Dr. Gray and Dr. Hebert (2006) of the Urban Institute stated, “No other facilities house
such large concentrations of people who cannot meet their own needs, who may require ongoing
life support, and who cannot manage their own evacuation” (p. 14). This is why it is so
importantwith their primary mission of caring for and healing some of our community’s most
vulnerable citizensthat hospitals must take lessons learned from their disaster experiences
seriously and implement policy changes to prepare for and harden themselves against the next
crisis (Arendt & Hess, 2008).
Hurricane Katrina illustrated this point, perhaps more than any other domestic disaster
this country has ever faced. While hospitals in New Orleans and across the Gulf Coast did
indeed perform nobly, selflessly caring for their patients in extreme adverse conditions created
by the storm, they also presented some of the community’s most difficult challenges once
flooding made their evacuation necessary (Gray & Hebert, 2006).
Since 9/11, there have been continued efforts to improve emergency preparedness across
the nation. Among these improvements are policy development, improvement of
emergency management standards, identification of competencies needed for health care
providers, and federal and state legislation that establishes improvement for health care
workers facing inevitable disasters (Danna & Cordray, 2010, p. 229).
These major steps have positioned hospitals to perform and respond better in emergency
situations. But even with the improvements made since 9/11, the events associated with
Hurricane Katrina provided a clear, indisputable example that considerably more work was
necessary to plan and prepare for large disasters, no matter where, when or what the hazard may
be. “Never before in the U.S. has an entire city’s health care system gone down overnight”
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(Terrazas & Morales, 2006, p. 1).
Tarrazas and Morales (2006) stated traditional education and training did not prepare
hospital administrators for the following situations:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Contingency planning of such magnitude,
Patient evacuation in adverse conditions,
Maintaining patients and staff without utilities, food, and support,
Reconstitution of a health care system,
Short-range planning for health care system survival,
Rejuvenating a reimbursement system in temporary medical facilities and
Contingency medical operations (Tarrazas & Morales, 2006, p. 2).

Despite all of the negativity associated with Hurricane Katrina—the missteps, the chaos,
the many painful losses and unbelievable human suffering—the storm had at least one positive
outcome in that it served as a catalyst for improvement. “The Congressional and White House
reports, for example, emphasize the need for better advance planning, better communications,
more rapid deployment of resources and better coordination” (Gray & Hebert, 2006, p. 13).
Lessons learned have given way to improved public policy, enhanced multidisciplinary planning,
and increased collaboration and cooperation. “The private sector and government are focused on
improved communications and cooperation. Investments have been made in technology to
ensure that communications are maintained in a disaster. Legislation has been passed”
(Danna & Cordray, 2010, p. 242).
It has now been more than five years since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated the
Gulf Coast region. For the New Orleans community, Hurricane Gustav’s arrival in September
2008 provided an opportunity to test the lessons learned and the plans and preparations made
during the three years since the storms of 2005. While Gustav did not fully test those plans and
preparations, evidence indicated that New Orleans area hospitals performed well due to intensive
effort put forth in the three years since Hurricane Katrina (Arendt & Hess, 2008). In the time
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since Katrina, acute care hospitals in the New Orleans area had made significant modifications in
their preparedness plans, allowing them to be self-sufficient in some cases for up to a month
(Arendt & Hess, 2008). “At the same time, these hospitals had developed and nurtured a
regional perspective on emergency preparedness, response and recovery in the three years since
Katrina” (Arendt & Hess, p. 7). This regional planning perspective, in particular, helped
hospitals tremendously in their ability to respond to a weather threat in a logical, ordered,
coordinated manner.
U.S. Legislation Related to Disaster Preparedness and Support
The United States is no stranger to crises or tragedies. Like Katrina, the terrorist acts of
September 11, 2001, served as a vehicle for change, with the events of that day proving to our
nation’s leaders and citizens just how vulnerable we were to emergencies.
The attacks in New York City, Pennsylvania and our nation’s capital revealed frightening
gaps in our country’s ability to obtain accurate and timely intelligence reports as well as to
respond to large-scale mass casualty events and disasters. When 9/11 occurred, the U.S. wasted
no time in reorganizing and reinvesting in the manpower and resources necessary to significantly
bolster the nation’s ability to not only prevent a similar incident from happening again but also to
create the necessary infrastructure to allow for rapid response to domestic disasters.
The sheer scale of the Katrina catastrophe and the flaws as well as opportunities it
uncovered, caused doctors, hospitals and the government to take yet another long look at existing
emergency response plans for disaster. “In the years since the storm, major steps have been
taken to streamline federal disaster preparedness bureaucracies and to assess and respond more
quickly to medical needs” (O’Reilly, 2010, ¶ 4).
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 is the foremost legislation of the past decade that has
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contributed to our nation’s emergency response capabilities. This act established a Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) as an executive department in the United States government. The
Homeland Security Act united component agencies into the department, including the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Secretary of Homeland Security leads this
department and has the ultimate authority over its functions, officers, employees and reporting
units (The National Response Framework, p. 1).
It is worth remarking that the Homeland Security Act assigns certain responsibilities
specific to the U.S. National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident Management
System (NIMS). These initiatives have allowed the U.S. to create a comprehensive, national
incident management system in response to attacks and/or disasters, while working in
collaboration with federal, state and local government personnel, agencies and authorities. This
legislation enables the U.S. to respond in a clear, unified, coordinated and collaborative manner
(National Response Framework, p. 2).
Important government interventions also have included The Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. This Act details the programs and processes by which the
federal government provides disaster and emergency assistance to state and local governments,
tribal nations, eligible private nonprofit organizations and individuals affected by a declared
major disaster or emergency. The Stafford Act covers all hazards, including natural disasters and
terrorist events, and initiates a process for a governor to request that the President declare a
major disaster or emergency (National Response Framework, p. 3). These laws played a critical
role in the nation’s response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Legislation continues to be
improved and created to enhance preparedness and response efforts.
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The Joint Commission
Federal and state laws and agencies impact health care facilities’ operations where
emergency preparedness, response and support is concerned. The Joint Commission (TJC) also
plays a major role in assisting hospitals and healthcare organizations in preparing for
emergencies. TJC is an independent, non-profit organization that was founded in 1951 by the
American College of Physicians, the American Hospital Association, the American Medical
Association, and the Canadian Medical Association, in collaboration with the American College
of Surgeons to provide voluntary accreditation of health care organizations (Joint Commission,
2009). TJC has a long history of establishing performance standards that measure quality,
performance improvement and outcomes through its accreditation and certification surveys
(Danna & Cordray, 2010). Hospitals wishing to establish and/or maintain accreditation must
undergo a periodic and rigorous site visit by TJC, including an evaluation of their policies and
procedures, both of which are held to a set of detailed performance standards.
According to TJC, “It is no longer sufficient to develop disaster plans and dust them off if
a threat appears imminent. Rather, a system of preparedness across communities must be in
place every day” (Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 2003, p. 4).
In an effort to improve public policy, TJC recommends healthcare organizations pay heed
to the following recommendations when putting together their emergency plans:
(1) Enlist the community’s help in preparing the local response.
(2) Focus on key aspects of the preparedness system that will enable community health
care resources to be used in the best possible way to care for patients, protect staff
and serve the public.
(3) Establish accountabilities, supervision, leadership and continuity of community
preparedness systems (Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations, 2003, pp. 8-9).
After Hurricane Katrina, TJC obtained feedback from numerous hospitals affected by
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Katrina’s wrath. As a result, TJC has recommended hospitals focus on six critical areas of
emergency response in order to assess their needs and prepare staff to respond to events most
likely to occur regardless of the causes of an emergency situation.
The six critical areas of emergency management are as follows:
1. Communication: In the event that community infrastructure is damaged and/or
an organization’s power or facilities experience debilitation, communication
pathways, whether dependent on fiber cables, electricity, satellite or other
conduits are likely to fail. Organizations must develop a plan to maintain
communication pathways both within the organization and to critical community
resources.
2. Resources and Assets: A solid understanding of the scope and availability of an
organization’s resources and assets is as important, and perhaps more important,
during an emergency than during times of normal operation. Materials and
supplies, vendor and community services, as well as state and federal programs,
are some of the essential resources that organizations must know how to access in
times of crisis in order to ensure patient safety and sustain care, treatment and
services.
3. Safety and Security: The safety and security of patients is the prime
responsibility of the organization during an emergency. As emergency situations
develop and parameters of operability shift, organizations must provide a safe and
secure environment for their patients and staff.
4. Staff Responsibilities: During an emergency, the probability that staff
responsibilities will change is high. As new risks develop along with changing
conditions, staff will need to adapt to their roles to meet new demands on their
ability to care for patients. If staff cannot anticipate how they may be called upon
to perform during an emergency, the likelihood that the organization will not
sustain itself during an emergency increases.
5. Utilities Management: An organization is dependent on the uninterrupted
function of its facilities during an emergency. The supply of key utilities, such as
potable water, ventilation and fuel must not be disrupted or adverse events may
occur as a result.
6. Patient Clinical and Support Activities: The clinical needs of patients during
an emergency are of prime importance. The organization must have clear,
reasonable plans in place to address the needs of patients during extreme
conditions when the organization’s infrastructure and resources are taxed (TJC
EM Standards, 2011, ¶ 4).
When organizations have a thorough understanding of their plans to respond to these six
critical areas of emergency management, they have developed an “all-hazards” approach that
provides for a level of preparedness that is of adequate depth and detail to address a range of
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emergencies (TJC EM Standards, 2011).
TJC also recommended that healthcare organizations spend sufficient time “to identify
potential hazards, threats and adverse events and assess their impact on the care, treatment and
services they must sustain during an emergency. This assessment is known as a Hazard
Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) and is designed to assist organizations in gaining a realistic
understanding of their vulnerabilities and to help focus their resources and planning efforts”
(TJC, EM Standards, 2011, ¶ 4).
TJC requires accredited organizations to use the information received from the
assessments to develop their specific Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), which organizations
are required to test regularly, with lessons learned being incorporated to continuously improve
the plan (TJC, EM Standards, 2011, ¶ 5).
The National Response Framework and the National Incident Management System
The National Response Framework and the National Incident Management System also
have a bearing on how hospitals plan for and respond to emergencies. In 2005, the Department
of Homeland Security issued the National Response Framework (once known as the National
Response Plan or NRP) to provide guidance for boosting the national emergency response
process.
The NRF enhances the ability of the U.S. to prepare for and manage domestic incidents
by establishing a single, comprehensive national approach that coordinates all levels of
government and ensures cooperation with the private sector. The NRF is an all-hazards
plan under which federal resources are provided by 27 federal departments and agencies
and the American Red Cross. Resources are organized into 12 emergency support
functions (or ESFs). Each ESF is headed by a primary agency and supported by other
federal agencies as appropriate. Medical and public health resources are deployed
through the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Emergency
Preparedness as defined under ESF 8, Health and Medical Services. (American Medical
Association, p. 7)
FEMA is the primary federal agency with the responsibility for carrying out the NRF.
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The primary mission of FEMA is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the
nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism and other manmade
disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive
emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery and
mitigation (National Response Framework, p. 2).
“While the NRF provides guidance for management and coordination of federal
assistance following a disaster, a central principle of the NRF is that the local or state jurisdiction
is in charge of managing the disaster response and that federal resources work to support local
efforts” (American Medical Association, p. 7).
Another fairly recent development that has helped hospitals to respond in a more
coherent and unified manner during an emergency has been their adoption of the National
Incident Management System, sometimes referred to as NIMS or HICS (Hospital Incident
Command System), in a hospital setting. Use of NIMS is required in hospitals in order to be
eligible to receive some grant funding as well as reimbursement for disaster-related losses.
NIMS provides improved communication and coordination in an emergency and “was
developed as a comprehensive national approach to incident management, applicable at all
jurisdictional levels and across functional disciplines, to further the effectiveness of emergency
response providers and incident management organizations across a full spectrum of potential
incidents and hazard scenarios. NIMS provides for a central, unified command” (Louisiana
Hospital Emergency Preparedness and Response Network, pp. 5-6).
Advantages of using unified command:
•
•
•
•
•

A single set of objectives is developed for the entire incident.
A collective approach is used to develop strategies to achieve incident objectives.
Information flow and coordination is improved between all jurisdictions and
agencies involved in the incident.
All agencies with responsibility for the incident have an understanding of joint
priorities and restrictions.
No agency’s legal authorities will be compromised or neglected.
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•

The combined efforts of all agencies are optimized as they perform their
respective assignments under a single Incident Action Plan (Townsend, p. 70).

By using a unified command under NIMS, the collective efforts of all agencies responding to a
crisis will be more effective.
Plans and Procedures
The importance of hospitals spending time creating and practicing their emergency plans
and procedures cannot be overstated. Hurricane Katrina proved this fact not only to hospitals,
but to everyone from around the world who watched and studied the storm’s aftermath.
As a result of what was learned in the storms of 2005, TJC has placed a greater emphasis
on emergency planning and preparation in its process for obtaining and maintaining
accreditation. In fact, it is so important that TJC has devoted an entire chapter in its accreditation
manual to emergency management.
The Emergency Management (EM) chapter is organized to allow hospitals to plan to
respond to the effects of potential emergencies that fall on a continuum from disruptive to
disastrous. Planning involves those activities that must be done in order to put together a
comprehensive Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). This planning results in the EOP
document. After the EOP is in place, it must be tested through staged emergency
response exercises in order to evaluate its effectiveness. Adjustments to the EOP can
then be made (TJC, EM Standards, p. 1).
Just as important has been the adoption of NIMS by hospitals and healthcare
organizations, which by so doing are making their emergency response plans in conjunction with
broader community participation. According to a July 2006 report by the Urban Institute,
“Hurricane Katrina showed that hospitals’ advance planning had been inadequate in several
respects. First, planning was left to individual hospitals, though the disaster was area-wide.
Clearly, hospitals must be a major part of area-wide disaster and evacuation planning” (Gray &
Hebert, 2006, p.15). The importance of hospitals and healthcare providers collaborating with
their local and regional communities is key.
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Additionally, hospitals, as Katrina has abundantly shown, are highly dependent on local
infrastructure. Hospitals must make plans for the possibility that infrastructure will become nonfunctional. As stated by Gray and Hebert (2006) in their Urban Institute report,
Although the assumptions that hospitals would not be destroyed proved to be correct,
their vulnerability to the secondary consequences of the storm was not anticipated either
by governmental officials or by hospitals themselves. Katrina showed that hospitals
depend heavily on citywide infrastructure—electrical power, communications, water,
security and transportation—that can be disrupted by an area-wide disaster. Disaster
planning for hospitals must incorporate the possible loss of essential infrastructure (Gray
& Hebert, 2006, p.15).
Finally, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita also demonstrated the need to not only plan, but to
practice your plan. One example of the importance of planning dealt with evacuation of New
Orleans during Hurricane Ivan in September 2004.
The New Orleans evacuation for Katrina was facilitated by the ‘dress rehearsal,’ which
had occurred the prior summer with Hurricane Ivan. The failures of the first ‘contraflow’ traffic plan (reversing major highways so they are outbound only) had been
exposed and largely corrected. This illustrates the importance of having a disaster plan,
repeatedly rehearsing it and refining it and most importantly, paying attention to it
(Dalovisio, 2006, ¶ 4).
Training
Disaster medicine has come into the forefront since the events of September 11, 2001,
and as evidenced further with the recent earthquake and tsunami tragedies in Haiti, New Zealand
and Japan. In the current atmosphere of these types of natural, as well as man-made disasters,
hospital preparedness is a fundamental necessity. While TJC requires that all hospitals prepare
emergency management plans that should be tested at least twice per year, the effectiveness of
these drills remains to be determined (Babar & Rinker, 2005). According to Reilly &
Markenson (2009),
Despite millions of dollars in public health preparedness funds distributed to hospitals in
the U.S. each year, hospital personnel still lack appropriate training for staff in critical
knowledge areas. Regulatory agencies and professional accrediting bodies must take a
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more active role in providing hospitals with the tools necessary to comply with
mandatory and recommended preparedness standards, and to increase the quality and
availability of preparedness-related education and training for hospital workers. Without
specific and tangible guidance from national organizations, hospitals will continue to lack
the capacity to effectively respond to disasters and public health emergencies (¶ 31).
Not only is it important for hospitals and their staff to have adequate disaster preparedness and
response training, but physicians must also take the time and make the effort to obtain this
training, as well. “At a minimum, physicians should know how to plan to keep their practices
going after disaster strikes,” said Raymond E. Swienton, MD, co-director of the Section on
Emergency Medical Services, Homeland Security and Disaster Medicine at the University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center in Dallas. Since 2003, some 100,000 health
professionalsapproximately 30% of them physicianshave taken advantage of all-hazards
disaster preparedness training courses through the AMA-supported National Disaster Life
Support Foundation. “We’ve made a dent in the overall mission to adequately train enough of
the healthcare workforce,” said Dr. Swienton, who helped to develop the training courses. “It’s
only a start in the number that needs to be trained” (O’Reilly, 2010, ¶ 32).
Hurricane Katrina confirmed the need to plan and practice evacuation plans as well. Due
to the complexities of evacuation, experts recommend conducting a regional hurricane
evacuation exercise sufficient in scope to test all major elements of a hurricane evacuation plan,
with participation from state, regional, and local agencies that have hurricane emergency
preparedness responsibilities (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). “Regardless of the scale, the goal
of the exercise should be to test the effectiveness of each plan in affording the public a safe,
efficient and effective evacuation from a hurricane threat” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, p.
14).
Additionally, the exercise should test officials’ ability to respond in the areas of
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evacuation decision making, communications, public warnings, manpower/equipment
deployment, resource allocation, emergency power systems, timing of issuing an evacuation
order or advisory, shelter activation, emergency transportation and traffic control (U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers).
A post-exercise review should be conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of each plan.
Officials who participated in the exercise should also contribute to the review. Monitors
should be asked to critique the activity to which they were assigned. A critique report
should be published at the state level that documents the exercise methodology, identifies
the problem areas and recommends improvements. Areas where future preparedness
training would be beneficial should also be identified (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, p.
14).
Surge Capacity
Another important aspect of hospital and healthcare planning in the world post-9/11 and
Katrina is the development of “surge capacity” in our nation’s hospitals (TJC, 2003).
Comprehensive surge capacity plans are critical to anticipating and reacting to a mass casualty
disaster event. According to an article published in 2007 in the National Association of Public
Hospitals and Health Systems Research Brief, “Effective surge capacity requires the
coordination of multiple resources, including beds, supplies, equipment, physical structure and
staff” (National Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems, 2007, p. 1). The number of
hospital workers affects the number of operational beds a facility can operate, and
correspondingly, the number of patients that can be cared for in the hospital. Hospitals can and
do use many strategies to ensure sufficient staffing during an emergency, including providing
daycare for employees’ children, sheltering their pets, and providing access to medication
supplies for workers and their families (National Association of Public Hospitals and Health
Systems). Hospitals also are investing in identifying and credentialing volunteer staff, as well as
familiarizing employees regarding emergency preparedness equipment and protocol, how to
erect and use surge tents, and use of associated ambulatory care sites (National Association of
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Public Hospitals and Health Systems).
Evacuation
Gulf South residents focus primarily on hurricanes where emergency preparedness is
concerned, as the southeastern Atlantic coast and entire Gulf Coast of the United States is at high
and frequent risk of experiencing them. “For areas which might sustain exposure to winds of
150 mph, severe tidal surge or massive flooding, there are no structures which can be truly ‘safe’
and planned evacuation is clearly the most effective life-saving strategy” (Dalovisio, 2006, ¶ 4).
There are a variety of viewpoints as to whether a hospital should evacuate in preparation
for an incoming storm or shelter-in-place. The decision to evacuate or not clearly is one of the
most difficult a hospital administrator will ever face. The challenges of evacuating patients from
a hospital are complex and many. Here are several that, according to The Urban Institute’s 2006
report, were experienced by New Orleans hospitals during Katrina.
1. Many patients have special requirements for both transportation and an appropriate
destination. Patients who require artificial life support or who are immobilized create
their own set of issues.
2. External coordination is essential as hospital evacuation is logistically difficult.
3. Appropriate destinations must be identified for patients who are to be evacuated,
particularly those with critical care needs.
4. Evacuated patients must be accompanied by their medical records.
5. A system for tracking evacuees is necessary.
6. That many patients had family members with them was both a benefit and a
complication; however, those same family members wanted to be evacuated along
with their relatives which complicated the situation.
7. In a crisis, hospitals become magnets for people who want to help or who are seeking
refuge. Decisions must be made in advance how a possible influx of refugees will be
handled.
8. Advance agreement is needed among key parties about which patients will be
evacuated first (Gray & Hebert, 2006, pp. 16-18).
With those challenges in mind, there are a number of resources and publications available to
hospitals to help them plan should they be faced with an evacuation need.
One such publication is the Hospital Evacuation Decision Guide, published by the
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Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). The Guide, provides “hospital
evacuation decision teams with organized and systematic guidance on how to consider the many
factors that bear on the decision to order an evacuation,” and “assists decision teams in
identifying some of the special situations, often overlooked, that may exist in their facility or
geographic area that could affect the decision to evacuate” (AHRQ, 2010, p. 1). The Guide does
not offer a standard evacuation plan or response as “No single formula or algorithm could
possibly capture all of the nuances involved in the decision or the myriad different disaster
scenarios that may lead to a hospital evacuation” (AHRQ, 2010, p. 1). Alternately, the Guide is
intended to supplement existing hospital emergency plans which frequently lack specific
guidance on how to make an evacuation decision, including what factors to consider and for
what period of time the decision may be safely postponed. Nor does the Guide recommend best
practices “for carrying out an evacuation or for sheltering-in-place during and after a disaster
other than to stress the critical need for comprehensive plans for both evacuating patients and for
sheltering-in-place” (AHRQ, 2010, p. 1).
There are several helpful tools in the Guide, including a Pre-Disaster Assessment of
Critical Infrastructure, that emphasizes critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, such as municipal
water, steam, electricity, natural gas, boilers/chillers, powered life support equipment,
information technology and telecommunications, and security (AHRQ, 2010). “The focus is on
environmental systems (HVAC), water, and electricity because they are critical for hospital
operations, and their loss for an extended period invariably triggers a need for evacuation”
(AHRQ, 2010, p. 2).
The Guide defines pre-event evacuations as those “undertaken in advance of an
impending disaster, when the hospital structure and surrounding environment are not yet
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significantly compromised,” and post-event evacuations as those which are “carried out after a
disaster has caused substantial damage to a hospital or the surrounding community” (AHRQ,
2010, p. 2). The Guide also discusses in detail the sequence in which patients should be
evacuated, suggesting “the most medically fragile and resource-intensive are usually evacuated
first, as soon as appropriate transportation and staff are available” (AHRQ, 2010, p. 3). “In cases
where all patients are in immediate danger and evacuation must be conducted as quickly as
possible, the evidence suggests that the most mobile patients should be evacuated first” (AHRQ,
2010, p. 3).
The Guide also distinguishes between ‘Advanced Warning Events’ and ‘No Advanced
Warning Events.’ “With Advanced Warning Events, like hurricanes, decision teams have time
prior to the event to make evacuation decisions. With earthquakes and tornadoes—No Advanced
Warning Events—decisions must be made quickly, either during the disaster or immediately
after” (AHRQ, 2010, p. 6).
The Guide offers decision-making ways to calculate how long a hospital can shelter-inplace if critical infrastructure is damaged. “For example, how long could the hospital maintain a
safe temperature without city water during the summer months, and how long could essential
power be maintained with only the current on-site fuel supply” (AHRQ, 2010, p. 13)?
Pre- and post-Katrina dialogue on whether it is better to move critically ill patients or not
with an impending storm is continuing. According to a story in American Medical News,
Doctors and hospitals are rethinking their approach to moving critically ill patients such
as those dependent on ventilators. Pre-Katrina, the rule was to keep these patients in
place. That’s because most believed that the danger of moving them could be greater
than leaving them in a hospital hit by disaster. But, as hospitals lost power after Katrina,
many of these patients had to be ventilated by hand for hours or even days. The sickest
did not survive the dehydration caused by days with limited water and no air conditioning
(O’Reilly, 2010, ¶ 21).
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Therefore, the quandary of whether to move critically ill patients continues to trouble physicians
who are responsible for making these decisions.
Dr. James B. Aiken, clinical associate professor of emergency medicine at the LSU
School of Medicine “was at New Orleans’ Charity Hospital during the Aug. 29, 2005 hurricane
and now is the director of emergency preparedness at the Louisiana State University Health
Sciences Center” (O’Reilly, 2010, ¶ 9). “For the patients who are critically ill, the risk of
evacuating them, based on what we know now, is worth taking,” Dr. Aiken said. “It’s worth
risking their lives to put them through the logistics of evacuation rather than sheltering them in
place knowing that once something’s happened, we may not be able to get them out quickly”
(O’Reilly, 2010, ¶ 24). Making the decision to evacuate also largely depends on the availability
of transportation assets. And not just any transportation assets, but those that are equipped and
staffed to handle the special needs of fragile hospital patients who are ill or injured.
An emergency evacuation of special needs populations requires close coordination
among the local and state emergency management agencies, federal resources, private
organizations (non-government organizations) and transportation agencies. Conveyances
used for evacuation include automobiles, buses, trains, boats and even airplanes and
helicopters. Each community will have access to specific modes of transportation, and
all transportation resources—public, private, and non-governmental—should be
considered in evacuation planning and operations. This may include, for example, airport
shuttle vans, buses from faith-based organizations, school buses, and paratransit vehicles.
In addition, it will be critical to consider specific modes of transportation resources and
commitments for use will be highly valuable during an emergency to avoid competition
for resources. To do this, emergency managers must bring together first responders,
transportation organizations and others that can assist during evacuation
(Federal Highway Administration, 2009, p. 3).
When local and regional transportation plans prove inadequate, in may be necessary, as
during Katrina, for the federal government to conduct large-scale logistical operations that
supplement and, if necessary, replace state and local logistical systems by leveraging resources
within both the public sector and the private sector (Townsend, 2006, p. 56).
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According to Wolshon et al. (2005),
Development of standards and best practice guidelines are also needed. While it is
recognized that evacuation plans need to allow room for flexibility, generic checklists
and guidelines could benefit state and local level Department of Transportation and
Emergency Management officials in the development of specific plans. They would also
ensure a basic level of practice uniformity from location to location, an issue that has
gained importance as evacuations become more regionalized (Wolshon et al., 2005,
p.140).
Human Resources
The availability and quality of a hospital’s human resources are critical anytime, but
especially so during disaster or emergency operations. Hospitals need to have a solid team in
place that is capable of making and carrying out difficult decisions and tasks in an environment
rife with ambiguity. Few would dispute the importance of having strong leadership and a welldesigned disaster plan. Having the right number of staff is also critical. There should be not
only enough people in diverse areas of specialty to ride out the storm and care for the current
patient census but also a similar team of staff to relieve once the emergency has passed. Tulane
University Medical Center in New Orleans, as a lesson learned from Katrina, reduced its “patient
population and staff on hand to as small as possible. In the run up to Hurricane Gustav, they did
this by postponing elective procedures, sheltering-in-place those patients who were too ill to be
safely moved and transporting less fragile patients to other facilities during the calm before the
storm” (Osterweil, 2008, ¶ 5).
Facilities also need to plan for the effect that traumatic stress can have on its staff. As
was learned in the days and weeks following Katrina, “The psychological toll of a disaster to
hospital personnel can be significant, and psychological help during the post-disaster period
should be provided” (Babar & Rinker, 2006, p. 3).
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Communication
Most would agree that lack of communication after Hurricane Katrina was one of the
most significant challenges hospitals had to cope with in the storm’s aftermath. Emergency
planners in healthcare organizations across the country took heed of the communications crisis
caused by the flooding in New Orleans post-Katrina.
The second and perhaps most dramatic lesson we learned as a medical institution and as a
community was the importance of retaining communication with our local and state
authorities, other local health care institutions, our patients and our employees. . . All of
the New Orleans hospitals desperately needed to communicate with each other about
critical needs for supplies, police or military security, hospital evacuation urgencies or
even to tell other hospitals that they had the capacity to take patients and help out their
colleagues. This underscored the need for some type of rapid deployment of a military
infrastructure with some rapidly deployable fail-safe communication system and a central
command structure to deal with police, fire and medical logistical emergencies
(Dalovisio, 2006, ¶ 5).
Communication is a key investment area for healthcare organizations seeking to create
reliable and redundant capabilities in their facilities. From satellite phones to amateur (HAM)
radio operators, hospitals have secured numerous mechanisms to help them to keep in touch with
the outside world, including police and fire departments among others. Communications allow
for situational awareness during an emergency, assist with command and control functions and
contribute to the overall management of the response effort (Babar & Rinker, 2006).
Much has been learned about the life-saving value of communications as a result of the
terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City during 2001, as well during the days after
Katrina. As a result, the U.S. government has enacted laws to address this important resource
and its availability and organization during emergencies.
Title XVIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, required the Department
of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) to develop
a National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) that provides long- and short-term
guidance to address national emergency communications deficiencies. National studies,
assessments, and after-action reports from September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, and
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other natural and manmade disasters in the last decade have underscored the critical need
for improved emergency communications nationwide (DHS & NECP, 2008, ¶ 1).
Therefore, Congress directed the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) to
develop the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) in cooperation with a variety of
stakeholders, including:
•
•
•
•

federal departments and agencies;
state, local and tribal governments;
emergency responders;
and the private sector (DHS, FAQs, n.d., ¶ 3).

The NECP was developed to be consistent with overarching Homeland Security
preparedness and response doctrine. This includes the National Response Framework
(NRF) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National
Preparedness Guidelines and Target Capabilities List, which combine to form a unified
structure for response and recovery efforts. The NECP establishes goals, objectives, and
initiatives for interoperable and operable emergency communications that will support
incident management (DHS, FAQs, n.d., ¶ 19).
“The vision of the NECP is to ensure that emergency response personnel at all levels of
government, across disciplines, can communicate as needed, on demand and as authorized. To
achieve this vision, the NECP identifies the capabilities and initiatives needed for
communications operability, interoperability and continuity of communications for emergency
responders nationwide” (DHS & NECP, 2008, ¶ 2).
It is also important to note that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has
enacted a change in its rules regarding amateur radio operations during a disaster.
Specifically, we amend the rules to permit amateur radio operators to transmit messages,
under certain limited circumstances, during either government-sponsored or nongovernment sponsored emergency and disaster preparedness drills, regardless of whether
the operators are employees of entities participating in the drill. Although public safety
land mobile radio systems are the primary means of radio-based communications for
emergency responders, experience has shown that amateur radio has played an important
role in preparation for, during and in the aftermath of, natural and manmade emergencies
and disasters (FCC, 2010, ¶ 1).
Local governments and hospitals that have not done so should test and upgrade their
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communication systems to the greatest degree possible in conjunction with conducting
compatibility checks with state, national and emergency systems (Guin et al., 2009). Ideally,
local and state government should develop their communication plan together to ensure
consistency with national and emergency organization plans, testing and revising the plan
annually, with a backup plan as well (Guin et al., 2009). Communication methods to consider
are two-way radios, text messaging capabilities, satellite phones and PDAs (Guin et al., 2009).
Supplies and Pharmaceuticals
“A common thread among hospitals ravaged by Andrew or Katrina is the need to be selfsustaining during a disaster—with enough generator power, water, food and supplies—for much
longer than previously thought” (Colias, 2005, ¶ 45). Those hospitals who have experienced
directly the effects of a recent hurricane know about the importance of self-sufficiency all too
well and are taking steps to become more so as they plan for future hurricane seasons.
Baptist Health South Florida in Coral Gables is working toward a new standard for each
of its six hospitals (including Homestead). Seven days of sustainability, up from three
days now. CEO Brian Keeley says the Hurricane Katrina disaster reinforced the need to
move forward on the plan (Colias, 2005, ¶ 46).
Hospital emergency planning must incorporate detailed preparation regarding supplies
and medications that will be needed during a worst case scenario, identifying those which will
allow them to be self-sustaining during a catastrophic event (Guin et al., 2009). Additionally,
hospitals must consider and plan for a backup communication/transportation strategy to get
supplies (Guin et al., 2009). Therefore, many hospitals are contractually pre-arranging with
vendors and suppliers to plan ways to get medication and supplies to their medical facilities for
patients, first responders, emergency workers, and law enforcement personnel (Guin et al.,
2009).
Where pharmaceuticals are specifically concerned, a system called Rx Response has
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proven to be a successful way to help to get medicines to facilities that need them most.
Rx Response was created by members of the biopharmaceutical supply system to help
ensure the continued flow of medicine to patients following a severe public health
emergency. The program’s inspiration arose from a key lesson taught by Katrina: the
lack of a single point of contact between public health officials and the biopharmaceutical
supply system hindered effective communication and coordination. In some cases,
shipments of medicine were not allowed past security checkpoints which delayed the
availability of medicine for patients. In other instances, efforts by public health officials
to learn about the status of medicine shipments and supply required dozens of phone calls
to individuals who did not always have the necessary information (Forrer, 2010, ¶ 2).
Another important development in the Katrina-inspired Rx Response Program came
during the 2008 hurricane season when Rx Response officials realized after Hurricanes
Gustav and Ike how important their status reports detailing which pharmacies had reopened were to emergency management officials. The new reports gave public health
officials the first of its kind status reports about a vital public health asset that had
restored its service to the public. The reports also enabled emergency room workers to
send people in need of prescriptions to available pharmacies (Forrer, 2010, ¶12).
Fuel and Power
For a number of reasons, it is critically important for hospitals to have access to power
during and after a hurricane. Life-saving technology, equipment, heating, and ventilation
systems are dependent upon a reliable source of power to run. Many Gulf Coast hospitals have
learned just how valuable generators and diesel fuel are in keeping a facility and all of its
essential equipment up and running. Consequently, hospitals have spent much effort and
resources into locating their generators safely above the flood plain, upgrading their generators
and making certain they have adequate fuel to power them (Guin et al., 2009).
Today, hospitals like Tulane University Medical Center in New Orleans, have generators
that are either located above flood stage or are housed in watertight casings with enough fuel to
last at least one week at full capacity. Robert Lynch, MD, Chief Executive Officer of Tulane
University Medical Center explained, “We have enough generator capacity to run everything—
air conditioning and all equipment—we can run the operation basically normally and stretch it
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out a little further by turning off certain areas of the hospital which we can do with only 400
people” (Osterweil, 2008, ¶ 13).
Medical Records
One lesson learned from Hurricane Katrina was the need to develop an electronic medical
record system. Many patients who were transferred to other facilities did not have complete
records with them when they arrived, causing an interruption in their care. Also, those
ambulatory patients who were able to get to shelters in neighboring cities and states often did not
have records regarding their diagnoses or medications, also causing them health-related
problems. These problems were particularly severe for cancer patients and others with rare or
chronic conditions. As well, stringent policies and laws must be developed to enable appropriate
medical personnel to access anyone’s medical information during a disaster, while deterring
inappropriate persons from violating privacy policies and laws.
“One clear lesson: the nation urgently needs an electronic patient health record. We
want to put in place a system that is responsive to any disaster but also to patients’ daily needs.
Patients need a continuity of care record they can carry with them on a diskette” (Eastman, 2006,
¶ 3).
“I’m not sure we would have paid as close attention to medical records had we not
experienced evacuees from Katrina,” acknowledged Karen Sexton, then Chief Executive Officer
of the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) in Galveston, Texas. UTMB took in 50 to
60 patients displaced from that storm. Some were receiving chemotherapy and radiation
treatment, but without records, UTMB physicians had no idea where they were in the cycle”
(Weinstock, 2005, ¶ 6).
While experts agreed that a national protocol for automated record-keeping should be
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developed, in the meantime, “citizens should be educated to keep copies of prescriptions,
insurance and medical information, including maintenance of a copy with someone in another
location, especially those individuals with critical medical needs” (Guin et al., 2009, pp. 103104).
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CHAPTER 3.
METHOD
The purpose of the research study was to review the experiences of nine Gulf Coast
hospitals located in Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas and to determine how they are managing
crisis preparedness in their institutions, what they have learned since Hurricane Katrina and other
significant storms, and ways they are applying that knowledge. Their lessons learned have the
ability to inform healthcare providers nationally and internationally as institutions craft
emergency preparedness plans in efforts to be ready when the next crisis strikes. This study
sought to share what strategies worked, as well as those that may need modification, in terms of
specific response to recent Gulf Coast storms. In addition, this study explored new, untested
strategies now being considered or implemented by hospitals to increase organizational
effectiveness in maintaining critical, life-sustaining patient care. The study attempted to answer
the following question:
What strategies are hospitals in coastal Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas using in
their emergency preparedness plans five years since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to
facilitate their ability to respond more effectively under crisis conditions and to
maintain critical patient care operations?
Qualitative Research Design
This study was a qualitative research design. A major feature of this type of research
design is that it was focused “on naturally occurring, ordinary events in natural settings,
enabling the researcher to vividly describe what ‘real life’ is like in that particular setting”a
hospital managing in crisis circumstances, for instance (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 10). The
fact that data collection took place in the natural setting also contributed to the groundedness of
the information.
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Qualitative methods consist of three kinds of data collection: (1) in-depth, open-ended
interviews; (2) direct observation; and (3) written documents. The data from the
interviews consist of direct quotations from people about their experiences, opinions,
feelings, and knowledge. The data from observations consist of detailed descriptions of
people’s activities, behaviors, actions, and the full range of interpersonal interactions and
organizational processes that are part of observable human experience. Document
analysis in qualitative inquiry yields excerpts, quotations, or entire passages from
organizational, clinical, or program records; memoranda and correspondence; official
publications and reports; personal diaries; and open-ended written responses to
questionnaires and surveys (Patton, 1990, p. 10).
Through interviews and continuing dialogue with the participants in their home settings, as
opposed to a mail or phone survey, the researcher solicited the participants’ specific knowledge,
perspectives and interpretation of the phenomenon of study.
Aside from studying real-world situations in their native environments, qualitative
analysis is characterized by embracing a holistic perspectiveattempting to understand the
entire phenomenon as a complex system that is more than the sum of its parts (Patton, 1990).
Additionally, qualitative analysis yields detailed, thick descriptions that capture personal points
of view and experiences (Patton, 1990). Working in the field, obtaining firsthand accounts in
informal conversations and formal interviews provides a level of personal contact and insight for
the researcher which results in a greater understanding of the phenomenon under study (Patton,
1990).
The ability to discover and apply this “richness and holism” to complex subject matter
e.g., conducting emergency operations in healthcare facilitiesprovided a clearer understanding
of decisions made during times of crisis, including which processes were implemented and why
they were implemented. Qualitative data allowed the researcher to go beyond providing merely
a snapshot of a situation. Rather, the data allowed the researcher to impart a deeper, clearer
understanding of what actually took place and what decisions were made and acted upon in a
hospital during a weather-related emergency or other crisis (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
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Phenomenological Approach to Data Collection and Analysis
This study was a qualitative research study using the phenomenological lens and the
modified van Kaam (Moustakas, 1994) method of analyzing phenomenological data.
“Phenomenological research is a strategy of inquiry in which the researcher identifies the
essence of human experiences about a phenomenon as described by participants” (Creswell,
2009, p. 13). “Understanding the lived experiences marks phenomenology as a philosophy as
well as a method, and the procedure involves studying a small number of subjects through
extensive and prolonged engagement to develop patterns and relationships of meaning”
(Moustakas, 1994, as cited by Creswell, 2009, p. 13).
As a research philosophy, phenomenology focuses on the essence of lived experience
(Rossman & Rallis, 2003). “Those engaged in phenomenological research focus in-depth on the
meaning of a particular aspect of experience, assuming that through dialogue and reflection the
quintessential meaning of the experience will be reviewed” (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, p. 97).
Patton (1990) also described a phenomenological study as “one that focuses on descriptions of
what people experience and how it is that they experience what they experience” (p.71).
The theoretical groundings for phenomenology are rooted in the beliefs of Descartes,
who “doubted the reality of external perceptions based solely on studies of bodies in space, and
thus recognized that knowledge also emerged from self-evidence,” and Immanuel Kant, who
believed that “knowledge of objects resides in the subjective sources of the self” (Moustakas,
1994, pp. 43-44). These kinds of ideas led the way for the development of phenomenology by
the German philosopher, Edmund H. Husserl (1859-1938) (Patton, 1990, p. 69). Husserl sought
to develop “a rigorous science based on philosophy, sound perceptions, ideas, and judgments”
(Moustakas, 1994, p. 45). Husserl’s “most basic philosophical assumption was that we can only
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know what we experience by attending to perceptions and meanings that awaken our conscious
awareness. Initially, all our understanding comes from sensory experience of phenomena, but
that experience must be described, explicated and interpreted” (Patton, 1990, p. 69). Husserl’s
phenomenology “emphasizes subjectivity and discovery of the essences of experience and
provides a systematic and disciplined methodology” for discovering knowledge.
(Moustakas, 1994, p. 45).
Through dialogue and reflection, the researcher described the “lived experiences” of
selected hospital administrative decision-makers and support staff, relative to preparations made
before, during and after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and other significant storms.
Phenomenology was well suited for this study, as the researcher desired to gather
participants’ comprehensive descriptions from their individual, real-world experiences. The
researcher illustrated commonalities among the participants’ experiences in regard to the
phenomenon, with the goal of reducing their unique experiences to a summation of their
quintessential essence (Rossman & Rallis, 2003).
According to Moustakas (1994), a phenomenological inquiry involves several steps,
primarily “Epoche” and “Phenomenological Reduction.” In the Epoche, we “set aside our
prejudgments, biases and preconceived ideas about things” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 85). Moustakas
(1994) saw it as a “preparation for deriving new knowledge but also as an experience in itself, a
process of setting aside predilections, prejudices, predispositions, and allowing things, events,
and people to enter anew into consciousness and to look and see them again, as if for the first
time” (p. 85).
The steps of Phenomenological Reduction include: Bracketing, in which the focus of the
research is placed in brackets, everything else is set aside so that the entire research
process is rooted solely on the topic and question; horizonalizing, every statement
initially is treated as having equal value. Later, statements irrelevant to the topic and
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question as well as those that are repetitive or overlapping are deleted, leaving only the
Horizons (the textural meanings and invariant constituents of the phenomenon);
Clustering the Horizons Into Themes; and Organizing the Horizons and Themes Into a
Coherent Textural Description of the phenomenon. (Moustakas, 1994, p. 97)
To expound, invariant constituents “point to the unique qualities of an experience, those
that stand out” (Anastoos, 1987, p.141, as cited by Moustakas, 1994, p. 128). Individual textural
descriptions are “vivid descriptions of the experience” and individual structural descriptions
“provide a vivid account for the underlying dynamics of the experience” (Anastoos, 1987, as
cited by Moustakas, 1994, p. 128). “The structures are brought into the researcher’s awareness
through imaginative variation, reflection and analysis, beyond the appearance and into the real
meanings or essences of the experience” (Copen, 1993, p. 65, as cited by Moustakas, 1994, p.
135).
Through this study, the researcher strove to experience epoche in advance of conducting
interviews with study participants. Phenomenological reduction occurred once interview
transcripts were available and as the study was unfolding.
Moustakas, in citing principles of “transcendental phenomenology,” described the
investigator as having a “personal interest” in the entities under investigation, providing an
autobiographical aspect to the study (Moustakas, 1994, as cited by Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2009,
p. 255). This aspect was a fitting description of the researcher for this study, who worked in a
hospital setting for 16 years and was, therefore, familiar with basic hospital operations,
administration and policy, as well as implementing crisis command operations in a medical
facility.
Reliability and Validity
“Without rigor, research is worthless, becomes fiction, and loses its utility. Hence, a
great deal of attention is applied to reliability and validity in all research methods”
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(Morse et al., 2002, p. 1). Scholars have developed thorough, comprehensive standards for
demonstrating the rigor, authenticity and trustworthiness of qualitative research. “In an everincreasing number of textbooks, guidelines for qualitative researchers recommend rigor in
sampling, data collection, and analysis; triangulation of data sources, methods investigators, and
theories; the need to search for negative cases; and the use of ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973,
as cited by Pyett, 2003, p. 1171) and detailed reporting as we document our accounts.
Qualitative researchers also need to heed and adopt policies of openness, honesty and
reflexivity” (Hagey, 1997; Marshall, 1990; as cited by Pyett, 2003, p. 1171).
Acknowledging the differences between qualitative and quantitative inquiry, Guba and
Lincoln (1981) substituted for reliability and validity the corresponding term “trustworthiness,”
composed of four key components: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability
(Morse et al., 2002, p. 1).
Credibility involves establishing that the qualitative research results are credible.
Transferability is defined as the “degree to which the results of qualitative research can be
generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings” (http://www.socialresearchmethods
.net/kb/qualval.php). Dependability is concerned with the researcher accounting for changes that
occur in the research setting and how those changes affect the way the researcher approaches the
study. Confirmability refers to the degree to which the results of the study can be confirmed by
others (http://www.socialresearchmethods. net/kb/qualval.php). Within each of these
components are “specific methodological strategies for demonstrating qualitative rigor, such as
the audit trail, member checks when coding, categorizing, or confirming results with participants,
peer debriefing, negative case analysis, structural corroboration, and referential material
adequacy” (Morse et al., 2002, p. 1).
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According to Patton (1990), the credibility issue for qualitative inquiry depends on three
distinct but related inquiry elements:
1. rigorous techniques and methods for gathering high-quality data that is carefully
analyzed, with attention to issues of validity, reliability and triangulation;
2. the credibility of the researcher, which is dependent on training, experience, track
record, status, and presentation of self; and
3. philosophical belief in the phenomenological paradigm, that is, a fundamental
appreciation of naturalistic inquiry, qualitative methods, inductive analysis, and
holistic thinking (Patton, 1990, p. 461).
“The qualitative researcher has an obligation to be methodical in reporting sufficient
details of data collection and the processes of analysis to permit others to judge the quality of the
resulting product” (Patton, 1990, p. 462). In analyzing data, the qualitative researcher must
continually examine and check his or her work again and again, evaluating the way he or she is
interpreting and explaining the data, taking into consideration the academic literature as well as
the nuances of the particular population being studied; consistently review the method of
analysis for technical and intellectual rigor; and enlist the help of outside stakeholders who can
provide an unbiased viewpoint (Pyett, 2003).
This researcher used triangulation, participant validation and peer debriefing to provide
additional credibility and dependability for the study at hand. “By combining multiple
observers, theories, methods and data sources,” researchers can attempt to “overcome the
intrinsic bias that comes from single-method, single-observer, and single-theory studies”
(Denzin, 1989, p. 307). This researcher used triangulation of data sources, “comparing and crosschecking the consistency of information derived at different times and by different means within
qualitative methods” (Patton, 1990, p. 467). To ensure additional technical rigor and
convergence of information, the researcher utilized the strategy of having independent analysts
review the same qualitative data, comparing their findings as well as asking informants to
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provide feedback on whether conclusions are accurate (Creswell, 1994).
Finally, according to Patton (1990), “Because the researcher is the instrument in
qualitative inquiry, a qualitative report must include information about the researcher” (p. 472).
Patton asked, “What experience, training and perspective does the researcher bring to the field?
What personal connections does the researcher have to the people, program, or topic studied?”
(p. 472).
The Researcher’s Lens
“Qualitative research depends, at every stage, and particularly for its validity (Reason,
1981, as cited by Pyett, 2003, p. 1172), on the skills, training, insights, and capabilities of the
researcher” (Patton, 1990, as cited by Pyett, 2003, p. 1172). “For better or worse, the
trustworthiness of the data is tied directly to the trustworthiness of the evaluator who collects and
analyzes the data” (Patton, 1990, p. 476).
“Because the researcher is the instrument in qualitative inquiry, a qualitative report must
include information about the researcher” (Patton, 1990, p. 472). Therefore, what experience
and training does the researcher bring to the study? How is the researcher personally or
professionally connected to the research question being studied? (Patton, 1990)
This researcher’s professional training is in the field of communications, public relations
and marketing as well as in business administration, with the first 16 years of her career spent
working in hospital administration. Specifically, the researcher’s hospital experience included
work at a small, for-profit suburban facility; a large, urban, religious-affiliated facility; and a
governmental, mid-sized, suburban, acute care facility. As a result, the researcher is familiar
with the many complex challenges related to providing high-quality healthcare to a community.
The researcher’s years of experience working in healthcare administration as a member of the
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executive team, helping to recruit and establish new physicians, assisting in the start-up and
marketing of new services and facilities, managing and being held accountable for budgets,
contributing to the creation of strategic plans, monitoring patient satisfaction, handling media
relations and spokesperson duties, engaging in and actively participating in community activities
and serving on community boardsall combined to help establish trust, confidence and
credibility between this researcher and study participants. The researcher also has experience in
managing organizational planning and response to crisis gained through her career in the
healthcare field by riding out storms such as Hurricane Andrew, in a hospital (1992); as well as
more recent experiences working in communications in a four-year research university with
28,000 plus students. This experience includes managing the university’s communication
response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Gustav.
In addressing the generalization of the results of this specific naturalistic study, this
researcher agrees with two viewpoints as stated by Guba (1978) and Cronbach et al., (1980), as
cited by Patton, 1990.
Guba (1978: 70) proposed that “the evaluator should do what he can to establish the
generalizability of his findings. . . .Often naturalistic inquiry can establish at least the
‘limiting cases’ relevant to a given situation. But in the spirit of naturalistic inquiry, he
should regard each possible generalization only as a working hypothesis, to be tested
again in the next encounter and again in the encounter after that. For the naturalistic
inquiry evaluator, premature closure is a cardinal sin, and tolerance of ambiguity a
virtue” (Patton, 1990, p. 488).
The view of Cronbach et al. (1980: 231-35 as cited by Patton, 1990) toward
generalizability is in the spirit of putting research results to good use following the completion of
a study. Cronbach et al. preferred use of the term “extrapolation” rather than “generalization.”
Cronbach et al. “argue against experimental designs that are so focused on carefully controlling
cause and effect that the findings are largely irrelevant beyond that highly controlled
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experimental situation. On the other hand, they are equally concerned about entirely
idiosyncratic case studies that yield little of use beyond the case study setting (Cronbach et al.,
1980: 231-35, as cited by Patton, 1990, p. 489). “Extrapolations are logical, thoughtful and
problem oriented rather than statistical and probabilistic” (Patton, 1990, p. 489). It is the hope of
this researcher that stakeholders in the healthcare arena are able to apply logically some of the
information, knowledge and insight “extrapolated” from this study.
Population and Sample of the Study
The sampling strategy used for this research study was purposive. Purposive sampling
techniques involve selecting certain units or cases “based on a specific purpose rather than
randomly” (Tashakkori, & Teddlie, as cited by Tashakkori & Teddlie, p. 173).
In this study, the researcher used a number of criteria in selecting a small, but
representative, group of participants. “Qualitative researchers usually work with small samples
of people nested in their context and studied in depth” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 27).
Because the depth, breadth and richness of information these participants provided was so
critical to the study, selection criteria were exceptionally important. The quality of the research
participant and his or her contribution to the study was of greater importance and relevance than
the quantity of research participants (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
This researcher used purposive, multiple-case sampling techniques to choose an
appropriate participant panel. “Multiple case sampling adds confidence to findings. By looking
at a range of similar and contrasting cases, we can understand a single-case finding, grounding it
by specifying how and where, and if possible, why it carries on as it does” (Miles & Huberman,
1994, p. 29). In addition to selecting a group of “typical cases,” hospitals representative of the
types, sizes and locations of facilities, the researcher also deliberately sampled “extreme or
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deviant cases,” e.g., facilities that experienced significant flooding and loss of running water and
utilities, as well as one institution that completed a full-blown, total patient evacuation prior to a
hurricane’s landfall. An additional “reputational case selection” interview participant included a
high-ranking healthcare association executive (Goetz & Lecompte, 1984, as cited by Miles &
Huberman, 1994, p. 28).
All hospitals were located on the Gulf Coast of Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas.
Hospitals were selected to represent each of the three coastal states. Selected facilities were a
mixture of large and small (based on bed size), community or tertiary, urban and suburban,
teaching and non-teaching, profit (proprietary) and not-for-profit (governmental, private or
religious). The researcher selected individuals from each institution, typically the chief
executive officer and either the director of emergency preparedness/facility director or chief
nursing officer or their equivalent, each of whom represented and had knowledge of the research
topic.
The researcher interviewed the chief executive officer (or equivalent) for that individual’s
ability to provide a broad overview of the hospital’s experience and preparation pre- and postHurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav and Ike. The researcher selected and interviewed hospital
emergency preparedness directors, chief nursing officers or their equivalents to provide a more
well-rounded view of their experiences in addition to obtaining their critical observations
regarding plans, policies and procedures relevant to preparing their specific institution for
emergencies and crisis. The researcher specifically interviewed these two types of individuals to
contrast decision-makers who served as incident commanders in their facilities to those primarily
responsible for handling logistical duties.
The researcher, through previous experience in the field, had former colleagues who were
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instrumental in helping her select and contact individuals for the study. Research participants
were solicited by phone and electronic mail to request their participation. The researcher
selected participants based on their having worked during one or more hurricanes at their
respective institutions within the past five years. This allowed for optimum sharing of rich, vivid
pre- and post-Katrina experiences, of the extreme circumstances in which they found themselves,
and of the unique operational challenges they faced.
Data Collection
This study consisted of informal, one-time, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews to
obtain narrative, digitally-recorded “lived experiences” related to participants’ pre- and postKatrina experiences and views.
The subject pool consisted of representatives from nine hospitals in Louisiana,
Mississippi and Texas, and included chief executive officers (or their equivalent), who provided
top management’s perspective, as well as institutional emergency preparedness managers/facility
director (or their equivalent) to supply a “front-line” viewpoint. The researcher also interviewed
a high-ranking healthcare association executive who had significant experience in managing and
leading healthcare facilities as well as assisting hospitals’ statewide response to a hurricane
emergency. A purposive sampling strategy was used, with each interview participant having
worked during one or more hurricanes during the past five years. This ensured that the
participants had relevant, information-rich experiences for the purpose of this study.
The researcher arranged to meet with each participant for a period of approximately one
hour at his or her office in his or her respective facility. Each participant was asked to read and
sign a consent form. The Internal Review Board (IRB) of Louisiana State University granted
approval to conduct this study, with the understanding that the study was voluntary and with
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participants having the ability to discontinue their participation in the study or ask that their
interview be withdrawn at any time (LSU IRB # E5086). The researcher explained the
confidentiality of information to each participant, making each aware that neither their name nor
the name of their institution would appear in the researcher’s dissertation.
Prior to each interview, the researcher sent via electronic mail the research proposal and
the conceptual framework of the study. The researcher verbally confirmed the informed consent
of each participant regarding participation and the digital recording of the meeting. Once the
researcher obtained informed consent, the researcher proceeded with meeting the participant and
conducting the interview, soliciting verbal responses to a pre-designed set of questions. The
researcher took detailed field notes both as the interview was progressing, as well as after the
interview was concluded, noting particulars about the setting, body language of the participant
and other pertinent facts and information. When the interview was complete, the researcher
requested that the participant send to the researcher any pertinent hospital emergency plans,
policies, procedures, organizational charts, photographs, videos, demographic information or
other related media that will further support this study. A transcriptionist transcribed the digital
audio files of each interview according to guidelines established by Louisiana State University’s
IRB. The researcher sent each participant their respective transcript for review and debriefing
and allowed the opportunity to correct the transcripts for accuracy.
The interview process continued until saturation was achieved and the researcher was
satisfied that data collection was complete. “Data saturation entails bringing new participants
continually into the study until the data set is complete, as indicated by data replication or
redundancy. In other words, saturation is reached when the researcher gathers data to the point
of diminishing returns, when nothing new is being added (Bowen, 2008, p. 140). “For their part,
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Morse et al. (2002, p. 12) pointed to the purpose of data saturation: ‘Saturating data ensures
replication in categories; replication verifies, and ensures comprehension and completeness’”
(Bowen, 2008, p. 140).
In addition to data collected primarily through interviews, the researcher also relied on
information obtained through an exhaustive review of the literature regarding pre- and postKatrina emergency planning and lessons learned in hospitals on the Gulf Coast.
Interview questions were determined based on a conceptual framework prepared by the
researcher. Each of the interview questions was supportive of informing the framework in a
meaningful way.
Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework (p. 56) identified the primary categories of focus in the study.
The researcher chose representative hospitals and identified study participants from each of the
respective facilities. Interviews concentrated on discussions of emergency policies and
procedures (including evacuation and sheltering-in-place), reviewing critical experiences, lessons
learned and major innovations adopted. The researcher also questioned participants regarding
management of human resources and investment in preparedness equipment and supplies.
Facilities’ commitment to providing training and practice drills was discussed, as well as how
hospitals evaluate and improve their performance following weather-related emergency events.
This evaluation process, as indicated by the series of arrows in the framework, served to inform
hospitals of future plans, policies and procedures, investments in capital and human resources as
well as potential modifications to and frequency of training and drills.
The conceptual framework represented the many and varied aspects of hospital
emergency planning and the complexities of their interrelation.
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Interview Questions
A list of questions for interview participants follows:
Plans, Policies & Procedures
•

What is your plan for protecting your facilities, infrastructure, personnel and patients?
What are the major differences pre- and post-Katrina?

•

Is there anything you have done at your facility that you feel is unique or makes your
organization more progressive in its approach to emergency preparedness as compared to
other hospitals—whether they are larger or smaller?
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•

What is your plan for recovering from incidents that impact your facilities, infrastructure,
personnel and patients? How are these current plans different from those pre-Katrina?

•

What special emergency response resources have you planned for in the past? As a result
of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Gustav, what special resources do you anticipate needing
in the future?

•

Has your facility adopted NIMS (National Incident Management System) as its official
incident response system? My understanding is that this is required of all facilities
wishing to be reimbursed with FEMA funds. Is this correct?

•

Have you directed/mandated managers within your facility to train, exercise and use the
incident command system (ICS)? Are employees held accountable for learning ICS and
taking online training and examinations?

•

Have you fully integrated ICS into functional and system-wide emergency operations,
policies, plans and procedures?

•

What actions have you taken to ensure everyone in your organization knows the plan(s)?
Are these actions different from what you were doing pre-Katrina? If so, how?

•

What processes do you have in place to develop, approve and maintain hospital
emergency plans for each of your departments?

•

What actions have you taken to ensure your plan is current and tested on a regular basis?
Do you have after-action processes following an emergency that allow you to incorporate
lessons learned into your existing plans?

•

What procedures are in place to update plans? How often do you review plans?

•

Do you have the ability to preserve emergency operating records as well as legal and
financial records?

•

Do you have a specific evacuation plan?

•

Does this plan address how the evacuation message will be communicated?

•

Does your plan address provision of transportation and take into account potential fuel
shortages? What about Medical Institution Evacuation Plan (MIEP)?

•

Does your plan address special needs populations? Dialysis?

•

Who has the authority to implement an evacuation?
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•

Do staff have pre-disaster guidance/plans on sheltering in-place versus evacuating?

•

Has the economy taken a toll on how much you are able to spend to prepare for
emergencies? Are you postponing any aspect of your plan due to difficulties related to a
poor economy?

Relationships and Mutual Aid
•

Does your organization work closely with governmental units to obtain assistance and
keep communication lines open? How close is your relationship to other hospitals in the
area, hospital association, local government and law enforcement, churches? Would you
say your relationships with external agencies are much better now than they were before
Katrina? Worse? About the same?

•

Do you have any mutual assistance agreements in force now for a future emergency?
What are those agreements? Food, fuel, water, supplies, pharmaceuticals,
staffing/volunteers, etc. Were these agreements in place pre-Katrina or are these
agreements in place as a result of that experience?

Preparation
•

What are some of the most significant protective actions you have put into place since
Katrina or considered for the future? What specific actions have you taken to do so? For
example, installed water tanks, purchased generators, etc.

•

What factors determine which protective actions are to be implemented?

•

How do you prioritize your crisis preparation activities?

•

Who makes the decisions to implement additional protection measures?

•

What are your biggest risks? What keeps you awake at night?

Human Resource Management
•

How are you organized for a catastrophic incident response along the lines of another
Hurricane Katrina?

•

Who works together to specify your organization’s critical organizational infrastructure?
What major differences, if any, exist in your organization chart under normal operations
versus crisis operations?

•

Which staff members are essential to your operation? Who is expected to report to work
during an emergency? Why? Are these key staff members aware of their roles? Is there
redundancy of their positions?

58

•

Who is responsible for identifying potential threats/risks in your facility?

•

Has your facility provided for the orderly process of succession for senior management
during an emergency in the event individuals are unavailable to execute their duties?
How deep are these plans?

•

Do you feel that all of your essential personnel are adequately trained and cross-trained to
perform all essential functions?

•

Have you considered the impact of absenteeism/personnel shortages on your ability to
continue operations?

•

Have you considered the role of volunteers in maintaining continuity of operations?
What is your plan for handling credentialing issues?

•

Do your plans address staff fatigue and stressful working conditions? How do you
handle this?

Communication
•

Do you have internal and external communication capabilities to support essential
functions? Do these capabilities enable you to communicate internally and externally and
provide you access to data, systems and services? What types of communication will you
primarily rely on?

•

Do you have redundant communication systems? For what period of time are they
sustainable?

•

What is the potential for a catastrophic-level event in your community?

Miscellaneous
•

Overall, how robust are your response capabilities? Are you better prepared now than
you were five years ago?

•

What are your biggest shortfalls, weaknesses? What are you doing to address those
shortfalls?

•

Who makes the decision as to what actions will be implemented? Has this changed since
Katrina?

•

How involved is the board and/or the medical staff in your crisis preparedness planning?
How are they kept apprised of your plans and their roles?
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Analyzing the Data
“Analyzing and interpreting qualitative data entails fully knowing the data (immersion),
organizing these data into chunks (analysis), and bringing meaning to those chunks
(interpretation)” (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, p. 270). The researcher carefully evaluated the
interview transcripts and other supporting data collected during the course of the study according
to the modified van Kaam (1959, 1966) method of analyzing phenomenological data. Using the
complete transcription of each research participant:
1. Listing and grouping of each relevant experience (Horizonalization).
2. Reduction and Elimination: To determine the “Invariant Constituents,” look to
maintain those experiences that are necessary for understanding the phenomenon
while removing those irrelevant, overlapping, repetitive or vague experiences.
The “horizons” that remain become the invariant constituents of the phenomenon
or experience.
3. Clustering and Thematizing the Invariant Constituents: Cluster the invariant
constituents of the experience that are related into a thematic label or category.
The clustered and labeled constituents become the core themes of the experience
or phenomenon.
4. Final Identification of the Invariant Constituents and Themes by Application:
Validation: Check the invariant constituents and their accompanying theme
against the complete record of each research participant. (1) Are they expressed
explicitly in the complete transcription? (2) Are they compatible if not explicitly
expressed? (3) If they are not explicit or compatible, they are not relevant to the
co-researcher’s experience and should be deleted.
5. Using the relevant, validated invariant constituents and themes, construct for each
co-researcher an Individual Textural Description of the experience or
phenomenon. Include verbatim examples from the transcribed interview.
6. Construct for each co-researcher an Individual Structural Description of the
experience based on the Individual Textural Description and Imaginative
Variation.
7. Construct for each research participant a Textural-Structural Description of the
meanings and essences of the experience or phenomenon, incorporating the
invariant constituents and themes. From the Individual Textural-Structural
Descriptions, develop a Composite Description of the meanings and essences of
the experience or phenomenon, representing the group as a whole (Moustakas,
1994, pp. 120-121).
This researcher constructed a thick, information-rich description of the research topic,
including how and why events occurred, as well as an accounting of research participants’

60

attitudes and experiences (Bowen, 2008, p. 149).
As mentioned previously, there were strategies to ensure credibility and rigor of the data
analysis, including triangulation, prolonged engagement, participant validation, the assistance of
a peer debriefer and drawing upon the community of practice (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, p. 69).
Employing triangulation, the researcher used multiple data sources, including transcripts and
field notes, as well as information obtained in the review of literature, to ensure completeness of
data available for analysis. Additionally, the researcher utilized the experienced knowledge of a
current hospital chief executive officer, who was not a part of the participant pool, to assist with
data analysis, provide an unbiased external perspective, point out omissions or inconsistencies,
as well as offer recommendations to strengthen the study’s value and to ensure its clarity and
credibility.
Prolonged engagement occurred naturally through the interview process, which allowed
for extended contact with interview participants in their respective hospital setting. The
researcher sought to obtain additional knowledge of the respective facilities through tours,
photos, books and other means.
Peer debriefing is defined as a process of “exposing oneself to a disinterested peer in a
manner paralleling an analytical session and for the purpose of exploring aspects of the
inquiry that might otherwise remain only implicit within the inquirer's mind”
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 308). Another definition of peer debriefing is as follows:
In peer debriefing, researchers meet with one of more impartial colleagues in order to
critically review the implementation and evolution of their research methods. The role
of the peer debriefer is to facilitate the researcher’s consideration of methodological
activities and provide feedback concerning the accuracy and completeness of the
researcher’s data collection and data analysis procedures (Spillet, 2003, p. 3).
Krisanna Machtmes, Ph.D., served as the peer debriefer for this study.
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Limitations of the Study
There were limitations in the study that had an impact on its conclusions and the ability
to generalize the results.
To begin, this was a regional analysis with a small sample of hospitals in a specific
area (U.S. Gulf Coast) of the country, about a very specific phenomenon. This may influence
the external validity of the results.
The researcher did not conduct a pilot test of the Interview Questions, but did have the
questionnaire reviewed by her community of practice, which included three registered nurses
and a hospital administrator. The researcher relied on their guidance to ensure appropriate
scope and focus.
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CHAPTER 4.
ORGANIZING, ANALYZING AND SYNTHESIZING DATA

This chapter describes how the researcher organized, analyzed and synthesized the data
according to the modified van Kaam method (Moustakas, 1994). Data are reported in the
following order: horizonalization, meaning units, themes, and a composite textural-structural
description.
Horizonalization
The process of horizonalization of the data entailed careful review of the verbatim
transcripts by the researcher, peer debriefer, two research participants, and members of the
researcher’s community of practice, known as triangulating analysis. The researcher sent each
participant a copy of their interview transcript via electronic mail. Participants did not make any
corrections or additions to their transcripts when given the opportunity to review them, therefore
their comments were considered to be valid descriptions and representative of the true essence of
their experiences. The peer debriefer met regularly with the researcher to validate the data
analysis process. The peer debriefer and researcher read each verbatim transcript to understand
each respondent’s experience. Additionally, the researcher reread each transcript during periods
of reflection, practicing epoche as she read each respondent’s comments, enabling her to more
completely understand their experience. This process provided the researcher with heightened
familiarity of every statement of each respective transcript and assisted in data organization
(Hathorne, 2006).
Identifying the Meaning Units
The researcher identified meaning units from the participant’s responses to the Interview
Questions. To begin, the researcher organized the meaning units from each transcript, then
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clustered all of the respondent’s meaning units according to each question asked. The researcher
weighted pertinent statements equally in importance to create the horizons or invariant
constituents referred to as meaning units (Hathorne, 2006).
The following pages of narrative contain the meaning units in the order of the Interview
Questions. The meaning units are the respondents’ verbatim responses with extraneous text
removed. The researcher was meticulous in presenting the parts of the transcript that were
relevant to the topic and avoided taking any statements out of context. Table 1 below is a legend
indicating the types of hospitals represented by the respondents.
Table 1: Hospital Characteristics
Respondent

Hospital
Location
Suburban

Ownership

Type

Beds

Classification

County

Not-for-profit

185

Suburban

County

Not-for-profit

104

Suburban

County

Not-for-profit

440

NA

NA

NA

NA

General
Acute Care
General
Acute Care
General
Acute Care
NA

Respondent 8

Suburban

Corporate

For-profit

580

Respondent 9

Urban

State

Not-for-profit

570

Respondent 9

Urban

State

Not-for-profit

255

Respondent
10
Respondent
10
Respondent
11
Respondents
12, 13 & 14

Urban

Corporate

For-Profit

235

Urban

Federal

Not-for-profit

492

NA

Corporate

For-Profit

NA

Urban

State

Not-for-profit

800

Respondents
1&2
Respondents
3&4
Respondents
5&6
Respondent 7

General
Acute Care
Tertiary Care,
Teaching
Tertiary Care,
Teaching
Tertiary Care,
Teaching
Tertiary Care,
Teaching
NA
Tertiary Care,
Teaching

*Note: In the following section “Meaning Units,” “XXXX” denotes names or specific places
that have been designated as such in order to preserve confidentiality and anonymity of the
research respondents.
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Meaning Units
•

Meaning Unit # 1: What is your perception of your facility’s preparedness plan?
Pre- and post-Katrina?

Respondent 1, Facility 1:
“I was here pre-Katrina and post. I really don’t feel like Katrina changed our internal plan
and what we’re doing now.”
Respondent 2, Facility 1:
“Our plan is based on an old plan. It has existed for a number of years and that has been
updated and improved over time based on our experience with four or five hurricanes and other
storms that have threatened us. Most of our planning is around hurricanes, although the plan
applies to other disasters. Our main purpose is to serve the people that live and reside in this
area, or who may be in this area during such a disaster, and to provide care continuously at the
highest level we possibly can under those circumstances. So that involves a physical plant that
works, that functions. And so what we’ve done over the years is add generator sets…the original
part of the hospital is all wired…for example the generators power everything…for patient care
purposes, for other support services. All electrical systems work as if they were powered from
the original source. We have also done more training…we have improved the communication
systems dramatically. We have, within departments of the hospital and certain services,
improved our ability to relate to external vendors, such as those people…those individuals. .
.those companies that provide food, pharmaceuticals, whatever it may be.”
Respondent 4, Facility 2:
“…I’ve always felt that we had a pretty viable emergency preparedness plan…back in
2005, we thought we were as prepared as we needed to be. We do a hazard vulnerability
analysis every year. We look at all the reasonable scenarios or what we think are reasonable
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…the one issue that we never really gave a lot of consideration to was flooding. We are in the
highest point in town, we are about 21 feet above sea level and it never flooded here before. So
that wasn’t anything that we really put a lot of, really not much thought at all into…we certainly
couldn’t have prevented what happened, but we could have salvaged a lot more equipment,
probably and lessened the damage had we anticipated, hey, we can take water out here. We
probably certainly could have come up with a little better internal planning at least to salvage a
little more of what we had.”
Respondent 8, Facility 4:
“That was a very hard thing [not being able to take in other patients] because we could
not deal with anymore. We did have, if I can remember correctly, there was a little lady, older
lady, probably in her 80s I would guess, and her husband walking. They were being pushed
by two men…whether they were sons or not, I’m not sure…like in a bathtub, and the little lady
had a stroke apparently. So we did take the husband and the lady in the hospital…the other
ones, whoever came with them, we did not, because we just could not have any other people go
in there. It’s just too unsecure. We didn’t know what was going on, we had no idea who these
people were or what they had, so, at that point, we had to protect the people that were there.”
Respondent 9, Facilities 5 and 6:
“Well, fortunately XXXX and the people that were, you know, myself included, that
were in charge of facilities and emergency management at that particular time, took that
somewhat to heart and understood that both the XXXX campus and the XXXX campus were at
risk because of where our major infrastructure was located. Although we were not able to do all
the mitigation that we knew needed to be done, because of funding sources, which was raise that
infrastructure where it was as much out of risk as you could have…envisioned. So, what we
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did…is we had probably about 20 small portable generators like you would go buy at Home
Depot. The reason we survived and had so few fatalities within our facility compared to some of
the other facilities in XXXX is that we had the ability to take and sustain our people who
were on ventilators and other critical life-support systems that required electricity, because we
had those generators. You know, we had extension cords running all over the place but, you
know…they worked. And we had them [generators] mounted on exterior fire escapes, out on
roofs, you know, so that they didn’t pose a fire risk or an exhaust, you know, carbon monoxide
risk to any of the staff. So I think that although the conditions were untenable from a heat
perspective, we did have adequate food and we did have adequate water. That is the main way
that we survived and, you know, because we knew…that we would lose our generators because
of our location and, although we didn’t have the 20-foot tidal wave...that (had been previously)
predicted…the levees broke and you had the flood so the basements of both institutions were
flooded, which took out the transfer switches and electrical service for both hospitals. I think
under the circumstances, you know, given the design of the facilities, we were as well prepared
as we could be.”
Respondent 13, Facility 9:
“I think that in general, there are things that you can to do prepare, but I think if you’ve
seen one storm, you’ve seen one storm or if you’ve seen one disaster, you’ve seen one disaster.
There are unique differences with each one that, I guess it’s what you’re not prepared for or what
you didn’t anticipate that you have to respond to that creates so much anxiety and is just anxiety
provoking. Then you think about the hospital is pretty contained, or the health system is pretty
contained. But then the community that you’re within and what they go through. How do you,
as part of that community, respond to things that weren’t anticipated? So you can anticipate a lot
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of things, but like you mentioned, radios were in one of your interviews. Well, we had 800 MHz
radios which were trunked with the county and the city and the emergency operations center…
but, the towers for those were blown down so they didn’t work…you can be prepared and have
redundant systems, but then, if they fail, what do you do?”
Respondent 14, Facility 9:
“I thought that we had a pretty good plan. A good plan to evacuate the patients, and
they had actually exercised or operated that plan and implemented that plan with Rita. Although
the storm veered away from here, a lot was learned with that total evacuation of the hospital
facility in 2005…Therefore, our plan was updated. As Ike approached, we put our emergency
management plan into operation. XXXX has a very well coordinated emergency response, statewide emergency response system in plan according to the office of the governor. And so
whenever there’s a storm approaching in the Gulf, we start conference calls typically a week or
so in advance of the anticipated landfall and begin to coordinate distribution of resources and the
like. This storm originally was anticipated to go into Mexico, and it kept shifting its way up the
coast. So we had plenty of advanced warning that a big storm was coming. As it grew in size, I
think we all became more frightened, but because the wind speeds were low, we really weren’t
thinking about the size of the surge that we experienced. That said, we put our emergency plan
into operation and we shut down our labs when we determined that the storm was likely headed
this way, which was on about Tuesday night or Wednesday before the storm struck on Friday.
We sent our students away. We notified our ride-out out teams, as we do, to determine who
would stay on site. We kept about 500 people, 250 caregivers because, again, we weren’t
anticipating such a significant surge and…we would need to get our hospital back in
operation to support the first responders…who would be here…helping clear debris and bring
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things back to life. About 250 support personnel, about 100 of those were police officers, about
100 were facilities specialists, and the remaining 50 were other forms of support. Then we sent
Our…IT business continuity people off to a data center in XXXX and so we were prepared to
operate at a distance. Basically, batten down all the hatches, did a total evacuation of the
hospital, close to 600 patients. A number of them were ambulatory, so we ended up transporting
about 330, plus or minus a few, by ambulance. Some were evacuated by air ambulance, fixed
wing and helicopter, and by ground ambulance. We accomplished that within 24 hours without
any significant incidents, our plan worked well. We learned a lot from Rita. So everything went
according to plan at that point. We felt that we had our generator capacity positioned correctly
…a lot of resources, fresh water, all of those things. So we thought we were pretty well
prepared, as well prepared as we could be according to the plan, before the storm arrived.”
•

Meaning Unit # 2: What are some of the critical experiences you had or
significant lessons learned?

Respondent 1, Facility 1:
“A logistical thing that changed post-Katrina…Since…we were almost like this beacon,
even our parking lot lights were on and when everything else post-Katrina is dark, you just glow,
absolutely glow. So the day after the storm…everybody…in the community must have figured
out, ‘Hey, what’s that glow?’ And then figured out, ‘Wow, we don’t have any electricity at my
house and we can’t eat hot food and we know the [hospital] cafeteria is a public cafeteria.’
…This is something we didn’t anticipate in the EOC…we left one of our early morning meetings
and…the line is out the door. It’s snaking through the front of the hospital…for food. And part
of our disaster plan…EOC plan…we have emergency supplies. And…it breaks it down by
department. And each department head comes to the EOC meetings or somebody in the EOC
meeting says, ‘Here’s where we stand on water, this is how many gallons, this is how much time
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we have, this is how much diesel we have, this is how much food we have to feed everybody inhouse, what’s the census? Okay, with that type of census we can feed everybody for five and a
half more days.’ Well, the director of food and nutrition services ran up to the meeting says,
‘Wait, wait, wait, I’ve got a problem. We can’t feed the public.’”
____________
“Here’s one, probably the biggest one that I think we’re aware of: dialysis. We can
dialyze in the hospital. But this…the huge need for the region is a way to have dialysis available
for the patients post-storm…not everybody is going to evacuate, no matter how much you can
preach. So what ends up happening, these poor folks that need it, they can’t get it. And a lot of
your clinics and dialysis centers, they’re closed. So then, they’re showing up with us and we’re
taking them as quickly as you can…the clinical people are the ones that do it. Maybe they
normally have to be on a dialysis machine three days a week, but okay, we’re going to do you
two days a week, you know, shorten it. And that’s a huge need for the region, probably the
entire state.”
Respondent 2, Facility 1:
“We’re going to grit our teeth and we’re going to hunker down and see this thing through
till the end. And I think some of that kind of intent, you know, discussion and commitment, is
critical ‘cause you can’t have people flapping around on you. You know what also feeds into
that is the people themselves. It was interesting to me in all of these hurricanes…Katrina and
stuff …to see who had the endurance…not just a matter of 24 hours, you know and…I watched
that and you know to me, you have to pace yourself a little bit, you know. I’ve stayed here the
whole time through all of them, but I take a nap once in a while. This sounds simple but, I take a
nap and I don’t sit there and worry every second while I’m napping. I need a nap, you know?
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And I’ve seen others who are pretty strong people, they think they’re going to power all the way
through the end, and you see them go and they’re just burned out. And for another day or so,
they’re not worth anything to you. And you might need them…you know what I’m saying? So
you have to take those kinds of personalities and the leadership style or endurance or whatever
you want to call it of people that are key to you into account when you’re making those
decisions, at least from my viewpoint.
But I would add this: our experience has increased. It’s one thing to have a plan, which a
lot of hospitals have around the country and I’ve been in with the CEOs of a lot of those
hospitals. It’s another thing when you live it, you know? Living through a hurricane, when I
first came…we had Hurricane Andrew and that was…that… came right on through this area,
you know? That’s just an experience that for people that is very…very…what should I say,
deepening thing. And Katrina took it to another new high. I think for even the Cajun people of
South Louisiana that was…that was quite an experience, you know? And it changed their
paradigm a lot, a lot of them. Now you see some of them who do leave here, people who
wouldn’t have [left] in the past, like some of our doctors that grew up here. So the judgment. .
.the key matters of how to communicate effectively, the trust level of the teams…the teams that
work together in that; the ability to organize things when you don’t know they’re coming. We
put a dialysis center—we don’t have a dialysis center, we don’t do inpatient dialysis, we have
third parties that do that. They all left during Gustav. So we had nurses…that decided to stay in
the area. You know, we found all these people and put these teams together. The ability…now
resides more so in this organization than it ever did before Katrina. And that’s what I have more
confidence in, you know? The ability to go get whatever it needs to be…get whatever you need
to and pull together and provide the service and keep on going.
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I always…it’s part of that lying awake in the morning…in the middle of the night trying
to figure out what it is you haven’t considered or even if you have considered it, something that
could happen. There’s so many experiences, so many unknowns in those situations. You really
do worry about it. Do you have the right people in the right place? Can you depend on these
people? If they’re not there, who’s going to be there? Things like that. But there are
weaknesses, I’m sure we have weaknesses but it’s more of, ‘Are we going to perform the way
we expect ourselves to perform?’”
Respondent 3, Facility 2:
“…When you read The Joint Commission manual, the accreditation body…if
you read the accreditation manual now…about every other change they made in the manual
came from some lesson that we’ve learned here or at one of the other hospitals in New Orleans
…this building had between three and four feet of water in it depending upon where you were.
Our traditional hurricane plans evacuate patients from the second floor down to the first floor for
reasons of avoiding the airborne debris and breakage of windows…And when the water hit
here…and we had no idea that this facility would flood…the water hit here as the storm surge
got worse and worse, we ended up moving all those patients back to the second floor…and
many of them after the power was already gone. We had one 600-pound patient that went up in
the elevator. That was the last elevator ride. Everybody else got carried up the stairs. So it was
kind of a redefinition. We looked at the plan again and for a hurricane situation, our hope is that
some protective measures can be put into place. We’re still wrestling with FEMA over
whether or not we can actually engage some of those protective measures or not. Everything that
we’ve done to this main hospital facility up until this point is now what they call ‘temporary
permanent reconstruction.’”
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____________
“…our emergency capabilities are better now, but still only as good as the backbone in
the community.”
____________
“Well, I think first it would be that people understand how the command structure works.
We found other agencies didn’t understand who was in charge either, which created a tradition
that we ran here for several months. Cookies every day at two o’clock. We used to bake cookies
once we had the little kitchen back, and we could get the other medical providers to come in…
we wanted everybody there for kind of a two o’clock coordination. Because the first problem we
had was when providers and suppliers hit the ground, they all tried to go their own way and they
all ended up driving around the same neighborhoods, helping the same people. And so if you’re
not from here, as they say, you don’t really know that there are people way out in this part of the
county and you need to go look over here and of course all the signage and stuff is gone so you
have to give them directions. But, I think the command structure, not just within the hospital,
but within the whole community and how that plays for the EOC. Basically, in terms of hospital
response, and it’s hard to overemphasize the drills and making the drills real. You know, making
the drills count. And that costs a little money in terms of personnel and time. We’ve taken that
as part of improving the structure, we’ve built an internal website for the response that people
can use to check on each other’s supply levels and actions and what’s going on. And I guess the
third one would be before you need it, you might want to read the FEMA handbook and then
understand what the OIG does afterwards…you know, having some idea of what the FEMA
requirements are. So that you can…arrange in advance…you can arrange recovery contracts.
You can arrange for labor contracts and food and catering and that kind of thing. If they’re not
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going to pay you to do it, then you need to have catering already in place. And you can…do
those contracts in advance…for example, we have our computer system archive purchase orders
for three years. We’re now five years post-Katrina and FEMA is still asking us for documentation from purchase orders from four years ago, which means I don’t have them because it’s no
longer archived in the computer system. They want to know…your subcontractors…we had
subcontractors come in and rebuild the chillers and the electrical system to get the building ready
for power again…it was day 16 before we got power back…FEMA is detail-oriented…the OIG
wants to know who did the work, what the worker’s name was, what their skill level was, were
they a licensed electrician, were they an apprentice and how many hours did they spend on
which aspects of the job and your contractor won’t be able to give that to you five years later,
unless they know up front that they’re going to have to keep it…we had to hire a person to do
that after Katrina, because we had over 30 project worksheets that had to be kept track of…the
OIG will come in and audit you five to eight years after the fact. And so you need for your
documentation to be somewhere. That’s pretty scary because they could take money back…they
came in and did one preliminary audit on one part of a project worksheet and took back half a
million dollars. That was probably correct to take back, but you know, it needed to be in a
different project worksheet, so it was a technicality, but it just shows you that if they had done
that eight years after the fact, you wouldn’t even remember. Let alone be able to document it.”
Respondent 4, Facility 2:
“…another reality I think you need to recognize; everybody has to recognize. You can
give us all the equipment you want, but when I’ve only got this many people, that’s all I got.
And so you have to figure out on the fly, most of time, what’s the most important thing we need
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to do cause there’s no way on God’s green earth that you’re going to accomplish everything in
this plan for securing the facility to…I mean, it’s wonderful, it’s a great old plan, but you need
an army to do it and the reality is, nobody has that many people. And if you think you’re going
to call up the fire department or the police department…and we’re blessed here…and you
mentioned it earlier on when you mentioned that everybody’s friendly and that’s wonderful. We
have…even with all my time in the Service…I’ve been through tougher stuff here…all except
for Vietnam. But I’ve been through tougher stuff here with this crew and there is nobody I’d
rather be with because…and we have our moments, we haggle and scrap at each other and you
know do our own thing. But when the crap hits the fan, everybody’s in lockstep and you know,
there’s nobody I’d rather be with to face a challenge because I’ve been there and done that on
numerous occasions but Katrina was probably the biggest one and we got it done and…the
community is the same way…I know the Police Chief, I know the Fire Chief, and I know the
Mayor…and you know, I have their phone numbers, cell phone numbers…the Fire Chief in
XXXX, we’re friends, we go to meetings all the time, we participate in the community
events…one of the things that I think is a big event…and it may sound kind of trivial, but…I
belong to the Chamber. I participate…the hospital always has somebody to participate in all
those things so we’re involved…all the time and not just one once in a while, you know? We’re
involved all the time. So we’re doing health fairs all around. We have nurses—school nurses in
every school in the county. We have I think, 14 clinics now. And so we’re out there and we’re
integrated in the community. And I think that when it comes time to, you know, I have… my
assistant here…when there’s an incident, she’s our go-to person. She goes to the EOC, she’s
our liaison for the hospital so we have somebody there that knows what we’re doing and can
serve that function. And the emergency manager and his staff, we know them just as well as we
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know our own staff. So, that’s real important I think…You’ve got to have a seat at the table,
you’ve got to. If you don’t have one, you need to make one. And here, it’s never been an issue.
We’ve always been involved. And a big part of it, too, is frankly, the boss. The boss kind of sets
the stage.”
Respondent 5, Facility 3:
“…we do get to practice the plan and a part of every hurricane scare that we go through,
or actual hurricane we go through, there’s a debriefing and we say, ‘Well, what worked, what
was problematic, what could we change a little bit?’…there were no dramatic changes postKatrina, because the plan worked. It was true, tried, tested and it worked very well…the single
greatest weakness that we encountered post-Katrina was communication ability…landlines
didn’t work, cell phones didn’t work very well, if at all. And we had trouble communicating
from here, outward. And people outward had difficulty communicating in. That was extremely
problematic on both sides…We’ve always had 800 MHz radios…we’ve greatly increased those.
We had some satellite phones…we increased the satellite phones that we had. We have
satellite now…satellite Internet capability. Probably the biggest thing we did is we have a
disaster website. The company is actually out of XXXX, I believe. It’s called FastCommand.
They contacted us and essentially what it is, is a disaster website. And if a disaster occurs,
whether it be a hurricane, tornado, or chemical release…whatever, we can deflect to that website
so that anyone who logs on…will get our disaster website. And we can provide up-to-date
information. We have it set up so that even if we’re unable to enter data to get it in there, we
have satellite phones, we can get information to XXXX and they can get into our website.
So that we can say…here’s what’s going on, here’s the conditions, here’s what we need, here’s
what you need to be doing [employees that have evacuated]. So that we can keep the
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communication open and they can also [people from the outside] send, kind of in a blog format,
information in, ‘I’m okay.’ You know, ‘everyone is okay,’ so that we can do as much as we
can to keep the lines of communication open.”
____________

“We have acute dialysis at this hospital. We do provide dialysis at this hospital…It was a
problem [in the community]…here’s the difficulty, dialysis centers outside this hospital are
private enterprises. As a result, they don’t get a whole lot of help or benefit immediately after a
storm. They have to have water and power. And until they get water and power, they can’t
operate. But the feds are going to say they can’t intervene on their behalf because that’s a
private enterprise. Something needs to be done about that. . .We had lots of dialysis patients
show up here and we did the level best we could to treat them. As a result of it, some of those
patients ended up having to drive a good little ways to go get dialysis.”
Respondent 7, Healthcare Association Executive:
“The biggest problems we had through Gustav…is in oxygen. And it’s because of all
the homebound people. And it’s not so much in the hospital but it’s the homebound sick that are
on home oxygen. Most of those folks are on low-flow oxygen which is like a one liter, the little
nasal prongs, one to five liters per minute…what happened is the O2 vendors bailed. There’s a
thousand little companies that can sell oxygen out of their storefronts and they just close shop
and go. They showed no responsibility to their patients and those patients are left coming to the
state, coming to us, or coming to the hospital, and there’s no room in the inn for them, or at the
shelters. So we developed, post-Gustav oxygen planning…met with the big oxygen
manufacturers and worked with the Office of Public Health and their procurement areas and their
supply areas. We then could buy thousands…of the small home cylinders of oxygen that we
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would have for an exchange for patients that needed them because that segment of the vendor
community failed, failed their constituency, they failed their customers…The dialysis centers
were as much of a problem if not more so than the oxygen because the critical nature of that.
You had to have dialysis and there’s just, there’s only so much dialysis resource out in the state.”
____________
[Regarding patient tracking] “…why the federal government doesn’t go to FedEx or UPS
and say, ‘Build this for us?’…I can buy something from Amazon.com that’s made in China and
ship and get to me in three days’ time and I can find out where it is any point in time and…and I
can’t do that with a patient. I think patient tracking is one. I also think the whole electronic
medical record piece of this and that exchange of information is another piece that’s getting a lot
of attention, and it will because that’s part of the affordable care act in healthcare reform. And
the mandates for electronic medical records and in those cases and so I think…and we found out
after Katrina and after Gustav that patients were getting pieces of their records sent to them and
putting them in a Ziploc bag…and they’re laying on their chest as they left and the things that
they could to try to piece together their care. Same thing the oncology patient does, what chemo
am I on? ...that is very complicated. So if they’re not in the hospital and they’re getting
outpatient chemo, that’s still an issue…”
____________
“Fatality management is big now. The pandemic, you know the H1N1 piece made
everyone start looking at their fatality management plans. Katrina made us look at our fatality
management plans. How do you deal with mass fatality? We did, with H1N1 we bought
probably close to a thousand ventilators. Little emergency ventilators that are used by the
Russian and Chinese armies, battery powered that you can either run them on air or on a hundred
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percent oxygen…and you’ve got these staging protocols…triage, you know that critical triage
capability is who gets a ventilator and who doesn’t. When do they pull off a ventilator so
somebody else could have one? You know, battlefield triage…those questions and those
decision trees…have to be addressed. So you’ve got a lot of that, which is a piece of the fatality
management and mass fatality, mass casualty events. There is a lot of conversation on those
types of things these days…It is a very hard conversation. Florida put out a plan about
prioritization of ventilators…and they took an awful lot of heat, an awful lot of heat for it,
because it came out extremely cold and callous even though nobody in that room was thinking in
a callous and unfeeling manner.”
Respondent 8, Facility 4:
“…one is trying to move 400 patients, some of them down as many as eight flights of
stairs…equipment to move people, because if you had an electric lift, well, none of that was
working. However, there are things now that are pretty neat…the things that they have to help
in evacuations now. But we also had…we called it a ‘hole in the wall.’ To get to the heliport,
number one, the elevator to that…all the elevators were under water. When it started flooding,
you could just hear the shafts being filled with water. In order to get to the heliport, of course,
the elevator was not working, so we had to put most of the patients…unless we wanted to carry
them back up 11 flights of stairs, there was no way we could do it. There was a hole in the
wall that was a plumbing room or something. It had pipes and all that stuff, on the second floor,
so we moved all the patients that went by helicopter…we moved them through that hole onto
the back of a pickup truck usually on the other side because from the hospital to that garage that
hole connected. Then we would go up the eight floors and then have to carry them up two more
flights to the thing [heliport]. So that’s how we evacuated those babies. Now remember, some
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of those babies were in isolettes that might have weighed 500 to 700 pounds. One of them in
particular…was a transport isolette, which actually would not fit on the truck, and so then some
of the guys had to push it up eight flights of stairs and then when they got up there it wouldn’t
work. There is equipment out there. There is specific evacuation equipment whether it’s
stretchers or lifts or all those things that are now available to hospitals to provide.”
____________
“Absolutely. I think there has been a tremendous effort on education, assessments of
the facilities, individual resources put into disaster preparation and training…each of our regions
in the state has a key person that keeps those communications going between hospitals and
facilities. There has been a lot of drills, constant drills and…table-tops or whatever. So definitely, I think the focus, a lot of conferences, a lot of education. So, I think there has been [a
tremendous effort on education].”
Respondent 10, Facilities 7 and 8:
“I think the first thing is that many hospitals, this hospital, the XXXX, and others had
way too many people sheltering in the hospital…I mean, what we did at Gustav, we were down
to the bare number of patients that we didn’t feel it was right to move in a pre-storm environment, yet, we thought we could manage if we had to manage a post-storm evacuation and then
the minimum staff to care for them. Whereas, here, before Katrina, there were family members
housed in the hospital, many patients, probably a little bit too many folks, and then people
staying over in laboratories across the way watching their research labs. We had family members in a hotel, all of which ended up in the hospital after the storm. They came wading over
here after the levees broke, and I think a total of 1,600 people had to be evacuated. That meant
they had to be fed…slept, all that sort of stuff, and…the sick patients, taking first priority. It
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made the logistics of everything tougher than it should be. So for Gustav, we had it down to…no
pets, no family members. If you had to come in, just caregivers, and in the case of relatives of
patients, really, only the pediatric patients were allowed to keep a family member present.”
____________
“There are a lot of people who are still here who were rescued by helicopter off roofs.
They’ve got religion on this subject. And this state, and this city, in this region, takes hurricane
preparedness very, very seriously. There may come a time when this becomes some distant
memory for somebody or a generation passes and maybe people will get sloppy about it, but I
don’t think we are going to see that for awhile. I think we are very serious about it here. [For
Gustav]…we all had problems and people got out of town and then the storm didn’t flood the
city and people all wanted to come back and they were concerned about looting, they were
concerned about the power being out at their house and the refrigerator going bad and these sort
of things. There was modest damage from that storm but huge concerns on everybody’s part,
you know, they had this post-Katrina image of New Orleans and they were thinking about
getting back here. I am more concerned about the population being a little bit less willing to
evacuate should there ever be a call for it again and that coming back to bite somebody…the
most vulnerable in the community are the ones you want to move and get up and make sure you
do evacuate them. We’ve got a better system now. I think Gustav was hugely ahead of what
Katrina was like in terms of all these sort of things and it was really kind of neat to watch. I
believe this, I believe the levees are more robust now than they were, so the chances of something like that happening are lessened. Are they [the chances] absolutely gone? No.”
Respondent 12, Facility 9:
“…Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM), and they also have a wrist-band
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system that is tied to a database that is tied to a GPS system so they can track patients wherever
they go…it’s called TxSNETS, so I kind of load TxSNETS in together with TDEM…then there
would be local county jurisdictions, the University of Texas System…we’re about 15 institutions
spread throughout the state that could be resources to us. We’re part of the Texas Medical
Center and they’ve got a fairly robust emergency management program that’s run by a fairly
experienced person. We have the East Texas Gulf Coast Trauma Advisory Council and that’s
basically involved in regional planning or regional response. We have a Catastrophic Medical
Operations Center (CMOC) that’s up in sort of Northwest Houston. We just had a meeting with
them and the state last week to say we want to better integrate our operations with yours. For
example, if there’s an evacuation and while we’d be watching the Gulf when it looked like it
potentially could come our way, we will have been sending census data to the Regional Liaison
Officer (RLO) at the state and CMOC…for a number of days so they can get a sense of how
many ambulances, aircraft, and so forth that we would need. If we pull the trigger and say we’re
gonna evacuate…we notify the RLO, we’d notify the CMOC. We do have a point-to-point
evacuation plan with XXXX Hospital in XXXX and that kind of mirrors the state evacuation
plan because there’s a point-to-point evacuation plan in their multi-hub plan but it deals with
XXXX to XXXX. We would notify XXXX who would give them a patient census. We would
quickly have an understanding of how many patients we need to send to other institutions and the
CMOC would help us coordinate that movement. What you had here, even though there wasn’t
a lot of planning for evacuations, a tremendous amount of resources and help from other
agencies, 400 ambulances, you know, from, I think as far away as Maine. There were
helicopters, aircraft.”
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Respondent 13, Facility 9:
“I’m trying to think of what we may have done differently after like, Katrina. Because
after Katrina was the first time that we have ever evacuated our hospital, and Rita was headed
toward us as a category five storm and was huge, filled up the Gulf. That was the first time we
ever decided to evacuate our facility. So I think we did that differently because we didn’t want
to relive what New Orleans had been through. And it worked out really well. You know, there
were something like…maybe 80 ambulances and 20 aircraft that evacuated a little over 400
patients in 12 hours from our facility and left only a handful of people here. Then, the next day,
this is in preparation for Rita, the next day, most of the staff who were here were released had
nowhere to go because a lot of them had been evacuated. So a cargo plane took them to
XXXX…so then we had to deal with how do we house them in XXXX? How do we feed them?
How do we get them to their loved ones or whatever? So things that we hadn’t thought about in
our planning, you know, came up. So we did it on the fly that first time. We got everybody’s
cell phone number on a piece of paper and you know, sort of do it like that but, just making sure
that those systems are more refined in case things happen that way again.”
Respondent 14, Facility 9:
“Then we started getting reports about the size of the storm surge from the offshore
buoys. So we started calculating how much damage we would likely have and it became apparent that with a 13 to 15, perhaps even [an] 18 to 20 foot storm surge, the damage was going
to be significant. By that time, we couldn’t change provision for the number of people we kept
here, and the reason I say that, had we known that that was going to be the case, we would not
have planned to reopen the hospital. We would have sent those 250 caregivers away. Although
with the wind speeds of this storm, the integrity of the buildings was never really an issue, but
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still they were at-risk. And, so it would have been nice not to have them here. So I think one of
the things that you’re assessing is, you know, what did we learn, and I think we all learned about
the Saffir-Simpson scale and its shortcomings and looking at wind speed as relative to surge
predictions and the like. Then, doing a complete assessment of the damage from both and
putting together a scenario of what’s likely to happen and using that to determine who stays onsite in terms of direct immediate support for the facility. Who do you station away and bring
back within the first 24 hours after the storm passes when roads are passable and things are
connected and then, you know, who in addition to that do you need for support over the coming
days? Along those lines interestingly, one of the things that we really hadn’t thought too much
about was physical fitness. We kept a lot of our senior people here, particularly on the facility
side because they know the most about our different…buildings and the like. In those first days
after the storm, we had power. We had plenty of generator capacity. We had fresh water. We
did not have a functioning sewer system or flowing water coming from the city…Its infrastructure took a very, very heavy hit. So we were carrying dry ice up and down stairs. We
didn’t have elevators that worked because all the machinery was in the basement and some of
our people who were less fit really struggled moving up and down. So really, on the fly, [we]
had to do a physical assessment of everyone and kind of change our shift work approach and get
people appropriately deployed by fitness levels, as well as by age and job responsibility. So
we’ve gone back now to look at our manning plan, our people plan for the future, and we are
going to take physical fitness into account based on what sorts of functions we think humans
might have to provide after a big storm. That said, everybody performed incredibly well.
We had what I think is typically the case where our people threw themselves into the
work. Our mantra became to protect and preserve our institution for the future. We knew we
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had suffered heavy losses that we could do very little about…in the short term, but we wanted to
protect and preserve what we had so that we could get the school functioning again and so that
we could get a research operation going…certainly protect our research animals and specimens.
We didn’t lose any of either fortunately, because our people worked hard to preserve them and
then as much of the health care as we thought we might get operational. We kept our ER
operating during the entire storm. We saw about 100 people during the course of the storm, and
immediately after. Then one of the disaster management assistant teams that’s staffed by
homeland security came onsite to help us and took over that function so that we could let our
people go. What I was getting to was we really had to watch our people closely. They wanted to
work straight through the 24, 36 hours and we made them take breaks. We made certain that our
supervisors were watching their people closely. People were assigned to the area where they
actually could get sleep. They had comfortable surroundings. We had some air-conditioners that
actually functioned with the generator capacity that we had and temporary coolers. Therefore,
we did our best to take care of our people and support them and as soon as possible, as soon as
we could get relief workers in, we did that and sent people away to get refreshed and then come
back later. I think we actually managed our people power fairly well, but a lot of it was learning
on the fly.”
•

Meaning Unit # 3: What are some of the changes you have made,
innovations you have adopted since the storms of 2005?

Respondent 1, Facility 1:
“Normally…the Chief of Staff…is in the EOC as well. Now…with the chief of
staff…the medical staff decided they wanted…a Hurricane Coordinator…That hurricane
coordinator is somebody separate and he’s invited to all the EOC meetings and then he’ll be
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giving his input, ‘Yes, I think we should stop elective surgeries. This is what the medical staff is
telling me we should do.’ So he’s advising us from a physician’s side.”
Respondent 4, Facility 2:
“…we’ve set up a little box for everyone that has the Incident Command Center [ICS]
job action sheets. And all the information, the vest and everything is all in the box. When it’s
time to activate, you say, ‘Okay, you’re going to be logistics. Here’s your box.’ So you can open
it up, put your vest on, see what you’re supposed to do and do it. It’s the same thing with the
incident commander and each of the three key functions…it’s all in one big locker. It’s in a
metal locker on wheels. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, it wasn’t on wheels. And obviously the
wheels are so that we can move that joker out of there if we need to. But it’s all set up so we can
plug it in. The radios are all in there, so it sits there charging the radios and if we needed to
move it we can.”
Respondent 7, Healthcare Association Executive:
“So EMSTAT was birthed after Gustav as a way for hospitals to preemptively and then
proactively report stats. As an event nears, hospitals are told, ‘Update your EMSTAT,’ and so,
at that point, they update their contacts. They are supposed to do it routinely but they forget. So,
we go in before an event and we flag them…so we have contact information for every hospital.
We have their helipads; we have the lats/longs of those helipads. We have the generators. If
they have multiple generators we know every generator they have. We know the make, the
model, and the power capabilities. We also know what those generators power in those facilities.
We know how much fuel they have, how much fuel capability they have. How many fuel tanks
they have, what their burn rates per hour are. So we could go in and actually calculate usage
rates…if we can’t communicate with the hospital, we can anticipate that hospital is gonna run
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out of fuel in seven hours based on this program. We can arrange for a fuel dump for them even
without communicating with them, which is cool. We know their oxygen status…We do know at
least their reservoir capabilities for oxygen so that we can at least somewhat anticipate, ‘Okay, if
they need oxygen we know that we have to get resources for this amount globally.’ …We were
able last year to do some GIS mapping so that we can map resources to hospitals…so all the
hospitals are mapped on a GIS platform. We were able to use that during the H1N1 pandemic
for putting out influenza vaccine and antibiotics and all of those materials you know the pan-flu
materials that were needed. We actually used EMSTAT in the GIS mapping, and EMSTAT to
be able to identify those facilities and use the National Guard to go drop inventory shipments to
them and everyone. We delivered material to over 200 hospitals in less than 48 hours.”
Respondent 8, Facility 4:
“We are, in fact, XXXX and XXXX received a HRSA [Health Resources and Services
Administration] grant on surveying the schools in the state to see where they were with
emergency preparedness. A conference was held, I guess earlier this year, maybe in March,
something like that. So I’m sitting currently on a task force of this group and we are developing
just like for hospitals, for schools, and resources for plans for those types of things, and then here
at XXX…we are working on a grant for disaster preparedness and really looking at involving
that in the curriculum. Most schools have some type of disaster or emergency preparedness,
usually in like their community health course in the undergraduate program, but some schools,
very few, there are some centers across the country and nursing schools that have stand-alone
courses. . .we are looking at all that. I guess I want to just say for disaster preparedness and
emergency preparedness, it’s an all-hazards type of preparedness so you know, just because
hazard vulnerability…number one might be flooding, might be biochemical or something like
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that, but I think everybody has [got to be] really prepared for all-hazards preparation. So it just
filters through whatever type of disaster it may be. I think that’s really how you need to look at
it. I don’t know if you’ll ever be prepared to have something like Katrina again. If it happened
again it would probably be the same, I would think, or maybe hopefully not, because people are
going to evacuate now. So I think that’s one thing I think we are much better prepared (for) than
we were five years ago. I think people are much more educated, much more thoughtful in their
deliberations of what they need to do. And hopefully it will not ever happen again because I
think we have things in place that we will get out if something like Hurricane Katrina, I mean
people would need to get out.”
Respondent 9, Facilities 5 and 6:
“Well, I think it probably even predates Katrina…9/11, you know, raised everybody’s
awareness about the need for emergency preparedness. Then you had the series of hurricanes
that hit, you know, across the center of the state of Florida, which really raised the awareness of
The Joint Commission and Centers for Medicare and Medicare Services for the need to increase
the need for emergency management planning within healthcare facilities.
Probably the main emphasis that had been placed on it, is previously that most all of the
planning was done strictly for a local community. That you would try to get resources within
that community to support you if you had some kind of an internal disaster that rendered you
incapable of operations or at least impaired your operations and you had to have outside, you
know, you could transfer patients out or get outside resources to support you. What that has
begun to point out is that you really need to have planning outside your community to be able to
provide support. They are starting that cycle, you know, they started saying, you know, you
need to look beyond XXXX…you know, you need to be looking to XXXX, or you need to be
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looking to maybe even beyond XXXX…XXXX has been mitigated. We still have infrastructure
that’s at risk. We have put in floodgates, sump pumps and what have you to reduce the potential
of the flooding in the basement. With the exception of some electrical equipment and our central
sterile supply we have no mission critical element in the basement any longer. What is in the
basement that is mission critical, can easily be moved out…like dietary. The actual food
preparation is elevated…it’s no longer in the kitchen, it’s just food distribution and cafeteria so
you can do food distribution and cafeteria someplace else in the building. We did it…we did for
Gustav.”
____________
“From a regional perspective we are much better off. From a state perspective, we’re a
whole lot better off. Of course, you know, we are in the process of getting ready to build a
replacement hospital. And the replacement hospital will be hardened, it will be able to withstand
a category five storm. It’s, you know, the first floor will be above the Katrina flood level or
above what they call a 100-year flood plain. Second floor will be above 500-year flood plain and
no mission critical services will be on the first floor. For instance, the emergency room and
everything is on the second floor and above…you know, the new hospital, which I think that’s
going to be state of the art for any hospital that’s built in the future or does major renovations is,
particularly, if they’re in an area of risk is to go on and define themselves that they can set in
place to a category five. That’s not to say that they might not end up being damaged and have to
evacuate, but they will at least be able to survive…until the appropriate evacuation can be made.
I think you will continue to see on both the NFPA 1600, which is the kind of a national consensus standard that covers disaster management, and with the Joint Commission and CMS,
both will continue to expand the role of emergency management or disaster preparedness in
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healthcare facilities. Now 1600 applies to, you know, that’s everybody. That’s all…NFPA…
National Fire Protection Association and. . .CMS. . .Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. And the reason they’re important, CMS is— if you don’t meet their standards then you’re
not going to get reimbursed for Medicare and Medicaid.”
Respondent 13, Facility 9:
“…some of the unique things that we had…when I’ve talked to other people they
think, ‘Oh that’s a good idea.’ Like our maintenance people had all of their schematics and
plans for our steam lines and our generators on memory sticks so they could…pull them up
anywhere. And I think they printed it out and laminated the basics, but if they needed further
detail they had the memory sticks. So that’s something unique that I want to talk to other people
about our experience with that, they thought was a good idea, and something that could be useful
to them. Because it’s really like I said, you know, what you don’t anticipate or what you don’t
know that you may need some material that you don’t think about needing in the immediate
aftermath that is useful, I think.”
•

Meaning Unit # 4: Tell me about your preparation in terms of
redundancy of leadership.

Respondent 1, Facility 1:
“So we have a backup on our Environment of Care Committee…and my hurricane
binder. So what’ll happen is this, if I’m going out of town…we do have a backup on our safety
committee. But this binder right here literally lets them know if something happens to me, if
something happens even to the next person…obviously the Regional EOC person is going to be
calling, ‘We don’t have (your) reports. We need your EOC plan.’ And it’s [the binder is]
tabbed; it goes all the way down. ‘How do we communicate on our radios? What’s our
frequency numbers?’”
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Respondent 2, Facility 1:
“So, there is a lot of experience and there is a lot of experience even in some of the
younger people who’ve come through these hurricanes since 2005, you know, and gained a lot of
great perspective and how you offer them in those conditions and they’ve really done a
marvelous job. So—but we have people who are designated behind people, you know, if they’re
not here, we could do that today.”
• Meaning Unit # 5: What impact did Hurricane Katrina and
subsequent storms have on your plans, policies and procedures?
Respondent 1, Facility 1:
“There was something that was established post-9/11 that kind of changed for the entire
nation and it’s called NIMS, N-I-M-S, and they came up with a National Incident Management
System. And…there is emergency grant funds that are put out every year. And it’s monies that
come through HHS and it’s distributed by…the state hospital association. If any hospital wants
to receive those funds then they have to be compliant with NIMS. Now, part of NIMS and HICS
[Hospital Incident Command System], they teach you how to establish an Emergency Operations
Center. I think probably EOC came about, post 9/11, as a result of it…it’s a unified command.
And we use the same unified command in our EOC. Then our EOC reports to the Parish EOC.
So if we’re in need of something, say post-Gustav, here’s a real example: Gustav comes,
everything’s okay over here, the water…I don’t know if you’re familiar with…what happened…but there was water contamination. So the water plants weren’t able to properly sanitize the
water. So then there was a boiled water order put into place. So what ends up happening,
obviously for our potable water, we have a pretty good demand for it. We weren’t able to allow
patients to drink or even bathe in…people that had open wounds…to even bathe in that water.
So, we had a need for water…potable water. We could…the way that this EOC system is set up
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now is that there is a web EOC and it goes straight to the state EOC. So I guess we’re three
layers down. So you have the state EOC, parish EOC, hospital EOC. We meet, we say, ‘We
have X number of gallons of water left that’s going to last us a day and a half.’ We don’t know
how long this is going to…going to go on and we put in an order. So we pick up the phone, call
our Parish EOC, they get the order, they put it in. And from that unified command, they’re…this
is where it works really well…all of the orders are going into this one system; they can see where
the needs are. And they start distributing water, supplies, anything that’s needed for that one
spot.”
Respondent 4, Facility 2:
“Well, about two years ago, XXXX started a move to get everybody to standardize their
emergency operation plans. And as you might imagine, that was not a real welcome task at the
time because everybody has a plan and every year we have to submit our plan to get our license
renewed. And I certainly understand why they wanted to standardize it, but it took us about two
years to get the plan in the format that they wanted it and we’ve done that. We’ve added some
policies and procedures that they wanted added. So I think again, standardization is a good thing
so that if you went somewhere else you would understand how the plan goes. As far as disseminating information, we have a safety committee that meets once a month and on the committee is everyone from the CEO to the chief nursing officer. . .the chief clinical officer now
…risk manager, the infection preventionist, most of the department heads, and everybody from
the lab to pharmacy to nursing and ED, I mean, it’s a crowd…and we also have the pathologist
who is the official chair…because…our safety is a combined safety and prevention thing…because we have all the people at the table, we can get some business done, I mean if there’s something that comes up, we can make a decision and go and you’ve got the boss there to say okay,
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let’s go. And so there’s not a lot of wasted time and effort to go, ‘Well, I’ll have to talk to
administration about this.’ Hell, I’ve got administration sitting there…”
Respondent 5, Facility 3:
“Nope, no family, no children…nobody. I will tell you that is very controversial because
people tell me, ‘Well employees just won’t come in if you won’t allow their family members to
come in.’ Well, I would suggest to you that you come here sometime because they do. We do
not allow family. There are always exceptions to the rule and there have been exceptions made
for very key people whose mother was the sole surviving relative and she had no place to go. So
we bring her in and just don’t talk about it. But as a rule, no family members. Here’s the reason
why: we have 600 people here; now let’s say we have 150 patients here. Now we’re up to 750
people here. We allow all of those patients to have a guest; one, not two, not three…a guest.
Now we’re up to 900 people. Now let’s go back to the 600, and multiply that times three…
you’re up to 2,700 people in the building and you get to the point that you can’t control it. I have
to feed them…I have to sleep them…I have to take care of them. And you become dangerously
close to depleting your resources. We just don’t allow it…No pets, either, while we’re at it.”
____________
“After Katrina…it may have been Tuesday morning, I got a call from my hospitality
services guy, who’s in charge of security and a whole bunch of stuff, he said…’We’ve got a
problem and I need you down here as quick as you can get down here.’…I’m on my way down
there and he said, ‘We’re getting ready to get overrun here. There’s people wanting to get in this
hospital to see their family members who are patients here, their family members who are staff
here, and we’re going to lose control of the building.’ And I said, ‘Shut the building down,’ and
we shut the building down. And the only entrance that was even open at all was right down here
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in the parking garage. And we posted security and denied access to the building. I walked out as
soon as we did that to talk to anybody that had questions…I was never concerned with people
pulling out weapons and shooting…We did have the National Guard here…We set up, in our
elevator lobby there’s a telephone there, and we set up a system where people could come in and
use our phone system inside the hospital lobby…they could call up to their family members who
were in here. Or they could call their child’s work extension and that child could come down
and walk outside and talk to them. And it worked fine, but we did that, actually, for several
days.”
Respondent 8, Facility 4:
“We really didn’t have anything written in our emergency plan, we did have stuff about
family. What we basically…because to be honest, we had just finished revising our plan, probably a week prior…had just reviewed it and revised it. The thing was that we could bring immediate people like your children or your mother or father, usually a couple of people. What
we did was kind of like a hotel that we had a desk set up when all the people started coming in.
We tagged everybody so we knew who they were, kept an inventory of who the people were,
who they were with, and where they were located at so we knew that. However, it didn’t happen
that way and it was very difficult for families and we had one nurse that brought in maybe a
dozen people, it was a huge amount of people, and at that point in time, there’s no way you can
turn them away. I think some hospitals, and the one that I worked in after Katrina, had a policy
that only one person could come in with each employee that was coming in and that person had
to be an able-bodied person to be able to help with moving, lifting, or whatever it could be. I
think it varies according to the different hospitals. Again, we tried to have a minimum amount,
but at that point, it was not possible, I guess.”
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Respondent 9, Facilities 5 and 6:
“We had probably about 1,000 people. We had about 200 patients on each
campus, very little family. Our emergency plan, you know, the only way a family member stays
in the house is if it’s some way that they can assist with the care of that patient. And no family
members for staff. And we make that clear up front with our staff is that if you’re on the
activation team, is that you need to make provisions to get your family to wherever you feel
they’re safe so that you’re not having to worry about their well-being…you know, family, pets,
get your house secure. Whatever you need to do, and we let them go far enough in advance so
that they can go home and get all those arrangements taken care of and then…report back.”
Respondent 11, Corporate Healthcare Executive:
“...a plan is simply a plan, and until you’re actually in a situation, there are just
contingencies you don’t plan for or think of, so you have to be willing to certainly deviate from
that plan based upon needs...I think another top thing that we learned was that even with that
being said, you can’t plan enough. You can’t really have enough resources. You can’t have
enough coordination of resources, and that’s probably where I think the biggest change for us
came in, not only from an individual facility perspective when I was at XXXX, but from a
company-wide perspective. Because since Katrina, as a company, we have now a team of folks
at corporate that purely is focused on emergency preparedness. We were provided with a large
additional number of tools, tool kits, resources, after Katrina, to better plan for upcoming events
…not just hurricanes but any type of mass disaster, mass catastrophic event. From a division
perspective, we never really had a division-wide plan as a division over all of our hospitals. We
just relied that each hospital had their own plan that would work. What we also came to learn is
that we needed to have better coordination between our facilities because we had to rely on our
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sister facilities to kind of take our patients, take our staff, to help provide resources, etc. and that
just all kind of evolved on its own in the aftermath. So now, we clearly have, if you look at my
bottom shelf here, you see the big thick binder on the bottom and the one on top. This is the full
version…and this is the travel version in the event we have a disaster…of all the resources, all
the plans, you know, we have a coordinated effort now from a standpoint of if the storm is
coming in from the southeast, here’s the evacuation plan. If it’s coming in directly from the
south, here’s the evaluation plan or here’s the contingency plan. If it’s coming in from the
southwest, because it certainly impacts which direction our patients, our staff may be going.
I guess that was the other kind of awakening is in our emergency preparedness, prior to
Katrina…truly, 95% of it, if not more, was based upon pre-storm strike. We never really
thought about needing a post-storm emergency preparedness plan…and so a lot more effort
took place thereafter as far as how do we shelter-in-place for longer? What happens if we don’t
get these resources to get us out? I’m sure you’ve read, you’ve heard, you know, because we are
a for-profit company, we had a lot of resources that were able to be deployed to us and we were
pretty much one of the first hospitals evacuated out of the New Orleans area, and then the folks
that corporate hired then assisted in the evacuation of…others…because the federal resources
just weren’t there, or the state resources, obviously. So, you know, I would have to say again,
planning certainly is a critical piece, front-end as well as back-end…a much more organized,
coordinated across-the-division plan, within-a-division plan, which we didn’t even have before…the plans are built upon the size, the strength, the movement, the direction of it [the hurricane]…it doesn’t have to be a category five storm for it to be a devastating effect, but at the
same time we know certainly category five is gonna be devastating, you know.”
____________
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“We do radio checks weekly on our HRSA emergency preparedness channels; 700
megahertz channels, 800 MHz channels every single Monday to where we can make sure lights
and radios are working. It goes beyond hurricanes…it’s truly emergency preparedness, disaster
preparedness, any type of disaster, any type of hazard, correct? You know, the other thing that
I’m doing now as well, which is certainly a change is, I also serve, in addition to my division
position over emergency preparedness, I also serve as a volunteer designated regional coordinator [DRC] for Region One, working with [individual’s name], to where it taps me into
the city-wide, state-wide communication network, which we were not tapped into before, to
where we can clearly know and see what’s happening all around us. I have access now to every
communications system for every region in the state. If I wasn’t a volunteer DRC, I would not, I
would be limited to only my region. Beyond again hurricanes, we’ve done avian flu
preparedness, we’ve done, you know, terrorist preparedness, and all those drills we do
collectively now as a region versus individual hospitals doing their own drills, doing their own
things, and that goes a long way.
So we’re doing much more detailed preparedness and much more inter-facility, interregional type preparedness, where we weren’t doing that before…and it’s much more coordinated. It’s just elevated it to an entirely different level and…there was some effort there
before, but it certainly got beefed up big time after Katrina.
Number one, we try to limit that [people] as much as possible because we had too many
people on-site for Katrina, including animals. The other thing that we’ve done as a contingency
is we have contracts. We rent out space where we have a location for our employees that can
drop off their animals at the hospital. We will take them…and route them to this designated
location where they’ll be sheltered and cared for and we send a team of people to shelter and care
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for them. The other thing we do is for our folks who are not going to be sitting in-house but we
need them as the backup…crew. We again rent out space in central XXXX. We send them all
up there. They all know they’re on Plan B, not Plan A, and they can go up there with their family. We provide food, catering, housing, what have you, and transportation, even if we need to
get them there, or they can provide their own, and then if we need them afterwards, we have the
ability to access them to get them back.”
Respondent 13, Facility 9:
“Yeah, we ask those staff who know that they are going to be asked to be available for
disaster duty, to make sure that they have a plan at home for their homes and their families. We
ask them to activate that as soon as we activate any plan that we have and that they know how to
contact their family members and that their family members know how to contact them. I have
taken that tack up until now that we can’t become a shelter for anyone. We just can’t take on
that responsibility.”
____________
“…what we did was we dialyzed them as long as we could that day knowing that they
would get out by 5 p.m. or whatever. Most of them are ambulatory and can take care of themselves. So we got them out like that. The prison population is a population that you can’t just
send anywhere. So you have to coordinate that with the department of corrections and decide
where they want to send the patients and where they can supervise them from the security
standpoint. So working with them was an important aspect.”
•

Meaning Unit # 6: What are your thoughts about evacuation?

Respondent 1, Facility 1:
“…probably the main difference in pre-Katrina, post-Katrina that it has to do with the
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evacuation of the hospital. Our plans…our emergency operations plans…have been the same or
basically the same since probably the 90s. So, way before Katrina they were that way. But what
we relied on for the evacuation of the hospital was just our own resources…contracts with
XXXX Ambulance or different ambulance companies and also memoranda of understanding
with different hospitals north of I-10 that would help us with bed capacity if we wanted to move
patients. Now fast forward to post-Katrina. Post-Katrina is something that the state has really
done well with and put together with, there’s an online system where we…it’s called EMSTAT,
E-M-S-T-A-T. And then there’s something called AT-RISK, A-T-R-I-S-K. And that’s where
facilities in particular, we’re talking about hospitals, report their current state, status, and also
they report their bed capacity, and their need for evacuation, either partial or full. So that’s one
of the main components that’s different, post-Katrina. And then what happens is if you are…if
you can’t evacuate yourself or you’re stuck with some patients, there’s a timeline. They call it
an H-Hour timeline that…and it’s H-Hour 60 is kind of the drop dead point where you have to
say “Shelter-in-place” or “Evacuate me.” And if you say, “Evacuate me” at H-Hour 60, then
soon after that the government, it’s called M-I-E-P, Medical Institution Evacuation Plan, they’re
coming to get you. And for us, they’re going to...the plan is to come to the front of the hospital
near the ER, pick up the patients. They transport them to XXXX Air Force Base…and there’s
C-130’s now. So, though that plan is nice to have and be able to fall back on, what everyone
needs to realize…and our hospital does, but everybody needs to realize, including all our
physicians…that’s a last resort. It’s a military operation. They’re going to move these patients
in a military fashion. So it’s a risky thing, it’s a tough decision that our own internal emergency
operations center takes very seriously and you have to sit there and ponder, ‘Are we going to do
this?’ ‘Can we do it ourselves?’ Because moving critical patients on…with the military is
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potentially very risky.”
____________
“…here’s where the AT-RISK system comes in to play…every four hours after H-hour
72, I think it is…I think that’s the H-Hour…they [the state] notify us. But every four hours you
begin reporting your census. And in that report you’re giving them medical history/criticality of
each patient. And then you’re giving your available beds. So all the hospitals throughout the
state are reporting this. And through the state EOC, someone’s looking at it and saying, ‘Wow,
okay, [this hospital’s] down to 60 patients. And if we need to evacuate all 60…where can we put
them, where’s the bed capacity?’ ‘…XXXX has 27 beds.’ And they’re looking at that every
four hours and they continue to update it in the system. It’s a spreadsheet and they’re looking at,
‘Okay, are we in the green?’…it’s color coordinated for them…’Those guys in the yellow and
the red, we can’t move all of them.’ So there’ll be discussions: What’s going to happen? How’s
this going to be handled? How are we going to handle it?...AT-RISK is the way they manage
that bed capacity system.”
Respondent 2, Facility 1:
“Approaching hurricanes, they change directions and they change force, and you’re
sitting here thinking, ‘Am I sitting here like a fool making a decision that’s going to possibly
endanger people’s lives,’ and, you know, ‘Am I trying to be a hero or I’m trying to do the wrong
thing here really,’ and it really makes you stop and think, you know, after you’ve considered
how well prepared you are, ‘Is this the right thing or the best thing to do?’ It really…you know
all the decisions in healthcare that you make…that’s a very key one. But I try to get the best I
can out of the people that I work with. What is their feel for it? Their understanding of it. I
want to make sure we’re as prepared as we can be and we don’t have deficits going into it, where
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we know we’re weak. You know, we don’t really have as you said, ‘second line people’ or
facilities, stuff like that, that’s not ready to endure a storm. And then, that’s what I think you get
paid to do is make a decision and hang with it. But one of the other things that I do…and I did it
very clearly before I…made the decision, I said to them, ‘Okay, now we’ve made the decision,
now there’s no turning back.’”
Respondent 3, Facility 2:
“…the major adjustment we made was the evacuation decision…in terms of that because
we work very closely with the local EOC and…the emergency manager. We took all of our
patients out of the ICU and sent them to XXXX…where they were, you know, safe. But the
ambulances couldn’t get back because the roads were so jammed. So with the contraflow and
taking up both sides of the roads, the ambulances weren’t able to get back timely enough to keep
them…cause we were considering at that point we would’ve gone ahead and loaded up a few of
the other patients…and sent them out, too. But we did…you know, I don’t know why I can’t
remember the name of the storm now…but after that we did evacuate. And that, maybe, is a
good thing for the patients. It’s a horrible thing for the hospital. And there is no financial backup for it all. Because you discharge everybody, you’ve got people sitting here drawing salaries
because you’re an emergency responder. You have no patients to bill and then it takes us three
weeks to get the census to come back up to a level where it was sustainable again as a hospital.
We lost millions of dollars by evacuating, and there’s no backup for that. So, in other words, this
is after post-Katrina and there was another storm that came up and you decided to evacuate
…financially we couldn’t sustain. We couldn’t do that again. We would do it if we had to, but
it’s just you have to be prepared for that several million dollar shock.”
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Respondent 4, Facility 2:
“…we’ve never shut the place down, I mean, we’ve never done that. So the thought of
not having someone here to take care of folks after the fact…we discussed it, and then, of course,
you had no idea of knowing what the magnitude of what was coming. Everybody felt pretty
comfortable, so we decided, ‘Let’s stay.’ Again, another reality is, you’ve got a couple of things
that happen, if you decide to evacuate and the governor or somebody hasn’t declared an emergency, guess who’s paying for that? You are. The other thing is that I guess people say,
‘Well, did you get rid of all your patients?’ Sure, we discharge all the healthy patients and get
them out of here, but guess who stays? Not your healthy ones, the ones that can’t go. And the
reality is…that in terms of transporting and all of that, there’s not enough transport around. I
mean you have to make that decision, not hours in advance, you’ve got to make that decision
days…days in advance. So it’s a double-edged sword, you know, it’s kind of a no-win situation.
And you try and weigh everything, look at what’s coming. In terms of a hurricane, an
evacuation…if we had to evacuate, we have a plan…our ambulance company…they are our
folks that would evacuate us if we had to do it…and they have the resources, but if everybody
…was trying to evacuate at the same time, nobody’s going to have that kind of [resource]. . .I
mean, it’s just the reality. So, you know, I think one of the things that we learned from Katrina
was you better be damn well able to stand by yourself for at least a week or four days. I think
Joint Commission is asking people to be able to do it for 96 hours…the magic number that they
used. You’ve got to be able to do that, I mean if you can’t do that then you’ve got a problem.
And that’s not easy to do, but we’re…I don’t want to say we’re all lucky because a lot of it, we
planned to do.”
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Respondent 5, Facility 3:
“We do not evacuate. Period. End of discussion. We’re a shelter-in-place facility. It,
number one, makes no sense to even consider evacuation…If you’re talking about a 100%
evacuation possibility, any disaster preparedness professional will tell you that if you perform a
100% evacuation of a modern healthcare facility, you should anticipate deaths. People will
die as a result of it…There is an infamous…e-mail that I sent out on Friday morning before
Katrina hit…and it reads something like:
Well, it’s Friday, and there is a category one storm that has just crossed over
Florida and it’s called Hurricane Katrina. All of the models indicate that
Katrina will enter into the Gulf, go north, then northeasterly and make
landfall sometime Saturday in Appalachicola. Having said that, we are
headed into the weekend, so everyone pay attention.
Friday morning we had no inkling that a hurricane was going to be here. Monday morning, the
…greatest natural disaster in the history of the United States hit…There is not enough time in
between when we became truly concerned…and when the hurricane hit to evacuate all these
patients, one. And beyond that, there is the financial component of it. When are you going to
make the call? Presuming it’s going to take about 72 hours to perform an orderly 100%
evacuation, are you going to start evacuating the hospital every time you’re within the 72-hour
cone of uncertainty? That can happen five or six times a year. And it’s not…it’s just not going
to happen…The discussion we have is one, do we go to shelter conditions?...[because that’s a
pain]…it’s just a pain…for us administratively and for the employees. And if we make a
determination…yes, we’re going to go to shelter conditions, well, then, when do we do that?
That is a collective decision. It’s not a single person’s decision; not the CEO, not me, not any
one person makes that decision. We hammer that one out and it usually gets fairly
argumentative because there are those of us that want to go to shelter conditions sooner…rather
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than later. And then there are others that, well it would really be better if we did it right at a shift
change. And so that tends to push it back a little bit. The key thing that you have to do is if
you’re going to go to shelter conditions, then you’re going to bring that Hurricane Team in, you
have to do it in such a fashion that, one, they can make some preparations…but two, if not more
important, those people who are not going to be here, that are on duty, you kind of have to give
them enough time to get out of town…or to do whatever it is they’re going to do. Don’t put
them in harm’s way as a result of it. So that’s where we have our big debates—are we going to;
are we not. It’s very expensive.”
Respondent 6, Facility 3:
“The problem with evacuating is where do you go cause you don’t know where the
storm’s going to be. I mean it would make no sense for [us] to evacuate to XXXX and XXXX
get part of the storm and lose their power…they’re in no better shape than we would be in. So, I
mean with hurricanes, they’re going north as far up as they can and causing downed power lines
and all that kind of stuff at other places, too. So, where do you evacuate? You can’t evacuate to
the east or west because you don’t know where the storm’s going to go in at. What I’ve never
really understood is why don’t we airvac patients out, especially with XXXX and their large
transport planes, things like that…”
Respondent 7, Healthcare Association Executive:
“…Gustav…was the first full coastal evacuation…in the history of the United States. It
was very intense…Not only did we evacuate over 1,000 hospital patients out, either privately or
through the National Disaster Management System (NDMS) program. (About half of them were
through the NDMS and the other half were private evacuations.) You also had 7,000-8,000
nursing home patients. You had another 25,000-30,000 patients go into different medical special
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needs shelters, general population shelters. So you had well over a million people that evacuated
…during that timeframe.”
____________
“…hospitals are places of refuge. They’ve always been that. They’ve been kind of the
refuge for the community. When everything else fails, communities depend on what? They
depend on that base infrastructure of support and life support. You know, they depend on fire,
they depend on police, and they depend on health. So hospitals have that fiduciary responsibility…And as a CEO then you have that responsibility for the community as well as the
patients and the staff that you have in-house, because you are the refuge…you have that decision
of who can be evacuated, who can’t be evacuated…that liability factor is huge these days in
decision-making on evacuation…As far as evacuation is concerned that’s an argument that’s
nationwide and you hear it a lot…ideally, you would rather shelter-in-place. If you knew that the
infrastructure was going to be intact. If you knew that your physical plant was going to stay
intact…and that you could get to things that you needed, including supplies, which was an issue
after Katrina. It was an issue after Gustav because of bureaucracy and policy to where they
weren’t letting trucks through. So, we ended up getting passes for trucks to get past state police
barricades that had critical hospital supplies in those trucks. So, there’s a lot of other
considerations along with that. Can you get the supplies that you need post? I’ve gone around
the country and spoken at length, and I went to New Jersey this year. I’ve been to New Mexico.
I’ve been to other places talking about sheltering and sheltering-in-place and what are the lessons
learned and the pros and cons of those things. And when you go with using the federal system,
there’s this fight with the feds about what resource. We don’t have the state resources to evacuate people…We don’t have that luxury here. You know, we don’t have enough ambulances
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and enough infrastructure to be able to do that. We also don’t have enough, generally speaking,
we don’t have enough in-state bed capacity to evacuate just in-state. Most of our evacuations
end up being out-of-state. So, then you’ve got to rely on a federal asset to do that. And the feds
are saying right now…that they can’t move any more than 150 patients a day…let’s do the math
…we evacuated 1,000 patients for Gustav. The math doesn’t quite add up…And so you’ve got
this huge disconnect in that. And so more and more we work with the facilities to build their
shelter-in-place…so they can stay but that they don’t have the same problems they had just postKatrina and sheltering-in-place when they lost infrastructure, where the generators are…more
and more the facilities’…desire is, ‘We’re just gonna hunker down,’ you know, and we’re just
gonna, ‘We’re going to beef up and we’re going to bone up,’ but that’s expensive to do. You’ve
gotta bring in supplies and resources and everything else to try to get everything that you need.
Hospitals weren’t evacuating their healthy patients, they were evacuating their sickest
patients and those least able to travel. So, it puts those patients, they become even more fragile
and they’re at greater risk, and we lost some patients as a result of that…we lost a patient on the
tarmac waiting on a C-130 aircraft. Because feds didn’t put airplanes on the ground when they
said they were going to have them there. We had the patients waiting on them. They said have
the patients there at 4:30 in the morning and we had them there at 4:30 in the morning. They
[the feds] weren’t there. They weren’t there until 10:00 o’clock that morning. And so we had
fragile, compromised patients and it was hot…so we lost one or two. We lost a couple. The
other side is that very fragile, very compromised, probably end-of-life patients anyway, but still.
Then you’ve got neighboring states that reach out and are wonderful to us. XXXX, they were
wonderful partners to us. They got just the shaft after Gustav. I can’t speak after Katrina as
much, but after Gustav, they were out millions and millions and millions of dollars that the feds
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wouldn’t reimburse…because they didn’t have that waiver capability because they weren’t in
the disaster area. They weren’t in a declared disaster. The governor declares a state of disaster
…requests the presidential declaration of disaster to get the 1135 waiver piece. . .So XXXX
this year pulled out of NDMS…the NDMS system is kind of a network around the country, of
states, it’s not a compact to become an NDMS provider. And they say, okay we’ll help out
…those hospitals in and around XXXX lost so much money after Gustav doing the right thing
taking care of our patients for us that they told NDMS, ‘Unless this is fixed we are not going to
renew our contract with NDMS,’ and they didn’t. They served a notice of termination. . .So, you
know, now. . .that affects those numbers of patients that you can transport and evacuate…We
deal with the logistics of, I have X number of people I’ve got to move and I’ve, what resource do
I need to put to bear?...Some hospitals CEOs do not want the liability. We had hospitals during
Gustav that were the only provider in their community closed up. So there was no place of
healthcare refuge for that community during Gustav because they didn’t want the liability. They
felt the risk was too great. They closed up. Closed the door. That’s the risk.”
Respondent 8, Facility 4:
“I think from the air evacuation, the hospitals that were completely surrounded by water,
of course, there were only two ways to evacuate patients, and one was by boat or water and the
other one was, of course, air evacuation. The problem with air evacuation in some hospitals
…I’m gonna say XXXX. . .I’m not sure of any others. I think there was one more that actually
built a heliport because these helicopters were landing on some roofs that were soggy. The
hospital that I was in, we had a heliport that really had not been used for about 20 years. We
had just put in a couple thousand dollars [on it]…I don’t remember exactly how much we put
in…to support it because, it was like, falling down. We hadn’t really used it that much because
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XXXX was the trauma center and there was really no need to do so, we hadn’t used it in many,
many years, and the fact was that it really didn’t have lights on it. When the first helicopter
came, we had no idea if the structure would support it or not, which it did. Therefore, I think as
far as air evacuation there are so many things that went on with this storm. Sitting in a building
with no communication…we would put people up there [on the heliport] waving down helicopters to try to get them and once they started, they did. Finally, the company that we
[contracted] for, XXXX, on that Thursday and Friday, did get helicopters in here, but the government took over that air space very quickly. The other thing that upset us at first, but it’s just the
way it is, when the city started flooding, we really did not see that water until Tuesday, you
know, it took a while to get to us. On that Monday, we had started, also that Sunday, but more
that Monday, we really started contacting some of our hospitals. We worked in a corporation
and we had hospitals in Alabama, Texas, calling to see if we could evacuate some of our
patients. Some of them accepted…many of them did, but the problem was, once the federal
government took over the air space and started coming once in a while to pick up patients, they
would only bring them to Louisiana [hospitals] so they would not bring them outside the state, so
that was one of the issues there, too. The lack of communication, I guess, one of the first helicopters that landed, we didn’t know…we went up to the heliport. We had no idea if they were
coming or not or when, and they really just came to get patients. If we had none up there, they
left. We decided from that point on that we had to have the patients up [on the heliport] and
ready to go because we had no clue when they would come or not…
I think we need to evacuate, I mean, and I know there is some criteria in the city that has
established what category of storm and I think they have it all planned. I’m not sure if that’s
from the hospital association or whatever with category one and two, so each hospital has been

108

looked at differently. So even XXXX might evacuate with a category two because of where it
is and no protection where maybe XXXX and XXXX might not evacuate until a category four.
It really depends on the assessments that have been done. That plan is in place so different
hospitals will evacuate at different categories of storm. I think we never know what’s going to
happen and I guess we had never evacuated the hospital before and I think that’s a problem in the
whole city. We have never done a full evacuation of our patients and, in fact, when we, you
know, there was some talk that these hospitals did not have an emergency plan. We had a very
good one, we practiced it, we had drills throughout the years. I think the issue is that the whole
infrastructure of the city, there was no way anybody could move throughout the city, so we were
just isolated and there was no way to evacuate those patients in eight to ten feet of water until
somebody came. I think people need to…I know it’s an expensive proposition, but unless
people have been through this situation where they cannot get out and when. . .the hospital becomes a victim itself, then people don’t really have any clue. Because we can walk out of the
front door of a place, you know, it’s quite different than not being able to. All the NICU babies
and all the plans have the high risk patients, the special needs patients, the ones on ventilators,
dialysis patients, all those are in the plans and those were done (evacuated). The babies got out
Tuesday, pretty much before our generators went out, so those were all gone, and our vented
patients.”
Respondent 9, Facilities 5 and 6:
“[We] have both fixed and rotor wing capability…ambulance capability and…bus
capability. So dependent upon what the nature is or where…the patient has to go, how critical
they are. The majority of our patients went out were by ambulance during Gustav. And all of
them came back by ambulance. But they do have that and of course you have a high population
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of what they call ‘classified patients’ sent to red, yellow and green. Red being the very acute,
life support, ventilator, what have you. Yellow meaning that they probably got some kind of
mitigated medical conditions that require constant supervision or medication. Green meaning
they are probably mostly ambulatory and/or in some kind of recovery and are capable of being
put on a bus…Whereas the red may or may not be eligible for fixed wing or rotor wing,
although fixed wing is preferable evacuation. They usually, probably the only people that went
out by rotor wing was our high-risk babies. During Katrina they [patients] went out, most all the
high-risk patients went out by rotor…and then we had the green patients who were taken to
XXXX and went out by fixed wing, a military aircraft.
Our position is we will set in place up to a category three. We feel comfortable that we
can withstand the category three given the mitigation we’ve done since Katrina. Above, a slow
moving category three or a category four, we will then evaluate what we think the most likely
scenario is. We will then make a determination, even for a category three, we will evacuate
dialysis patients. We don’t want to run the risk of having dialysis patients in the building and not
being able to have water to provide dialysis. So even for a category three, we will evacuate
them. We have a mental health facility that is in a building that is not capable of withstanding
much more than a mid to high-level category two. So category three, they’re going. And we
have arrangements with XXXX and XXXX to take those patients. And we go up there
every year and kind of go through a little, you know…exercise…just let them find out where
the patients will be and what the protocols are going to be. What we should supply, what they
are going to supply, and what have you. For a category four we will evaluate, you know, we will
always, even to a category five, we will be here and we will have at least an OR [Operating
Room] open and we will have our trauma center open. Once you start getting into those extreme
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levels, we will then make a medical evaluation of which we think is a greater risk to the patient.
Setting in place and possibly not being able to be adequately provided for, or being transferred
out and being put at the risk of the travel. I don’t know that anybody can just absolutely say
under no circumstances am I going to evacuate…or under all circumstances I am going to evacuate because you have to evaluate each scenario, which is going to pose different risks. Your
plan has to be flexible enough that you evaluate the scenario that’s at hand and then take whatever is the most cautious action that you can take to protect the lives of your patients and your
staff. I don’t know that anybody would evacuate before the governor declares a state of emergency…the governor has to make a declaration and he has to get the president to make a declaration in order to be eligible for federal assistance…I would say the people that put finances as a
primary argument have kind of lost vision of what their mission is…And you know it is expensive because the minute you pull the trigger…If we don’t move one patient, but just to pull the
trigger…we’ve already put a couple million dollars on the line. Our protocol is strictly based on
an evaluation of the situation to protect them. What level of storm it is, what the protector factor
is…how fast it’s moving and what action will put our patients at the least risk…I know there’s
not an absolute answer.”
Respondent 10, Facilities 7 and 8:
“…you create a certain amount of risk in a prophylactic evacuation that may not be
necessary. There is a story of some kid here who was on a bed with a big external thing and with
the elevators down they had to carry him downstairs and all sorts of stuff to try to get him on a
helicopter and fly him out and everything. So, the kid versus somebody who you can bag up a
ramp someplace…So you have a tradeoff between the risks/benefits of moving just a simple vent
patient prophylactically versus that kid I just described. So we ended up moving a lot of NICU
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babies who were hard to move. When Gustav came…it’s not easy to get enough transportation
and get everybody out, you know…you have to manage your timing and your logistics just right.
And Gustav also presented a problem because we became an evacuation site for all hospitals up
in Baton Rouge. It was like a sloshing event for us. So you have to kind of manage for those
things. Shrink your footprint, I like to say. Keep what you should and I’ll defer to the good
judgment from the folks on the ground about who that should be. . .almost a Noah’s Ark sort of
approach to things.
It is very dangerous to move somebody in an emergency situation, and I use the case
of a preemie baby in a NICU, or a patient on a bag. We moved those patients under the calm,
very early before the storm hits and we have designated hospitals we transfer to…So we
transferred those…it’s the ones that are in-between that I don’t transfer that are…yeah, you
could move them, and while the risk is much less to move them electively, running more risks
than I think warranted for the small chance I might run a risk of evacuating them after the storm.
I can keep their ventilators going, I’ve got dedicated transport. I can get them out easily but I
think I’d rather just keep them here…most of the time I’m gonna have a Gustav where I didn’t
even lose city power and I would have moved them for nothing. So it’s sort of a tradeoff and
everybody’s going to draw their own conclusions on those sort of things. My gut is move the
really difficult ones and the very, very easy ones. Everybody in between are the ones you sit still
with. That’s my line.
Transportation is another piece. This hospital was evacuated by helicopters. Knocking
down telephone poles on the top of the XXXX garage so the helicopters could land. XXXX
contracted for several helicopters. Well, you know, it was like finding satellite time…you won’t
have spare ones lying around at this point in time. So they got a few modest things in here and
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they started hauling people out, the sickest of the sick, but they were gonna take a long time, one
or two at a time, getting 1,600 people out of here. Eventually, military craft showed up…the big
Chinooks and stuff that could carry 50-60 people at a time between rotor jobs. That’s when the
stuff really started moving. Now, everybody pretty much, at least we do, [have] contracts with
carriers to get fixed and rotary wing to get people moving both for pre-storm evacuations, poststorm evacuations, whatever immediately needs to happen. So we’ve got the logistics linked up.
The evacuation [the hardest decision for a CEO to make?]…absolutely! Do you know
what one of those decisions costs? I can give you the long version of it, but the short version is,
[a hurricane] drives my expenses up and makes my revenue go away. The cost for a hospital like
this has about over a million dollars a day running through it, in a normal day.”
Respondent 11, Corporate Healthcare Executive:
“We had a heavy emphasis on getting our critical patients out. Well, that’s totally reversed now because we spent a lot more money and we have a lot better processes and systems and
equipment and so forth. It is pretty much now back to a shelter-in-place philosophy unless it’s
truly a category five that we know is highly predictable and directly heading our way but, even
with that we know realistically, there’s no logistical way we can evacuate every patient out of
XXXX. We just don’t have enough manpower, enough resources. There’s not enough
ambulances, there’s not enough helicopters, so we can still evacuate some but we have to
certainly plan to still shelter-in-place with some of them as well.
…you don’t know when to pull the trigger, you know, I mean, as you know, living here
…it’s a matter of the latest report and how much time do you have and that’s our problem…as I
said earlier, logistically, there is no way that everybody could be evacuated. It’s not physically
possible, it’s not humanly possible. We can shelter-in-place longer than we could now before
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Katrina, but I certainly would not want any of my staff, or any of my patients to be around for a
category five cause none of our facilities are built to withstand a high category four, or a
category five, we know that. However, at the same time, we also know, as I just said, you can’t
get everybody out. So, Lord help us if that truly ever does happen cause…I think to an extent
you have to be prepared to shelter-in-place, but at times you have to be more prepared to
evacuate.”
Respondent 12, Facility 9:
“XXXX has a state evacuation plan, part of that plan, there is a local…point-to-point
plan. They load up buses with medical special needs patients. XXXX assists them with what
they call, ‘HEAT Teams,’ Hurricane Evacuation Assistance Teams, which are basically students
in positions. They help in loading the special needs evacuees. Now these aren’t hospital
patients…they are just residents…help them with loading the bus. They accompany the bus up
to Austin and then they’ll stay in Austin to help in the treatment of those patients.
I don’t know if the number is accurate…it is something like two million dollars a day [in
lost revenue from evacuating]. What I tell everybody is to think back to Ike. Imagine doing that
evacuation when outside is flooded, there’s no electricity, no water, or no wastewater…no
elevators…and so you have to take those patients down nine floors of stairs and so forth and just
think back and think about how that would have been. Of course, that was going to be a
judgment call and, you know, potentially you risk, each of them involve risk to the patients, so
you’re trying to minimize the risk, the total risk…First you do census reduction, you know, those
patients that you can. For the patients that you can, we have to evacuate them. For example, the
Neonatal Intensive Care and Intensive Care are pretty much the two big ones. Those are the ones
that you really need to take care of and the person making that decision has to weigh the risk to
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moving them or keeping them here. Another thing to consider is that Ike was only a category
two, right? Yet look at the damage that it did, right? Obvious lessons learned are that you’re
looking at the hurricane severity index and the size of the surge. Everybody knows that now, so
it’s nothing particular that we’re looking at, you know, because the information that we’re
getting now from the National Weather Service…and we contract with a private company to give
us a fairly specific tailored weather forecast for us. So, your decision to shelter-in-place, though,
is driven by whether or not you have designed your facility for the risk, or if you were able to
mitigate the things that weren’t designed for the risk yet.
We started running some small drills for evacuation. This is Neonatal Intensive Care,
this is an ECMO [extracorporeal membrane oxygenation] baby, okay? All of this equipment
goes with this baby down, you know, hopefully an elevator, and it takes about a team of 12 to
move that patient. Then they’ll be taken to fixed-wing aircraft at XXXX Field where I believe
it’s a military aircraft with a specially staffed team of experts that will then transport that patient,
I believe, to San Antonio. So, you can see that this is not a simple problem…it’s just another
example of how you have to address this in advance with very careful planning and testing and
refinement to the plans and so forth. I have just checked today…they actually had to evacuate
this (NICU) room recently due to a power outage. The first thing I asked them for is an afteraction review of that evacuation and I put in there that I would like you to compare how the
evacuation went to the procedures in your standard operating procedure for evacuating Neonatal
Intensive Care, with the knowledge that more than likely there is no written SOP [standard
operating procedure] on evacuating this room. The next step is for them to either pony up an
SOP so that I can look at it, or they say, ‘We don’t have one,’ and so then I can take it to the
Quality Council and say, ‘This is your first order of business. There needs to be a written SOP
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[standard operating procedure] on evacuating this room, especially because the nurse manager is
retiring in January.’ I’ve already told one of the VPs [vice presidents] to the hospital to make
sure she knew that manager was leaving. We need to capture that knowledge before she goes.”
Respondent 13, Facility 9:
“Well, when you live in an area like this, every June to end of November, The Weather
Channel is on in the morning when you’re getting ready for work, and you always have a wary
eye toward the Gulf, so to speak. However, I think we were much more educated about what we
wanted to do when Ike came along than we were when Rita came along, and we had talked a lot
about our Rita experience over the couple of years that were between Rita and Ike. My personal
role, I guess I can tell you about that. In Ike, we knew it was headed our way. We were in constant communication with the state emergency operations center. I went home on Wednesday
evening, I left here around 5 p.m. to wash my clothes, get my house ready and put the plants
inside and all that. I came back at one in the morning after I got all that done and the CEO was
here and the chief medical officer and you could even tell more that the storm was gonna come
this way by then. So we decided that, well, we’re probably going to have to evacuate the, you
know 450 or so patients that we have here. How are we going to do that? So we spent from 1
a.m. until about 6 a.m. trying to plan out how we would do that evacuation and we had, you
know, a couple of principles that we laid out first. One was, we would lose no patient, that
patients would go to the right destination by the right mode of travel, and that we would know
where they were. We articulated those principles and then sort of spread out. We gathered
information about all of the patients that were in the house and asked the physicians who were on
duty, the residents, to start summarizing the care of all their patients so that we would have those
things ready in packets for each of the patients when they got ready to evacuate. We made the
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evacuation call about 7 a.m. when we talked with the state emergency operations center. We
told them, ‘Yeah, we think we want to do this.’ They had anticipated that and had ambulance
resources ready and aircraft ready to evacuate our patients to XXXX or XXXX or wherever they
were going to go…Some of the prisoners from the prison hospital went to XXXX, I think. We
anticipated that we would, at least we planned, to get the most critical patients out first but that
wasn’t how the transportation resources arrived. The transportation resources [that] arrived were
the least prepared to take the most critical patients out…so we had to sort of, on the fly, decide
that we would have to go with that. So…it took us that whole day from about 9 a.m. to midnight, I think the last patient left the helipad at the ER at midnight that night. So that’s sort of
how we approached things…released all the staff after the patients were evacuated. I shouldn’t
say all, there was still a core group of people here. Probably about five hundred people...because
[we] got the evacuation order late so there were still probably 20 to 30% of the…population that
was still [here]. So we felt like we had some duty to maintain some healthcare for them…We
kept our emergency department open and thought that if we are going to have our emergency
department open we need people to be able to do surgery and that kind of stuff. So those people
were here.
Well, I think that we were really smart that we evacuated our patients, both for Rita
which wasn’t much for us. You know, most of that went through XXXX…and XXXX got hit
really hard…It was in the aftermath of Katrina so we had the knowledge that we had gained
from that experience, or what we had seen on the news…from New Orleans to say, ‘Hey, here’s
this huge storm headed at us, let’s not put our patients or our staff in harm’s way. Let’s get them
out of here.’ I think we made that same correct decision in Ike. It would have been horrible to
try to evacuate those 400 patients the next day. Of course, I think they would have been safe.
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The building didn’t suffer any structural damage from the winds or anything, but the
toilets couldn’t be flushed and it would have been a mess. No air-conditioning…”
Respondent 14, Facility 9:
“Well, we have a low threshold for evacuation now. The old-timers around here will
tell you that XXXX never evacuated for less than a four and this thing was coming at a two.
But…this is where we learned a lot from the Katrina and the Rita experiences. You just don’t put
it at risk because, even though our own capabilities in terms of what we generate with power and
the like, we’re fine. I mean no running water…we couldn’t flush the toilets because of the
XXXX infrastructure issue and the like. So there’s no way that you could safely care for patients
under conditions like that. And, so again, we think we have a management plan based on severity of storm that is appropriate based on what we think is likely to happen, but, again, we have a
low threshold for evacuation. We know we can do it safely. We know we can do it without
major incidents. We have transfer agreements with major facilities across XXXX. Even though
it’s expensive…it’s the right thing to do…loss of revenue…You know, it’s probably, add it all
up again, one million and a half to two million dollars for the state…to do a complete evacuation
by the time we mobilize all the ambulances and aircraft and the like. It’s an expensive proposition, but again, you think about what would happen with critically ill patients under those conditions. It’s just not worth the risk. And hopefully in the future, we’ll have a much more solid
infrastructure and, you know, feel more comfortable leaving patients in the hospital, except
under the most severe conditions. But right now, we’ll look at evacuation as an option for all but
the most insignificant storms.”
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• Meaning Unit # 7: Do you have any contracts with suppliers or
mutual assistance agreements in force now for a future emergency?
Respondent 3, Facility 2:
“…we’ve done a couple of things…one was just arrange through the vendors to make
sure that they have a more dependable backup plan. In case their New Orleans region warehouse
is down or something…that they can get stuff from Memphis or somewhere. But we also have
worked with another company to provide a kind of secondary layer of backup if we need it.”
Respondent 5, Facility 3:
“We never hurt at all for supplies. We have agreements with…Owens and Minor for
Med Surg distribution…and they were impacted in New Orleans. It wasn’t so much as their
facility flooded, everything flooded and they couldn’t get to their facility. I believe our supplies
then came out of XXXX, if I’m not mistaken. But they have other…sites that they can pull
from. Is it optimal? No. Do you get by? Yeah. And the fact of the matter is, there’s enough
people got enough supplies squirelled away that they’ve hoarded over the years, that you could
live for a few days. Just from things that have been ‘just in case’ inventory systems. Linens, we
do not do in-house laundry. If not in 20 some-odd years, that laundry facility was flooded and it
was also in New Orleans during Katrina. We scrambled and came up with some alternatives.
That’s been formalized more to where there’s several different laundries…Mutual aid agreements as it relates to patients…we have those. Those are very problematic. We’ve signed
them with other hospitals. The problem with those kinds of agreements is you always have to
stipulate to the degree possible. ‘Yes, I’ll take your patients, to the degree possible.’ And since
most of our associations are coastal associations, it might not do you any good if you had an
association with a hospital in New Orleans. It might not do you any good if you had an
association with a hospital in Pensacola. It just depends on where the storm goes.”
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Respondent 4, Facility 2:
“You know, you can have all the paper you want. The reality is when you get into this
situation, everybody’s vying for the same stuff. You’ve got most of the healthcare facilities
dealing with the same vendors, so we all use Sysco and we all use the major suppliers for
medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. The choice is not unlimited. So the reality is, in fact,
they’re having drug shortages now for some common drugs…So from my point of view, you
know you got it in your hand, you know you got it. If you’re waiting on it to show up, I don’t
know…we probably have more stock during hurricane season and that kind of thing than we did
in the past. But again, it’s a cost...you just can’t go crazy…getting to the mutual aid agreements…The Joint Commission would like you to have a mutual aid agreement with every hospital that’s close to you. And have an agreement to say, ‘Well, I need beds,’ then you’ll loan me
beds blah, blah, blah. . .our current mutual aid agreement we have right now is expired. . .it was a
very simple agreement that said we’ll do what we can to help each other out, basically. And I
think that’s all you’re going to get. But. . .if somebody revised it and they tried to put a lot of
detail in there saying I’m going to tell you my inventory and all that, that ain’t going to happen.
Nobody’s going to do that. Nobody’s going to commit to saying, ‘Oh yeah, if you get a problem,
then you can count on me…to provide you with ten ventilators or whatever.’ That’s not going to
happen. Now, if I call up and I say ‘Hey, I really need this,’ and they [have it on hand] they’ll let
us have it.”
Respondent 8, Facility 4:
“Hospitals are looking at…mutual aid agreements and working with vendors to have a
pallet of supplies and pharmaceuticals maybe stashed or held in XXXX or XXXX or wherever
the place is, but having those agreements with those suppliers and pharmaceuticals and water and
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those type of those things.”
Respondent 10, Facilities 7 and 8:
“…the idea is to basically have access to all sorts of supplies to be delivered. The
helicopters that XXXX sent in here, every helicopter that came in that was gonna take somebody
out, dropped off water, rations, and all sorts of things cause they were running out of stuff.
People joke they were eating Pop Tarts and tuna fish here, but they had something to eat that was
coming in on helicopters. You gotta get that stuff in here; that’s the problem having 1,600
mouths to feed and they didn’t have enough stuff for 1,600 mouths…for that period of time,
particularly once refrigerated things started failing and stuff like that. So logistics, you know,
busses, things like that…you’re gonna have to take control of it. It’s easier than not having
them [contracts] to start with.”
• Meaning Unit # 8: What were your experiences with communications?
What investments have you made in improving your communication capabilities?
Respondent 1, Facility 1:
“We begin meeting and are reporting every four hours. And that’s, you know, every four
hours we’re looking at our census, we’re looking at our staffing pattern…We call our own
shelter-in-place time when storm riders have to be here. We’ll notify everybody through normal
communication systems. That’s going to be through the department meetings, that’s going to be
through phone calls, but we’ve got…something they call RallyPoint. And it’s an online system
…it’s a crisis communication system. And it’s a way that in our command center we can put a
message out and we push the information. We’ll put out a message saying that, ‘Storm riders
have to report for work at 5 p.m. on Sunday,’ and we push that out and it’s going to go out in a
voicemail, it’s going to go out in a text, going to go out in an e-mail and it’s going to alert all of
our employees. All of our employees are in the system. It’s going to push it to them, their text
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messages are going to go off, e-mails are going to go off and they can go and get that
information…the beautiful part about it is a department manager can then go back and look in
the system and see, ‘Wow, 48 of my 50 direct reports have received the message,’ and they can
start working on calling those other two and make sure they have the message…our physicians
are in it as well. We’ll send out a little information like, ‘Elective cases have been cancelled
because of the impending storm if you have any questions, come to the EOC for more
information.’
Katrina came and here’s what was learned and changed since Katrina…our levels of
communication are this: we have the normal telephone system, e-mails, and now my RallyPoint.
So the RallyPoint was put in place after Katrina. If…that goes down, we have these Cisco
phones. This Cisco phone right now is supported by AT&T. If AT&T goes down…these will
operate within house…We can still call and announce throughout the hospital…We have
handhelds…handheld telephones that will continue to operate within house…cause they’re
supported internally…next level is we have a little over a hundred hospital-issued cell phones.
Even with Gustav, which was in ’08, you know, [at] our department head meeting…our [CEO]
did this and said, ‘Does everybody know how to text?’ because that is something in our plan.
We say if phones are down…the next thing is you can try [is] to text…and everybody said, ‘Yes,
yes, yes.’ And then he stops the meeting and says, ‘Everybody send the person next to you a
text, right now.’ I knew how to do it, but [other] people struggled. And he says, ‘We are not
leaving this meeting until everybody can prove to me that they’ve texted.’ So we did that.
So next, we have three 700 MHz and 800 MHz radios. So we could communicate with
the EOC, with the different components of the EOC…Police…Parish and the Regional
coordinators. So we have three of those. Then we have three satellite phones as well. Now all
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of these are redundancies but…if those go down…the next thing is we have 20 five-watt radios.
They have…we tested it as far as the number of miles…what we do with these radios is we could
communicate…and we have 20 of them so we could issue them out within house. If things are
really bad, everything’s down or we can’t use these phones for some reason, it’s 20 people
throughout the facility that have it. What we do is this…a lot of physicians will ride the storm
out with us and they may want to go back to their house after that and stay there, kind of clean up
their yard. What we saw in previous storms was this…we had someone present in the ER
because they’re using a chainsaw. We needed a surgeon that was on-call and his cell phone’s not
working that well. The surgeon just took it upon himself, like every two hours, to drive back to
the hospital, ‘Do you all need me?’ ‘No.’ And he’d go back. Well, with this radio, it’s one
frequency, so all the surgeons…everybody can hear, but you’re going to hear, ‘…We need you
in the ER. You have a patient. Do you copy?’ Puts his…chainsaw down, whatever he’s doing,
and he comes on in…So those radios work as far as a mile, so probably five to seven miles.
And…the last redundancy we have…we have two licensed HAM operators.”
Respondent 3, Facility 2:
“…satellite phones…our antenna blew off the roof. And we didn’t realize that that, of
course, would happen, but we’ve replaced that [antenna] with one that we can take down and put
back up right after the emergency…right after a storm, if there is one. So we’ve got better sat
phone capabilities, got better radios in the county. And cell phones are still cell phones.
Everyone’s got their own phones. And actually, that’s probably better, because that means that
you have a variety of providers. I mean they all tried hard, but it really was…it really was
almost 14 days before we had coverage…when the emergency people, the emergency operations in the county, switched over to Nextel because Nextel has that reputation for being with
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fire departments, ‘push to talk,’ and you had all that nice capability. And so the hospital,
police, fire department. . .most of them had switched to Nextel and Nextel basically just abandoned us completely. It was two weeks before you could even think about making a call on their
network. When I called their 800 number to say something about it, the first time we had a decent signal, the lady said, ‘Well, I’m sorry sir, your zip code is not in the affected area.’ I suggested they check their map. But they ended up trying to sue us over the bill because I refused to
pay for the 14 days of service when I had nothing. They tried to sue us over it and I just said,
‘Okay.’ When I got that final call from the collection guy and he said, ‘Well we’re going to
have to take you to court on this,’ and I said, ‘I’m going to love it.’ I said, ‘As a matter of fact,
the TV station is right here.’ They were here doing an interview for something else. I said, ‘The
TV reporter is right here. I’m going to go out and tell him Nextel’s going to sue us over this bill
now.’ And then [he said] ‘well…wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute…’”
Respondent 6, Facility 3:
“…communication was as good as it could get at that point in time. You know, not
everyone’s going to walk around with satellite phones...I worry more about communicating
within my department. We have walkie-talkie type phones at this time that allow us to communicate well. . .the house supervisor has that type phone…engineering has that phone, you know.
We actually have two different walkie-talkie type systems in the hospital that can be used.”
Respondent 8, Facility 4:
“I think some of the big gaps…I think number one is communication by far. I think the
whole Katrina mess was a lack of communication on every level from local, from even the
hospital side, up to the federal government and when I look at communication, there were things
that I think we could have done better. We were in a huge facility…probably a million square
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feet…it’s huge, multiple buildings. The communication was not always there. Number one we
didn’t get a lot of communication from the outside at all. Typically, we were pretty paralyzed
with that, but internally, I think communication could have been handled somewhat differently
and maybe more frequently from, I don’t want to say the administrative staff, but the people that
knew what was going on and had the responsibility to coordinate all the efforts. So I think, you
know, that was one big thing. I think when people don’t hear a lot they assume the worst and
probably by Thursday, people, whether it was staff or visitors…we had about 2,000 people in
the facility…probably close to 400 patients, maybe 600 staff and so the rest were family
members…people from the outside community and all that came there. So, again trying to take
handle of all that and keep those communications going was a very big challenge for us.”
Respondent 9, Facilities 5 and 6:
“…800 MHz will be gone by the end of the year…700 MHz is the standard now…The
people that are on incident command [receive the radios]. And they receive those and then we
have, for…department to department, and for the principals in the incident command, we have
little two-way radios that are good for…three to five miles that they can communicate with
whatever support functions report to them. Those are post-Katrina. They were bought with
…HHS [Hospital and Health Services] had several grants and communications was one of them.
Matter of fact, participating in HHS grants, if you participate there’s a set of criteria you have to
meet. One of them is that you have to have at least two 700 MHz radios. The idea being that
you probably have one in a central communication standpoint, and one would be for your
incident command, at a minimum. . .on this campus they totally lost communications because
they lost their telephone switch. On the XXXX campus we still had some land lines that worked.
The phone in my office worked the full time. It never went out. My cell phone never went out.
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We did have a satellite radio, telephone, which was sporadic. I think some of that was probably
due to atmospheric conditions, some of it was probably due to the user, just not being familiar
with that. We still have satellite radio, that satellite radio’s capable of doing both voice
communication and data communication. During Katrina what happened was that we would,
through satellite or through hospital police, you know, just two-way radios that we had, that we
could communicate from one campus to the other, is that we would get the status report from this
campus down to XXXX campus and then because we had a landline…And that’s the way that
most of that communication went on at that time. We did have HAM radios. Now, since then,
we have…a volunteer ham operator. Since that time, XXXX has installed two HAM radios in
every XXXX hospital.”
Respondent 10, Facilities 7 and 8:
“…it was a big problem for everybody…communications. It was worse for the XXXX
than for here at XXXX. Here they had a landline phone, analog phone. Interestingly, when the
phones failed with the battery backup from the digital switches, I’m inferring this, I’m no phone
expert, but the analog failed…the rotary dial worked and we actually had a couple of those
here…down in the switch room. XXXX didn’t have them and I can give you the long convoluted thing cause the communications deteriorated by the day. At one point, the federal
government was on Sprint circuits, that’s the federal telephone system. Sprint had a big node
here that flooded. It was out completely. So they had to make long distance calls and the only
way they could make long distance calls when the local phone service failed was to have a
calling card. Nobody had any more cell phones. Everything was closed in this area. Every store
was closed. I had somebody in Washington go to a Wal-Mart and buy me calling cards with
minutes on them so I could call in the numbers. That lasted about a day cause then the local
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lines failed, and at the time we were actually evacuated from XXXX, we were communicating
by police band radio with a XXXX clinic in XXXX who was calling me in XXXX on a cell
phone. I didn’t have landline communication. I was calling Washington on my cell phone or
texting on a Blackberry, which was very intermittent, by the way, and they were communicating
through an Air Force base in Illinois with all patient information. We were getting a tail number
for the plane who was gonna pick those patients up out of the airport. There was a long
convoluted stretch…communications were terrible. People had handheld satellite phones. They
didn’t work. The theory is overcast, helicopters, not a bandwidth with all the traffic and
everything. We found out that cell phones from other area codes might work when yours
didn’t…different carriers would work. There was no rhyme or reason to it. So what we have
now…we have a fixed satellite system on the roof that is hurricane-proof that we prepaid…hard
to buy satellite bandwidth after something like this happens. You have to pay for it up front, pay
for the bandwidth up front, so you’ve got time on it. That’s what CNN, and everybody else were
doing, they’re sitting down here broadcasting up the street here. Sanjay’s running around and all
that sort of stuff.
So, satellite communications, we have cell phones from other area codes, we swapped.
We have HAM radios, with trained HAM operators…plus, and I’m not sure of the frequency of
this, but the state has used monies, it got emergency preparedness monies, we now have radionet
where we’re in contact with emergency services, other hospitals, and we have a statewide
radionet that will work when all else fails. I’m confident we have communication covered where
we didn’t have it before, and all hospitals have that now.”
Respondent 12, Facility 9:
“…communications was huge during Katrina or the lack thereof, because no one…our
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plans did not call for us having to stay within a facility more than 72 hours, not having to be
without power for more than 72 hours. However, we had the front-end covered in regards to
communications. We didn’t have the back-end covered and that’s what we were talking about
earlier, that’s where thereafter we decided to purchase satellite radios and satellite stations to
where we wouldn’t have that as an issue.
…in terms of communications planning, because one of the problems that they had with
the evacuation last time was that there wasn’t good coordination between the staging area and
here. For example, if they needed an advanced life support system ambulance for a given
patient. Here, they thought that ambulance was coming, they’d bring the patient downstairs at
the front door, and wrong kind of ambulance would show up…or the ambulance would show up
and they’d say, ‘Okay this patient is going to XXXX.’ Then the driver would say, ‘Well, my
orders were to go to XXXX, and I’m not going anyplace else.’ Yes, that patient has to go back
upstairs while another ambulance comes…so, a couple of things that we’ve done is…we now
have a land use agreement where Target and Home Depot is for an ambulance staging area.
Those property owners have agreed to basically outfit this to help support those ambulances
while they’re there. So, we are here and we’ve got XXXX Field here for fixed wing and we’ve
got a heliport here for rotary aircraft. And so, you’ve got ambulances basically coming to the
front door…so there’s patients going out the front door, there’s patients going out the back door
for helicopters, then they are going here to XXXX Field getting on fixed wing aircraft or they’re
going across the XXXX, you know somewhere. At this staging area, one of the things we’re
going to do now is when we’re gonna trigger that evacuation, immediately they’ll put in the
request for a medical incident support team and they are going to help in the coordination of the
movement of the ambulances. We’re going to put somebody from…County EMS in our
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command center and the other thing that we found was, you know, if an ambulance shows up
from Maine, there’s not a good chance that they’re going to be able to reach us for communication. So in that initial request, too, they’re gonna bring in a special piece of equipment that
basically takes whatever frequency that message is coming in on and then retransmits it on our
intra-operable frequencies so it can reach our incident command team. So with this in place,
we’re going to reduce the number of the wrong kinds of ambulances that show up.”
Respondent 13, Facility 9:
“Communications? Yeah, I think we did the best we could. I can remember when we
called the state emergency operations center the morning after the storm to tell them to send the
disaster teams and more water. We had to stand up in one of these windows to get a cell signal.
That was sort of the only place on campus that you could get a cell signal. So, communication
with the outside world, we made it work. You could go to certain points like that to get a cell
signal and still talk to people. Internally, we tried to get people to stay connected by sending a
runner to the command center, you know, on a frequent basis. We had twice daily staff briefings
for the staff that were on campus so that they would know what was going on. [Our CEO] led
most of those. He would be there at a certain time in the morning and a certain time in the
evening and people would know to go there for those briefings. The emergency operations team
met every morning and did the same thing, and then every evening for a while, then it just
became ever morning for most of the time. We made communication work without a lot of tools
that we were used to before the storm…we had satellite phones and have those connections
now. They’ve been beefed up some since Ike. If we set the emergency preparations center up,
there are two or three satellite lines on the desk phones that are in the operations center…our IT
folks have a remote site, I think in Dallas, where the data warehouse and everything’s backed up.
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…hardened against most anything…the plan is to have some of our public affairs staff there to
be able to send messages out. We did a lot of that after Ike, sort of on the fly. I think it’s more
formal now.”
•

Meaning Unit # 9: How has the economy impacted hospitals’ ability
to improve their infrastructure for a future emergency or crisis?

Respondent 1, Facility 1:
“If you’re going to accept these [grant funds] you have to have these NIMS criteria. Well,
we met those. But once you get those dollars, like we got about $16,000 this year…you’re required to spend them in certain categories. One category is going to be surge capacity, so you
have to purchase beds. Another might be in…PPE, Personal Protective Equipment…and that’s
going to be respirators…cause you can’t just use these dollars and say, ‘Hey, I’m going to go
get…’ whatever. It’s got to be emergency preparedness. You could go buy radios with it, but
you have to submit your requisition before, ‘Hey, this is what I want to buy.’ They [XXXX
Hospital Association, HHS] have to approve it. And now the state has guidelines and they say
every year, you know, by 2012, for your size facility, you have to have 90 extra beds, surge beds.
So they might let you spend all your money on communications during the years, but you better
have come up with your own funds to get your beds.
But, here’s why I’m positive it’s [the economy] affected other hospitals. For the first
year…those HHS funds…it’s always been a grant. They give you the money up front. You tell
them where you’re going to spend it. As soon as they approve that, they send you the money and
then you buy it. And then you show them the receipts that you actually purchased that. This
year, ’09 was the first time that it changed to reimbursement. Now these funds that they give us,
our size facility, which is one of the bigger ones…we got only $16,000 to $18,000. So, you
know, it’s a lot of money, but really, it’s not a lot of money for a hospital. So we spent those
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monies. Now, it changed to reimbursement and there was at least a 5% match, which meant you
had to spend at least 5% more than you were given. So they wanted hospitals to have a little skin
in the game. And there was deadlines for when you had to say do you want the money. . . yes or
no. You had to spend the money, at least five percent more before they sent you the check.
Well, we got a call right before the deadline was coming saying, ‘Hey, we have an additional
$17,000.’ I said, ‘Well, that’s all we got in the first place.’ They said, ‘Well, several hospitals
have decided they do not want to or cannot match. . .put the money up front, nor do they want to
match.’ So they say, ‘We’re going to forfeit the funds. Do you want it?’ and we said,
‘Absolutely!,’ because we got what was basically free money…So they said, ‘What other
emergency repair and equipment?’ and we say, ‘Hey, we want our own tent…’ Here our afteraction plan was we had to call an outsider…to bring a tent to us so we could triage patients in the
parking lot, then get them into the ER or just send them on their way. Well, now we have our
own tent. We have our own hospital tent. And we bought one from the same company that had
purchased the regional one. So, if there’s a major issue somewhere in our region, the regional
tent that’s bigger is somewhere and we have connectors so we can go and connect to that
tent…it’s almost like wings in a hospital. So, then all of a sudden you have this 40 x 40 tent and
we attach to the side and you know a 20 x 20 tent that we could put 20 more patients in.”
Respondent 2, Facility 1
“I grew up in hospitals that were turn-around hospitals that had hard decisions…they just
didn’t have the resources to do a lot of things. So our hospital has continued to be really strong
financially. We have no debt. We have 400 days of cash on hand and we’ve actually increased
our cash reserves within the last year. But, it’s where these things lead you that worry you about
the cuts; there’s more of them coming, can you sustain them, and so forth. It is a—it is a
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concern. These hospitals that are financially marginal, they’re on the edge all the time. There’s
a hospital in this area, pretty close by us. For example, this morning one of our nurses in cardiac
rehab lives in that town. I just asked her how it’s going over there and she said, ‘Not so great
over there.’…she doesn’t work there and she lives there. They’re guaranteeing the staff…the
OR nurses…40 hours. They don’t have…they’re not hardly doing any surgery and then they
guarantee them 40 hours if they don’t leave, in other words. And we haven’t gotten any of that.”
Respondent 4, Facility 2:
“…if people weren’t a problem or money wasn’t a problem. The reality is…money and
people are going to be even more of a problem with some of the stuff that’s going on with
healthcare reform as things evolve with that. And I don’t even know if we know yet what the
impact is going to be, but we’ve already seen facilities reducing their staff and doing what they
have to do to…stay viable. So I can assure you, that’s not enhancing anybody’s emergency preparedness posture. And I mean that’s just the cold, hard facts. So, you know, you can’t have it
both ways…it’s kind of the healthcare business. I’ve been in it a good while now and…I don’t
think you ever get to do anything to the degree that you’d like to do it, to the degree where you
say, ‘God, I did a nice job with that.’ I mean you are flying by the seat of your pants all day,
every day. And it’s almost an art, if you will, and I think those folks [the people that are
successful] are the people that are savvy enough to understand what’s important and what’s not
or what’s more important than something else…So you wear a number of different hats, but
there’s lots of different opportunities to screw up if you misstep. And a key to that is having
good people that know, that have common sense and go, ‘Okay, I know this can wait and this
can’t.’…so there’s a lot of juggling that goes on and the reality is, you have to manage your
priorities and everything isn’t going to get done.”
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Respondent 7, Healthcare Association Executive:
“When you’ve got almost half of the hospitals in the state that have a negative margin
right now, you know, at the end of the year they show a negative margin on the financials
…somewhere between 43% and 46% of the hospitals. Around 60% have either less than or
equal to one percent margin, right now. And it’s that margin piece that funds the generators…
on top of the CT scanners that you have to upgrade and everything else that you have to do.”
• Meaning Unit # 10: What are some of the physical plant modifications,
mitigation or improvements you have made to your facility post-Katrina?
Respondent 1, Facility 1:
“Pre-Katrina and post, we had the same amount of generator power. We’ve got three
different generators…Joint Commission requires you to have your critical branch…on
emergency backup power…It’s got to come up within a few seconds. Critical branch in most
hospitals, if you walk around you’ll see there’s red outlet plugs. And those are going to be the
ones that are going to have to be on. Backup generator power. We had 100% of everything in
the hospital on emergency backup power…Gustav was a good example because Gustav hit us
harder than Katrina…we lost power pretty quickly. And we were on generator power for 82
hours…if you’re inside our facility before, during, or after Gustav, you would think it would be a
normal day. The HVAC, the air conditioner, is working just like normal, all the lights are on, all
the equipment.”
Respondent 4, Facility 2:
“As far as our emergency preparedness…once we get through this project that…we
finally have approved, that is up for bid currently, we will be in as good a shape, from a flooding
perspective, as we could possibly ever hope to be because we’ll have a floodwall…literally
have a floodwall around the facility with flood gates and those things that aren’t will be elevated
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to protect them so that we, should it flood again, we won’t have to worry about it as much. Of
course if it’s a bigger flood, then we’ve got a problem. But we have, of course, replaced all our
equipment and we probably, no doubt, have better equipment now than we had before. And we
had good equipment before.
…probably the most reliable communications that we had were the handheld Motorola
five-watt radios, and we have increased our inventory of those substantially cause those things
work…when nothing else does, they work and for a pretty good distance too…I mean it
[communication] was gone. It’s been interesting. I’ve done a bunch of interviews since that and
people just don’t even grasp that—they can’t even grasp the notion [of being without
communication].”
Respondent 5, Facility 3:
“And what we do here is…anhydrous ammonia, for example, if there was a significant
anhydrous ammonia spill and it was such that it was going to be coming our way, then disaster
was imminent. We have a button, a single button, in the plant that can be pushed down to all the
air handlers that you don’t have anhydrous ammonia getting into the building. Never had to
push that button, don’t ever really want to push that button. It’s not something you do cavalierly
cause it creates a mess; all those air handlers have to be individually and manually reset, but we
could do it if we had to.”
Respondent 9, Facilities 5 and 6:
“We’ve added generators, but we’ve changed the way our generators were configured for
one thing…which now gives us capability of running, like I said, all the air-conditioning and
probably about 30% of all the power in the hospital.”
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Respondent 10, Facilities 7 and 8:
“We have put in better electrical generation capacity in this hospital and putting extra
generators on the second floor in one of our parking garages, extra fuel storage and taking our
main generators, which are on the first floor and putting them in a…well, we raise them up, we
build a bathtub around them like a floodwall. They used to be air-cooled…with the floodwalls,
they don’t get enough air so we had to make them water-cooled…and to have constant access
to water, we drilled a well. That well also allows us to flush toilets. We don’t use it for potable
water, but we could use that water if necessary to flush toilets…We can’t run the whole building
but we can support 500 people in here and keep them in air conditioning and we can do it for the
better part of a week. We can do rolling brownouts and all sorts of things. We can keep it
habitable here, which it wasn’t then [during Katrina]. So we’re better prepared from that
standpoint.”
•

Meaning Unit # 11: What measures did you take and are you taking
to ensure you have enough fuel, water and power?

Respondent 2, Facility 1:
“We took care of 70 or 80 patients with bottled water for two or three days. So that shows
you the resourcefulness of the staff…the people that work here. But it also shows you that you
can get stuff in here. So we weren’t nearly as worried about things like food or pharmaceuticals
or diesel fuel or other supplies, not nearly.
I will say this though, to me, one of things I have learned about hurricanes is…you never
know what to expect exactly. And I’m sitting here saying we’re going to have those supplies,
but I say that tongue-in-cheek because depending on how a storm works. And you know, we had
the eye…the hurricane was just a few miles from here and it wasn’t near as destructive as some
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others. So you don’t know what they’re going to do and what they’re going to interrupt, so you
just really have to be flexible.
The only thing we’re thinking about is this…it’s a water tower—our own water tower. It’s
about $1 million dollars and…We have a…water tank. But I’m talking about something like the
cities have. And we’ve come within a hair of building one of them…you know you have to
circulate the water, keep it fresh. . .but you would have your own water supply. So you’d have to
shut it off when the storm comes so you can preserve the water that’s in it just in case you
needed it. Water’s an important resource. So that’s…that’s the thing on my agenda. We
haven’t taken hardly any money, just a little bit from these grants or whatever that are coming
along. That’s one however, if somebody wants…if you wanted to get a million dollars from the
government, it might be well spent.”
Respondent 3, Facility 2:
“…The generators will be raised as a part of this final big FEMA project. We hope when
it’s all said and done that we’ll have the capacity to run chillers next time, but we don’t know.
The chillers and boilers and stuff will be protected by the flood wall.”
Respondent 4, Facility 2:
“…there’s been another burst of grant money that’s been distributed out to the states for
emergency preparedness…and, in my opinion, has done a really good job with standardizations.
They didn’t just give the money to the hospitals. What they’ve done and what they do is if
there’s a need for something, I may not get the one I want, but for example, we’ve received,
gosh, all types of protective equipment. We’ve received some negative air machines and what
they’ve done is they’ve bought the same equipment and distributed the same stuff to every
facility so that we’re all working with the same equipment. So, if XXXX is in trouble down
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the road and they need some help, my folks can go down there and work because they’re familiar
with the equipment.
I think Katrina opened everybody’s eyeballs up. So, from that perspective…we now
have a commercial decontamination unit that we didn’t have before. We just had a homemade
deal that my guys and me designed that got us by for years. Now, you know, we have state-ofthe-art stuff. We have lots of personal protection equipment. We have that staged, not only at
the hospital here, but we have a clinic at XXXX that we have the potential for. It’s at the
industrial complex out there. We have the potential to get hit by God only knows, so we’re
pretty well prepared with that regard. So from that point of view, I think we’re in pretty good
shape.
And one of the things we did after the storm, one of the huge problems was…every one
of us lost our car because it flooded out here. So those that did have a vehicle or transportation
…and were willing to come back and help, couldn’t because there was no gasoline available.
So, we bought our own 500 gallon tank of it that we keep…right now our back up is bottled
water and water that we have brought in. We have a supply of that we keep on hand and we’ll
continue to do that but…by the end of the month we’ll have two four-inch wells tied together
with a chlorinator. And so we’ll have…backup capability for water to a point that we could
drink it if we have to.”
Respondent 5, Facility 3:
“…we have, for what it’s worth, two 400 KW generators, two 800 KW generators, and
three 1500 KW generators. We can run the entire hospital wide open with the three 1500 KW
generators and one 400 that we use just to level out some peaks that occur from time to time.
Now, when you do that…you burn 6,000 gallons of diesel a day. We store 24,000 gallons of
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diesel on-site. And you’re talking about a lesson learned during and after Katrina, it is this…just
because you can run the building wide open, doesn’t mean you should…run the building wide
open. So we have some shut-down protocols now. You have two CTs, two MRIs…you don’t
need two CTs and two MRIs. You need a CT and an MRI. You have two chemistry machines in
the lab. What we do is start shutting down some redundant equipment so that we pull down the
power load. We tell people, ‘Turn off the lights. You don’t need to run the lights up.’ We’re
going to increase the air temperature just a little bit and all of those things are just to kind of pull
down the load that the generators are under so that we conserve fuel. We can go four days…and
we made it with no problem at all. That’s key one. Key two…we’re connected on a direct
connection to a city well. That city well is on our standby generator power so that we can have
water. Not only do you need water though, and people tend to forget this, to flush toilets and to
prepare meals and to drink and all of that kind of stuff. You have to have water to run chillers.
If you don’t have water supply in most healthcare facilities, you have no air conditioning. So
you can have all the power in the world, but you still won’t have air conditioning and facilities,
especially if you talk to New Orleans where they had all kinds of troubles…these buildings are
not made to be operated without air conditioning. It gets very hot and very humid very quickly.
And it gets to be an unsafe place to be…our protocol is that as a storm is approaching, we’re
monitoring the power coming in from the power building. We know what’s going on with the
power and you begin to see fluctuations. Experience says, ‘We’re getting ready to lose power.’
And…the few times that we’ve had to do it, I get a phone call from the plant and they say,
‘Listen, we’re beginning to see some squirrelly things on the XXXX transmission lines.
We’ve got a feeling we’re not going to have power very much longer. If it’s okay, we’re just
going to go ahead and shift over.’ So we just go ahead and switch over to generator power, that
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way you’re doing it in an orderly fashion…as opposed to chaos. And we go ahead and switch
over.
…one of the things when you’re going through a disaster…you’re just doing what you
need to do. After the hurricane, that’s where your plan…your recovery plan really begins to be
important. We had employees who said things of us like, you know, ‘It was like they had
thought of everything. And whenever we had a question, they just had an answer.’ And, ‘Can’t
believe they were that prepared.’ We weren’t. Your plan is the guideline. There are going to be
things that happen that you didn’t anticipate. So you have to have a good enough group that’s
flexible enough to brainstorm answers, you know? And it’s kind of a little bit like the Wizard of
Oz every now and then, you know? We’re back behind the curtain figuring out stuff before we
can walk out and talk to people. And I’ll give you an example, since my name can’t be used.
We were holding 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. briefings to our management team every day, post-storm, and
did that for a long time. We held those briefings for two reasons: (1) to communicate with them
and what we knew was going on and (2) for them to communicate with us what they knew about
things that were going on…One of the directors raised her hand and she said, ‘We have a
problem brewing.’ …’Gas is very difficult to come by and I have people that are driving back
and forth to work. I’m concerned that if it comes down to ‘I’m going to run out of gas or I can
have gas and just not go to work,’ they may choose not to come to work.’ I said, ‘Okay, we’ll
see what we can do.’ …Called my engineering folks, said, ‘I need some gasoline.’ …About
3,000 to 5,000 gallons…They called me back a few hours later and said, ‘Alright, we’ve got
4,000 gallons of gasoline coming in.’ Oh, good. ‘The problem is, we don’t have anything to
pump it with.’ I said, ‘Well, you know there’s a gas station across the street from the hospital.
Convenience store gas station, I know he’s not pumping gas, but he’s running his convenience
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store.’ ‘Well, he’s got no power to the pumps.’ ‘So why don’t you guys go over and talk to him
and ask him if we can use his pumps?’…Long story short…we put 5,000 or 4,000, however
many gallons of gas it was, in his tanks. We had power to his pumps. Then the question
became, since gas is so short, how are we going to dispense it to employees without creating
civil unrest?...We did it all after curfew hours…Now, we only did that three or four or five days
until the immediate crisis was over and then things settled down. The point is…that wasn’t in
our emergency plan, neither was having a washer and dryer for employees in our emergency
plan, but we rigged that up as well and opened our own laundromat here so employees could
wash what few clothes they had. You have to be flexible.”
Respondent 8, Facility 4:
“Again, many of the hospitals now in the city have wells, several of them have built, you
know, dug wells to have that access to water in case we needed [it] to flush toilets and those type
of things that you need water for. So, many of them [hospitals] have built wells. Some
hospitals, I know one in particular, have purchased a large supply of MREs and those I think
you can store for like 25 years they’re good for or something like that, which is a long time. So
they have purchased those so they will have that ready.”
Respondent 9, Facilities 5 and 6:
“The other thing we’ve done, we’ve increased our fuel supply…we now have a, well
it’s a minimum of seven days, and that’s a list of our generators there…and, like this building,
I could run this building for 35 days based upon the capacity I have…and most of them are
about 15 days. Hospital is about 15 days. The theory is that after seven, the reason we have
seven days is that after seven days, anticipation is that you will either one of two things, you will
either evacuate or…or the city will have recovered and you will be able to get…back online
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or get additional fuel brought to you.
We do not have a well. Our power you know, our air-conditioning, our chilled water, and
steam comes from a third party. It comes from a district thermal plant that serves the whole
medical district…We keep backup water, drinking water on hand, and then if a hurricane’s in
the Gulf, you know, and looks like it’s going to strike, we bring in additional water, plus we
have an agreement with our water vendor that 48 hours, H minus 48…he actually brings a truck
filled with water and parks it on our emergency ramp…as a backup to what we already have inhouse.”
Respondent 10, Facilities 7 and 8:
“So, logistics, you need to take care of that. Of course, you need to have the right
supplies in the hospital so we have everything from like kitty litter—do you know what kitty
litter is here for? Human waste. That’s what we used it for…things like that, supplies, and stuff
like that.”
Respondent 12, Facility 9:
“…we have a major mitigation plan that I’ll tell you about, but until such time as all of
that mitigation is done, in a nutshell, the mitigation is you raise critical infrastructure up 25 feet.
You don’t have generators on the ground. You don’t have any kind of critical infrastructure on
the first floor, and so forth. Once that is in place, it becomes a little bit easier for you because
you have a higher confidence that your facility can handle the patients, not only on the landfall
[of the hurricane] but then in the days afterward, okay…I think it’ll be another two years until
it’s all in place. Right now, I think you have to err on the side of protecting people by evacuating
them if it’s the case that we’re going to get a major hit, okay. Whether you shelter in place, or
you evacuate, part of the response is an alternate provision of healthcare. So, typically what
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might happen here is there would be a small contingent to protect the workforce that’s here.
There would be…based on the scenario…there would probably be a small team here to provide
urgent-care-type, emergency care in a sense that you would do it like an immediate treatment
and then ship them off right away to a hospital. We do also have as part of that RAC, Regional
Advisory Council. They have a portable hospital so it is possible that could be set up…
somewhere…right after the landfall. In Ike, they used a Disaster Medical Assistance Team, a
DMAT, which was brought here. In essence, it’s got to be sort of a regional response to
providing that care until such time as the infrastructure is back in place here because even if we
are in, you know, pristine condition…if we don’t have water, waste water from the city.
Additionally, if we don’t have electricity from XXXX Energy, we pretty much won’t be
taking care of patients. I mentioned, too, in terms of response to the disaster response
contractors, we also have insurance adjusters coming down here right away. That insurance
helped, you know, and ultimately, it was the decision of the legislature to say, ‘XXXX needs to
be back here.’ They needed an estimate of, okay, what are the damages, you know, what is it
gonna cost to bring XXXX back up to some level and it helps to have, in presenting that
information to key legislators and the governor’s office. It helped basically to say, okay, we’ve
got this much insurance. We anticipate this much in FEMA Public Assistance, so this is the gap.
If we come back to a certain level, this is what it’s gonna cost and ultimately, you know, it’s the
state legislature saying, ‘This is the money to reopen.’ So, for recovery basically, you have to
rebuild damaged facilities, incorporate mitigation measures and our mitigation plans basically,
you know, in the hospital there won’t be any critical facilities on the first floor. Any new
construction is going to be planned for 25 feet below sea level flooding, so basically, all the
mechanical and construction so forth is above the water line. We just got word, too, that
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probably one of our mitigation projects was to build a safe room. This is essentially something
that could withstand a category five hit and we haven’t gotten word yet from FEMA but we’ve
heard from the state just last week that it will probably be approved; therefore, the concept being
a building that could withstand a category five that would hold about 500 or 600 people. The
original plan was for first responders from XXXX and XXXX and it gives you another option,
right? I heard from our Regional Liaison Officer on Friday that Texas has a new program that’s
called the Texas Storm Shelter Initiative, TSSI. I looked on the website and I couldn’t find
anything written about it yet…the idea being that you can keep spending millions moving buses
and saving buses and maybe using them, maybe not or you can building something that’s going
to survive…Then, at least reduce the numbers of people that you have to bus. Ideally, it would
take care of all of them but, you know, at least reduce them.”
Respondent 14, Facility 9:
“Well, some of our buildings, the newest building is the XXXX building, which is just an
incredible facility. There are very few like it in the country, much less the world, and it was
designed with this risk in mind, and so it suffered no damage. It got a little water under the
outside set of doors…on the floor mats and that was it. It functions as it should have. So we
know going forward as we construct new facilities that we can build them to be storm-proof. But
what do we do about the 120 year old XXXX building? Well, you have to let the water wash
through that one. So move critical functions up to 25 feet or higher, put in impervious…building
material advancements and technology out there that are just incredible …but, put in electrical
circuits that can be disconnected, if you will, from other circuits in the building. There are some
impervious wall materials now that can handle flooding and water. Floor materials that are the
same…hose everything down, sweep it out and it’s ready to go in a matter of a day or two. So
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we have the opportunity in some of our older buildings to do something like that…So we let the
water wash through. The lower spaces in those buildings will be public spaces with movable
furniture and files. We know when a storm is coming and we’ll move them…some of our
buildings can be well protected with some floodwalls and flood barriers at the entrances. So, we
have a variety of mitigation strategies based on location and type of building.”
• Meaning Unit # 12: How does your facility handle staffing matters
to ensure successful operation during a hurricane event or crisis situation?
Respondent 1, Facility 1:
“…in the years that I’ve been here, we’ve done it [staffing] two different ways. One, we
had a meeting prior storm, kinda look at the storm saying, ‘We don’t think it’s going to be that
bad.’ We’re designating…going down by the departments seeing who are the essential
departments and who are the non-essential. Non-essential are basically broke out this way…if
you are not a direct patient caregiver and you are not a 24-hour unit…and we’re not going to
have any patients in house, then you leave. And you…and the understanding is…it’s in our
policy…you return once the roads are open again to relieve. And then everybody else, you’re
going to be a storm rider. And long before hurricane season, it’s clearly communicated to each
employee…You’re going to be storm rider, you’ll be A Team, you’ll be B Team. And we are…I
guess we have to be this way, we’re…we’re very tough, for lack of a better word, on once
you’ve committed to be a storm rider, and it gets close to the storm, we call, we say, ‘We’re
getting close to sheltering-in-place, get with your plans,’ who’s agreed to be here and your name
is on that list. If you don’t show up, unfortunately there’s been terminations after because we’re
relying on you to take care of a patient and at the last minute you decide, you decide, ‘No.’ So
it’s pretty strict. I think it has to be. Cause you have patients relying on you.”
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Respondent 5, Facility 3:
“We have a Hurricane Team and we have a Relief Team. For the most part, Security
Department…they’re all on the Hurricane Team. Engineering…all on the Hurricane Team
unless there’s some reason that you can’t be. Other than that, you bring in people enough that
you can run your department 24 hours a day…we run those on 12-on, 12-off shifts for the
hurricane people. We have about 2,800 employees altogether. Everyone else that’s not on the
Hurricane Team is on the Relief Team. Now, as you well know…2,800 includes a lot of part
time, PRN, and people that never work and all that. It begins at employment. That it is an
understanding that there’s certain responsibilities associated with hurricanes here. We try, to the
degree that we can, to have the Hurricane Team be 100% voluntary. In areas like Security and
Engineering where you need all hands on deck, I’m sorry, you just got drafted, part of the job. In
other areas, I have directors who will, when they’re developing the Hurricane Team, they’ll look
for volunteers first and then they look for people who don’t have small children. Single people
are great. People whose children are grown and moved away, those kinds of people that can stay
here and have the least amount of hardship possible. But also you have to have quality
employees here. So you have your Hurricane Team and you have your Relief Team. There’s
one very, very clear understanding here at this hospital and that begins at employment: If you’re
on the Hurricane Team and you don’t show up, you just lost your job. If you’re on the Relief
Team and you don’t come back, you just lost your job. It may sound cold, may sound hard
…We’re not kidding about it. We are very serious.”
Respondent 8, Facility 4:
“And what happened with us, we did have a team A and a team B, and a lot of the team
B did come in because they just did. I had been at that hospital for 32 years. We had gone
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through many hurricanes and some that we had to stay, maybe the most I would say, two nights
that I can remember that we ever stayed there. So, we just brought in a couple extra people in
case, so the staffing was fine. There was no problem with staffing. We had enough staff to take
care of the patients for those that week there. I do think that it is a very stressful thing and one
issue that we dealt with, with staffing, was definitely people that were on the A Team that could
not come in. I remember one example we had, her husband was a policeman and was called to
work and she had like five little kids and she was on the A Team. Those types of situations we
had to deal with pretty much, some were out of town, they couldn’t get in, it was too late before
evacuation. But, I think now most of the hospitals, especially after Katrina, and I’ll just tell you
something that isn’t really, in my opinion, too good. After Katrina, some of the hospitals in the
city, including the one I worked at, had developed policies on how people would get paid, and if
they were on the A Team and they didn’t come in, then they might not get paid, and some
hospitals terminated people. I remember I was in Houston at the time after Katrina and working
with the HR person, because managers were giving lists of people that should be terminated and
shouldn’t be, and that was a very difficult thing. I’ll have to be honest, some of them I
overturned and I thought this was ridiculous. One example was…the nurse with the policeman
with the five children or four and another one that [had] just had a baby two months prior. I
think many hospitals now, nurses have to, when they are hired usually now have to sign, you
know, it’s up front, this is our policy and you have to abide by them. I talked to a lot of nurses
because I did again work in the hospital again after Katrina. Many of them will sign it and I
guess it really depends on their situation, and I think as an employer, we need to make sure that
we’re sensitive to some of these issues. I know some of the nurses that worked at XXXX
worked in hospitals when Gustav came. Many of them [managers] were very gracious and said,
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‘Okay, you’ve just been through Katrina, you don’t have to work this time,’ and stuff like that
…I think from the staffing thing, that’s always going to be a big issue. I think people have not
forgotten Katrina and definitely they were separated, many of them, quite a long time from
family and friends, and so they’re not going to do this again if it would ever come to that case.”
Respondent 10, Facilities 7 and 8:
“What do you do with all your people? Some places laid them off, some people paid
them, but you have to be able to communicate with all of them, regardless of what you’re gonna
do. What I did at XXXX is I put them to work in other [hospitals] until I could get them back
here. We paid our people and brought people back…lot of good will out of that.”
• Meaning Unit # 13: Have you made any additions to your staff as a result of
experiences with Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav or Ike? How did you handle
difficult human resources issues that came up during and after the storms?
Respondent 1, Facility 1:
“Each region…has a designated regional coordinator…that is an unpaid position. And
that person is a full time employee at another hospital. Our particular one is a full-time
employee at XXXX Hospital. So obviously, they’re going to be very busy during the storms.
What region XXXX did with the help of XXXX [hospital association] two years ago…we said,
‘Listen, it’s really unfair for that person. They have their own hospital to worry about. We need
some help…’ XXXX [hospital association] facilitated it and basically we came up with this: we
said Region XXXX always gets these grant dollars and then it gets distributed by your hospital
size…what the proposal is, and this is what happened, proportionately we’ll take money off the
top from every hospital before it’s distributed. That money’s going to be used to hire a
regional—a designated regional coordinator…we have one now…She’s excellent. It’s a hired
position, that’s her full time job, what she does all year long. So, she’s our resource. She’ll
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notify us about, ‘Hey, listen, y’all need to be NIMS compliant; listen, EMSTAT needs to start
meeting in May.’ She’s our contact point…So we took those monies and she’s paid. This is her
second year doing it and the plan is to continue to do it.”
Respondent 8, Facility 4:
“I think during the event, while we were there, of course, everybody gave 150%.
There were a couple nurses that might have gotten a little dehydrated or something, but as far as
pulling their weight on everything, I think it was. The mental health issues come after, where
people now have left. There’s no more hospital. They have no job, many of them had no homes
to go back to, many of them did not know where their family was or whatever, so I think some of
them…are still receiving counseling, still having really difficult times. Many of them have
changed jobs quite frequently trying to find that right place again. So I think many of them are
still having difficulty with that.”
Respondent 11, Corporate Healthcare Executive:
“Yeah, it’s all pre-planned out and certainly is something that’s covered with every
employee, at orientation before they’re hired, they know, if you’re working in healthcare, you’re
essential, either here or you’re essential elsewhere, but you’re essential.
The other thing that we have is the XXXX Fund, where every employee within XXXX
can contribute to this XXXX Fund to assist families and employees and their families in
needs of disaster. I can’t tell you how much that assisted lots of folks in getting through Katrina.
We had people at XXXX that were literally out of work. We didn’t reopen XXXX until
February 14. The company left everyone on the payroll. No one was without a check.
Whatever they were making before Katrina, they continued to make and get paid for…until the
hospital reopened and there was a tremendous amount of financial assistance, resource
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assistance, and those that lost their homes, didn’t have anything, where other employees were
assisting…not that that’s unique to us, it’s just, we have our own family, you know, within the
company that we work for across the hospitals. So, I do think it’s…we just have those
additional resources that a single-standing hospital…just doesn’t have because you don’t have
that larger pool of resources to rely upon.”
• Meaning Unit # 14: Explain how you conduct training and drills
with your staff, teams. How do you determine which crisis scenarios to plan for?
Respondent 1, Facility 1:
“There’s a requirement with the Joint Commission that you have a safety committee
…And the safety committee is, by Joint Commission standards, required to meet six times a
year. We meet….every month…You’re going to go through reviewing of policies and
everything. But one big component of it is…emergency management…we drill at least twice a
year and the way…this committee, selects what the drill is going to be is, we…assess potential
risk. And you go through and you look at, ‘What are we most vulnerable for?’ You know, ice
storm…pretty low probability…things like severe weather, tornadoes or hurricanes…that is one
of the components that we’re going to drill, on a minimum, once a year. So with a Hazard
Vulnerability Analysis…we assess the potential risk. One of them is for probability, how well
equipped we are and we get a score…whichever area comes up with the highest score, then we
say, ‘This is where we need to drill because we need to be prepared for this.’ Probably the one
that’s come up the last two years was mass influx of patients. So, outside of hurricanes, that’s
been the one that we’ve drilled on. Pandemic flu…There’s two regional trailers for mass
decontamination of patients. We bring that on-site. Plus we have our own tent, where we can—
we can decon patients, get them into the facility without contaminating the facility. And we will
run the drills here. The National Guard will come in. Their HAZMAT team will train us. And
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then we don the equipment…We’ve got all those respirators. We’ve got the suits. So,
everybody suits up and we…we pull people from…all different departments. So, we had nurses
in there. We had respiratory therapists. We had maintenance folks in there. We had safety
committee people…Here’s what we did last year and it…kind of helps us hone our skills on
many different levels. We did the flu shot, the regular seasonal flu this way and also we got the
H1N1 vaccinations as well. We had, just prior, a year and a-half ago, we wrote our POD, the
Point of Distribution policy…where are we going to route the people? Which door are they
going to come in?...On paper, this thing looks great. They were like, ‘Well we need to execute
this.’…We always want to test our RallyPoint, our crisis communication system…for hurricane
season. But…we also want to test this new POD policy, but then we also have and we want to
give the seasonal flu shot. We want to alert everybody that it’s available…We did it all at once.
We waited a couple days before we’re going to give the shot out, went through RallyPoint. We
sent the communication, ‘FYI: you know seasonal flu shots going to be offered at this point’ and
then when we gave it out, the team showed up to, to execute the POD policy to make sure the
parking was in the right area and make sure people came through right area…We did it like a
real like a real live exercise…We accomplished our goal.”
Respondent 3, Facility 2:
“…we not only participate in the drills that are set up but we also have enough…false
alarms of hurricanes and stuff that we exercise the plan quite regularly. The thing that…we’ve
concentrated on is response to contaminated victims. Contaminated patients…we’ve done a lot
more emphasis on that. We’ve trained many more people to dress out in the suit, you know, and
be able to work with a patient who may have been contaminated and triage them, help
decontaminate them and get them treated properly…we found years ago when the…it’s just
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funny what you learn…but, years ago when the anthrax scare was going on, we had somebody
leave some white powder in one of the lobbies. And we all knew it was powder, but we decided,
let’s go ahead and report this to the local authorities and see what happens. And so they went
through the whole thing…and the firemen came and dressed out, all of them. They took our
employees out that had been exposed and decontaminated them. But as the firemen dressed out,
one of them responded into the room and then realized that you can’t use your radio unless it’s
outside the suit. So, you know, you’ve got your radios and your phones and everything in your
pocket, strapped to you, put the suit on and then you get in the room and just like ‘Oh, gosh. I
can’t talk to anybody.’…you talked about lessons learned and I said that was years ago. So as
we’ve gotten more experience…actually in the hot weather, responding in the suits…in the
decontamination suits, you only last about 20 minutes.”
Respondent 4, Facility 2:
“And our drills, we’re required by the Joint Commission to have two drills a year because
we have an emergency department and one of them has to be an authentic receiving patients kind
of thing and I think we’ve already had three this year that we’ve done. Of course, we used the
oil spill because the county activated their EOC and in fact that’s still going on.
We have the classes going on…and there’s a lot of drills that we’ve got to do…the fire
drills, the emergency preparedness drills. And, you know, does everybody know every aspect of
the plan? No. But one other thing that we do when we exercise the plan, is we…again this is
reflective of the administration…is the last couple of drills, in fact, the boss has said, ‘Okay, I’m
not going to be the incident commander. I want you to be the incident commander.’ And one of
the nurses will take it on. But, you know, it’s a great opportunity and that needs to happen…it
gives them confidence…that they know what they’re doing. Do we make mistakes? Absolutely.
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You’re going to make mistakes…and after every Joint Commission, again, in all of their revising
of the standards, they’ve got it locked down pretty tight so that you have the drill, you have to
document to enforce your drill, and then you have to document your lessons learned or your
opportunities for improvement as well. And then when the next drill comes around, you use
those things in planning your scenario to say, ‘Okay, this is the risk we had last time. If it did,
let’s test them.’…as much as I gripe about The Joint Commission, if I were going to design a
plan…that would probably be one of the first. I’d pull out The Joint Commission standards and
kind of use that as a foundation.”
Respondent 5, Facility 3:
“A tornado keeps you awake at night because they have about four minutes’ warning…
I have been through what’s called CBRNE training up in Maryland. It’s chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and explosive disasters…even if you study, or you study at all,
bioterrorism, it is a terrifying thing. Cause you’re already in big trouble before you even know
that you are in trouble. Those are scary. There’s a railroad track right down here. There’s more
anhydrous ammonia than you could shake a stick at that runs up and down this railroad track
every single day…We have drilled extensively on that, but those are things…the instantaneous
things are the ones that are the scariest. We’d be fine…we’d do okay, but it’s the things that
you don’t anticipate…that leave you the most exposed. So you spend time trying to think of
those things and what you would do.”
Respondent 7, Healthcare Association Executive:
“So many people get caught up in all of the planning that they lose track of reality.
Most of these folks have never had to deal with real disaster out there. Most of the so-called
experts in there have never had to deal with real disaster. You know, that’s all tabletop to them.
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And so you’ve got all these academic types that that’s what’s being published and that’s what’s
out there and that’s the modeling that’s there. There are all these high-end folks that just thought
a whole lot of themselves in the room. And all this planning they had done, not a single one had
had to evacuate a hospital…it’s good to be a good planner, but you also have to be flexible when
the caca hits the fan you’ve gotta be ready to alter your plan…you know, things are not going to
go exactly according to the way you thought they were. You’ve got to be able to have a grip on
reality to know how you’re going to change your plan for the particular scenario that you are
faced with.”
Respondent 11, Corporate Healthcare Executive:
“It’s [training] kind of one of those necessary evils, you know. I think they work to
make you better prepared. Do they guarantee you any type of…no. We didn’t think of so
many things. I promise you, we never thought at XXXX until we were in that building and knew
that we had to be air evacuated. We had never thought of turning the top of our garage into a
helipad. We never thought of getting hacksaws to cut light poles down to where Chinook
helicopters could land on it. Why would we have thought of that? We were never going to be in
that situation, you know, there are things you just don’t think of…who would have thought they
would’ve been using the backs of pickup trucks to bring patients from the parking garage up to
the top of the garage to the helipad to get them transported out?...a pickup truck as a transport
vehicle? We had them available in the garage. It was too difficult going up and down stairs
…some patients couldn’t be transported up and down flights of stairs…power was out, you
know. You improvise.”
Respondent 12, Facility 9:
“We just did a very rigorous risk analysis for XXXX. It was no surprise that one of our
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major risks is hurricanes…We didn’t say hurricanes, but we talked about extreme wind events
and flooding and then, of course, we have others because we’re not just doing hurricane
planning, we’re doing all-hazards planning. For example, another one would be, of course,
disease outbreaks. In terms of collaboration for preparedness, we participate in the state
hurricane evacuation exercise. They typically will have a rehearsal concept and an exercise or
rehearsal of concept. Up until this point, we have always participated in that. I’m in the process
right now of talking with Texas Engineering Extension Service (TEEX) to help us do what
would be eventually our Joint Commission exercise for the first part of 2011. We are going to
break that up kind of into a series of trainings and smaller exercises and kind of culminate that on
a big exercise…”
Respondent 13, Facility 9:
“I think we’ve been trained but,…I think to be proficient in the incident command
system you have to use it with some regularity to make it sort of second nature to what you do.
So have we been trained? Yes. Do we implement it by the letter of the law? I don’t think we
do, but there’s enough organized around it that it provides a sort of structure that works for us.
Now, I know there are incident command purists in the fire service where incident command
started that, that’s the way they live their lives. We don’t necessarily do that, but I think it
provides us enough of a structure to be able to make the personnel inside pretty lean, and then to
sort of cover all of our bases, based on the different categories that incident command
recommends.
I don’t have a quantification of the amount of time that we spend on preparation
activities. I would say it was probably more after 9/11 than it was before 9/11. And it was
definitely more after Rita than it was before Rita, and now, it’s more after Ike than it was before
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Ike. I think probably more than the time, it’s [training] with more intention or with more
people’s attention to the detail about ‘What’s my role if something happens here?’ I think that’s
what we’ve tried to focus on is what, what is the individual’s role? Where do I go? Who do I
talk to? What am I supposed to do if something happens? And that’s…the valuable thing for
individuals in their response. What are they supposed to do if there’s nobody to give them
direction? Where do they go? What’s their information source? Then you have to do it both for
your personal life and your work life. I think that with the aftermath here in people’s personal
lives they give a little more attention to how they handle things at home and what they would do
in the case of another disaster at home after they’ve taken care of their work responsibilities.
Have we trained our staff well enough that if nobody else is around, like in the middle of
the night or on the weekend that if something came up, that they would handle it the way they
should? When all the people who have those responsibilities aren’t around, could they handle it
the way it should be handled? I don’t know if you can ever have enough training or enough
practicing—so that’s the biggest thing that I think sticks out in my mind when I try to go to
sleep at night and think about disasters”.
Respondent 14, Facility 9:
“…the other thing that served us very well during this recovery period is that we had
drilled a lot…we know we’re at risk for hurricanes. We went through our emergency plans
frequently before the storm. Everybody was well versed in the plans and how they function.
One of the things somebody taught me a long time ago about emergency situations. Number
one, you need to drill frequently so everybody knows what’s in the plan. Number two, the plans
never completely apply. You end up having to make up things because…you can’t anticipate
everything that can happen, so you have to be able to improvise. The more you drill, the more
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people have the capability to be innovative and come up with good solutions to the things that
confront them. One of our jokes, if you will, was that, ‘Well, we’re beyond plan A, B, C to plan
T and what’s beyond,’ just because this was something we didn’t anticipate. Our people
performed incredibly well. I think, again, they were well prepared. We had drilled a lot. We
had senior teams, a group of senior people who were kind of used to dealing with the thought of
storms and the damage that they bring, so that served us very, very, very well.”
•

Meaning Unit # 15: How do you evaluate success or make changes
in your plans post-emergency?

Respondent 1, Facility 1:
“We do after-action on three different levels that I know of. We’ll do it on the executive
team level, where we’ll have an after-action plan…that’s a report out…everything rolled up from
department heads…What went well, what went bad? And then we put together a report and the
executive team looks at it…submits it then to the Safety Committee. Safety Committee reviews
it. ‘Yeah, we could do this better, or not.’ Then…finally there’s a parish after-action plan. So
then we’ll get together as a Region and discuss what went well, what didn’t go well…”
Respondent 2, Facility 1:
“Our experience with Katrina and Gustav and so on, Rita…you know, our staff…our
people, who are so critical to anything, but here this is now, you know, a very difficult situation,
they performed superbly and they worked extremely well with physicians and we delivered care
seamlessly and we did it without relying on the government or others to help us. I think that fits
our philosophy, our culture. We try to stand on our own feet. We don’t expect somebody to
come in and save us. We are resourceful…we work together in teams. I know that sounds
simple…teams…but people don’t always work together as teams and…so you don’t get very
good results. Communication’s been great. The spirit of service…volunteers, well even for
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people who work here has been incredible. And, like in the last go around, we were the only
hospital open in the entire region. It’s a hard swallow to keep your hospital open and make the
commitment but we did it. And, you know, it resulted in people who have needs for dialysis, for
example, there was no other place to go but here. Heart patients who have heart attacks came
here during those storms and likely…could have very likely died or had really bad effects of
those heart attacks. They received, though…they received the care. So, I don’t know if we’re
totally unique, but I think…we’ve learned to function well during these…you have to have a
clear command center, a chain of command, and you have to know that the information you’re
receiving is accurate, timely…and you have to make good solid decisions. And then people have
to execute those decisions. The last thing, you have to be flexible…you have to be willing to
change without much notice.”
Respondent 12, Facility 9:
“…we ran a system-wide exercise, the concept being that if your system…is so
geographically spread, you’re somewhat mitigating the risk if you think of a system and the
elements of that system can support those that might be damaged in some kind of a disaster. So,
what we have is a mutual aid agreement among the institutions in XXXX, and to exercise it
that year in 2007, we decided on a hurricane scenario for the exercise. We ran it in December,
even though that’s not hurricane season, it was in preparation for the next season. It was called,
‘Hurricane Mike,’ and was originally designed…this is the XXXX and this is the XXXX and
it’s coming straight across to XXXX where we have an institution and XXXX, and
there’s a high pressure system over XXXX, which moved to the northeast, which caused the
storm to turn due north with 24 hours’ notice. In the scenario, it hit 20 miles east of campus as a
category two storm at 2:00 in the morning, which was pretty close to what actually happened in
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[Hurricane] Ike. So, the point here being was to drive home the fact that you don’t necessarily
always have a great deal of warning for a hurricane, because a lot of people have that
misconception. In addition, the idea that we needed to build on our system to make sure that we
have the continuity for our three major missions…academics, healthcare, and research. In our
scenario, we built in that, you know, various buildings had been destroyed here or were
unusable…and we had 400 students that were going to be displaced that we needed to find other
places…to put them in, so that they could finish out the semester.
One of them clearly was familiarity with the incident command system [ICS] and we’ve
had subsequently two [classes]…the state’s…regional liaison officer…came in and taught an
ICS-400 level training class where we had about 40 people that were certified…and they gave an
ICS-300 level class that we had probably about 20 people…”
•

Meaning Unit # 16: Miscellaneous Information Provided by Respondents

Respondent 3, Facility 2:
“And so we just really helped to keep people focused. Our board of directors didn’t meet
for the first week or so, but they all showed up. We’ve got seven people on the board…six of
them lost their homes. And yet they all showed up here at the hospital within a day or two
afterwards and basically signed the back of a piece of paper that I found. And we wrote on there,
‘This provides the administration emergency spending authority,’ and they all voted on it, you
know, by signing it, which I used because I not only had that, but when, a couple of days after
the storm, the contractors started coming in. The recovery contractors start coming in and offer
to help you start cleaning the place out and count your equipment. They have some
extraordinarily talented people that follow storms around the country…disasters around the
country. Fortunately for us, there were three different companies that showed up. And we
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walked them around the building and in reality, on the back of a napkin for one of them, they
gave us bids because the first words out of the FEMA people’s mouths when they walked in and
saw that we were starting to tear out the carpet and get rid of the walls and stuff and they realized
that it wasn’t all our own people, they said ‘Well, how did you bid this? Did you advertise in the
local paper?’ and I said, ‘Well, no, we didn’t advertise in the local paper. I didn’t realize you
had to do all that stuff.’ They said, ‘Well, all you had to do was access our website; you
would’ve seen it all. It was all right there.’ I just looked at the guy and said, ‘Well, you haven’t
been here very long, have you? Have you tried to make a cell phone call? Have you tried to get
on the Internet anywhere?’ And they just kind of backed off after that. But, fortunately, we had
bid out because I had three bids…And they accepted that once I showed them we had the
emergency spending authority from the board. So, just another great example.
You know, we saw when the storm hit here, we usually see about 2,000 patients a month
in the ER. We saw over 800 patients in the space of 48 hours. So often times, people say, ‘Well,
why in the heck did you stay?’ Of course, number one…we didn’t think it was going to be that
bad, but number two…if we weren’t [here], 800 people wouldn’t have had any place to go…in
terms of first response, what you run into with FEMA on the Stafford Act, we had food that we
fed to police, firemen, hospital workers, community. . .basically anybody that walked in for the
first three or four months after the storm. Since we had staff that stayed here, and kitchen staff
that stayed here, we were able to find some propane grills and our food…deliveries started
backup. FEMA has denied payment for all that, telling us that that’s part of our routine
operating costs and it’s not eligible…and even if it were eligible, they would only pay overtime,
they couldn’t pay regular pay. However, they would cover it if it were all catered instead of
furnished by our in-house personnel. Because then it would be not a regular thing, but catered
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…six months or so after the storm we were pretty busy just kind of getting the place back
together. Then we started planning how to really reconstruct it. So the time frame was…the
storm was August 29th …we worked out of tents in the parking lot that DMAT brought in and the
Air National Guard brought a field hospital down here. And then we…as the main agency,
helped coordinate emergency function aid. We were making sure that the clinics that were
forming in the community were supervised and the Department of Health knew where they were
and that was a whole separate discussion. By October 5th, we had rebuilt the emergency room
temporarily with sheetrock and everything and gotten equipment back in order and we reopened
the ER on October 5th. And by October 28th, we reopened 25 hospital beds upstairs, which
meant we had to create a safe corridor all the way through the building since the ER is on one
end and the patient beds are on the other. We had to build all the way through. We did our first
surgeries here in December in our reconstructed ORs and we delivered our first baby in January,
the next year. So, we were pretty quick putting things back together. But remember, all of this
is temporary reconstruction just because we actually had contacts from Washington saying ‘Go.
Work hard. Get it put it back together because you’ve got an awful lot of resources down there
[the DMAT, the Air National Guard people] and we need them somewhere else. So, they were
trying to pull them to New Orleans. As we responded to that, we started working with the
architect and, in a mitigation sense, we thought, well, let’s take those really high dollar loss areas
[operating room, laboratory, emergency department], you know, places with lots of X-ray…lots
and lots of expensive equipment. The government was spending…it was about $25[million],
$26 million of damages to this building plus another $15 million in equipment…plus another $5
or 6 million in our other facilities when you add up all the project worksheets. If you just look at
the high loss areas here on the main campus, we thought, well, let’s build right next to the main
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structure. Let’s build an elevated structure and let’s put the OR and the emergency room and Xray and some of those high dollar things in that elevated structure as a mitigation effort. So, we
worked very closely with FEMA. They came to our meetings with the architects…they sat in on
the design meetings and we had this building not completely designed, but it was close enough
that they were going to do the detailed construction drawings; we spent $250,000 in architect’s
fees. And we got to that point and FEMA changed personnel again. The new team came in,
looked at it for about a month…met with us once, looked at it for about a month and then said,
‘Can’t do it.’ You can elevate equipment, but you can’t elevate the other spaces. So, for
example, in this case, the other example they used for me, because normally, when you elevate
things, you’re talking about sticking a generator up in the air so the generator doesn’t go under
water. So, what we were discussing was putting an MRI or a CT scanner up in the air so it
doesn’t go under water. Well, they said that’s fine, you just can’t mitigate all the other space
around it. So in other words, you couldn’t have lobbies, hallways, or patient access to the
equipment elevated. You could only have the equipment elevated. So we had visions of…one of
our guys drew up a little cartoon of a patient climbing up a rope ladder up to get to an MRI…
And we thought that’s probably not what we want to do…it took about a year and a half to get
resolved and everything. So, then we started from scratch and it took us another couple of years
to get through the process of approvals for what we now have out to bid.
Most people don’t appreciate just how complicated it is…to design a hospital, you know?
And with all the agencies with their fingers in it, the Public Health Service…You’re doing it
with FEMA. Our review process was just ridiculous…we tried not to make it antagonistic…but
rules got so bad.”
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Respondent 4, Facility 2:
“Well, it’s an unbelievable process. It is truly unbelievable. The project worksheets with
all kinds of nuts and bolts, establish, for this building, establish what they call a project
worksheet. And then right after the storm they sent people in and they started evaluating the
damage. Great idea! Except for we were busy trying to get this place back up and going. So,
you know, we had National Guard out here, we’ve got DMAT out here costing God only knows
how much and they want to know how long it’s going to take you to get your ER up and going
cause they wanted to go home. So, our focus was trying to get our services back up and running.
Well, in the meantime…here come the FEMA guys…no healthcare experience…they come in
and they write this stuff up…So, they write up the project worksheet and you look at it and you
go, ‘Okay, it looks okay,’ and you find out after the fact that they missed a bunch of stuff. And I
mean it was just a battle, an absolute battle. You know the building was built in 1985. Well
…there’s life safety codes that have…transpired since that time and FEMA will not recognize
that, so they don’t care. So it’s like, by law we have some areas in the building that are not
sprinkled, you know, they don’t have the fire sprinkler system in it. Well, by law, if I tear it out,
it’s okay as long as you don’t fool with it. As soon as you open it up to do some renovations,
you have to bring it up to code. Well, renovating the entire first floor of the facility is a
renovation and we have an 1985 construction, a 1994 construction and a 1998 construction. So
we have three different levels…about the time you would just get working well with one team,
they leave…And somebody else comes in. And they start out, ‘Well, you got copies of this?’
Same questions. ‘You got copies of this?’ ‘Hell no, I don’t have copies. The stuff I had was
flooded and the stuff I got we…already gave the other guy.’ ‘We can’t find them.’ The first
plan they told us, ‘Well, the best way to mitigate this is to build another facility and just tie it
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into this building and put all your expensive stuff up.’ Great idea! It would have been easy. We
spent a year and a half working on that and then they came and pulled the rug out from
underneath and said, ‘No, you can’t do that.’ I was like, ‘What?’ So I mean unbelievable, just
colossal waste of time. We spent, I think, about $160,000-$170,000 on A&E fees and testing
and things like that and they didn’t want to pay it…they finally did, but not without a struggle
…we asked for a letter…we wasted a year and a half of our time and we want[ed] something in
writing. That took probably two or three months to get and when it came, if you would have
read it you would have thought, ‘God, the hospital people are really stupid.’ I mean, it flat said
that we didn’t follow the rules. And I was like, ‘Whoa, time out here!’ So you know, they went
back and massaged it. They weren’t about to take the full blame for it, though. So that’s been a
lot of the frustration.”
Respondent 7, Healthcare Association Executive:
“FEMA came out with money, $30 million dollars, post-Gustav for a generator grant
program. HVAC Mitigation Grant is what it’s called. And basically because of the issues that
we had with air-conditioning and the lack of after Gustav, this grant money came out to help
hospitals…harden their facilities to include and give them more air-conditioning capabilities
during the course of the storm. So, there’s grant money. Politics gets into play with a lot of this.
Nursing homes could get the bulk of the money. Hospitals get about $8 million dollars of this
$30 million dollars, to go across. Now a generator set…that will power…entire facility, lock,
stock, and barrel, air-conditioning, everything is millions of dollars. And so, it wasn’t money
that was going to actually pay for them [to get] a generator to do all of that, but it was a little bit
of money to help…anything helps. That was a year and a half ago…there’s been maybe six
hospitals that have gotten money out of that program so far…it’s just the bureaucracy of it all
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that comes down and it’s just amazing…that FEMA will come up with this rule or that rule or
this rule or that rule…and hoops to jump through for hospitals to try to get this money. And oh,
by the way, we forgot, there’s this rule now, there’s this rule now. So that changes gears and
slows things down and so here we are a year…”
Respondent 8, Facility 4:
“I think some of the other big issues that we faced and some of the gaps were pets. We
had about 130 to 150, can’t remember exactly the number of pets in the facility. So many
facilities in the city now will not allow pets in there. There is federal legislation on the pet act
that has to be followed through. There are places now for pets to go in times of those things.
That was one issue.”
_____________
“I think that…probably, after communication, probably number two on the list [is
security]. I never personally felt unsafe because I knew the place. I’ve been there 30-something
years. Many of us had been there that long, so we pretty much knew every inch of that place. I
think it was pretty unsafe if you want to look at it. I want to say there’s about 20 plus ways to
get into that facility, maybe even more than that. So again, trying to man those, lock those down,
you know, the garage was all open, which goes into the hospital. Going into that, we did have
people, we had several, there was a stabbing victim that came in during that time we took in.
During the day, there were policemen that came to the hospital and stayed on the ER ramp,
typically with us, with guns. There were several occasions where people did try to get in the
building that we turned away. They were just neighborhood, who knows where they came from.
There were people across the street in our XXXX building…right across the street. They had
broken in there and kind of took up refuge and [were] kind of hanging out, barbequing,
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screaming at the nurses across the street, when were we gonna get out of there so they could get
in there, and things like that. I remember the last night, that Thursday night, there were about
30 of us left because everybody else had been evacuated and because it was night then and we
couldn’t leave. We all stayed up on the heliport and we did have some security guards.
However, most of them were not in good shape to do anything, but people did bring guns in
there. They were armed, so some of the guys did take turns standing and watching us as we were
on the roof. The one thing that really hit home to me about how unsafe it was…it was early
that Friday morning and we were waiting for someone to come get us. There were about 30
of us left. On the intensive care unit on the eighth floor, you can get out on the roof from there.
That morning, I heard one of the guys that was with us saying, ‘Get back or I’m going to use this
gun,’ kind of thing, I don’t know the exact words. They actually had people coming out of the
hospital. We had evacuated everybody, I personally had mostly gone through that building, and
most of us had gone through and made sure everybody was out. However, people were still
getting into that building…I don’t know where they were so and then that night also as we sat
there we could hear car alarms going off underneath us, was of course one of the garages, and
glass being broken, like people trying to get into the cars, so they were there on the periphery.”
Respondent 9, Facilities 5 and 6:
“We lock the building down…We do have armed post-certified security. Well it’s really
a legal police department. And most of them carry, you know, are armed with a pistol and
during a storm will actually break out assault rifles that they are armed with in case somebody
tries, like during Katrina when they were trying to storm hospitals either to get in to seek shelter
or either to get in thinking they could get in and can get drugs…or whatever their situation was.
So we lock the building down and, you know, on this campus…we didn’t have any trouble on
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the XXXX campus. They had some problems on this campus during Katrina with outsiders. At
XXXX campus, we did not. Why, I don’t know, because XXXX campus was more accessible.
You had to swim to get to this one. You could wade to get to XXXX. The water depth out here
was like six, seven feet in the street, whereas at XXXX it was like about two feet.”
Respondent 10, Facilities 7 and 8:
“We have very good security. That was a very real issue here. We use…armed officers
with full arrest authority. We had an arsenal here with bigger guns and stuff if they needed, what
have you…they brought them out during Katrina. While there were concerns about various
areas being unsafe, nothing really happened to anybody or anything inside this place. We were
okay from that standpoint. If you have a place that doesn’t have it, the XXXX, we didn’t have
much of a police force there and they didn’t have as many folks as we did. One of the first
things we brought down was police officers. The first thing in was police officers with supplies,
with extra weapons and we used the vehicles that brought them in to start the evacuations.
Security is a big piece of it, but we had it here. It was fine here. We were like a small-armed
camp in that sense and we were prepared to do that again during Gustav…We have a lot of real
estate down here to protect.
XXXX had an electronic health record…and it was…decentralized to each hospital but
you could talk to other hospitals. So if you saw a patient from Houston, say in New Orleans the
thing would show up and say that that patient had records in Houston. Then you click on it and
you can go open those records and pull them in to your New Orleans records. It was really…a
Houston chart, a New Orleans chart. They’re working to make it all one unified, centralized
chart now, but at that time they were decentralized but they could talk to each other. When the
Sprint lines went down, you could no longer talk to New Orleans and all these people were
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evacuating New Orleans…including XXXX patients. We have basically a data warehouse in
XXXX where monthly we pull data extracts of other hospitals, a whole bunch of stuff…
administrative work, clinical data we put in a relational database we do all kinds of analysis with.
But, it had every patient’s name, the major diagnoses, their medications, things like that. We set
that up on a secure website where people could access within a day to pull up any of that patient
information, so if a patient showed up in your emergency room from XXXX, you can get that
information. I say that because Newt Gingrich gives a talk cause he’s a big fan of electronic
health records. He said there were patients from XXXX showing up in Texas with cancer, and
they not only did not know what they were being treated with, they didn’t even know what type
of cancer they had. When you’re in the middle of chemotherapy/radiation therapy, that’s
impossible to manage if you didn’t know. You just can’t start over again. You will kill them
with the treatment if you don’t do it right…very difficult…we got tapes out, backup tapes, flew
them to Houston and set up a virtual New Orleans, so whenever you went someplace that New
Orleans icon appeared again and you could go get all the New Orleans records…And all those
patients, their medical records followed them anywhere they wanted to go in the country…So, I
am a big fan of electronic health records…they’re trying to do with some of the money in the
stimulus bill. The other piece I would point out for special populations, patients who have
special diseases, or special conditions, transplant patients, dialysis patients, patients in the middle
of chemotherapy, patients with very funny diseases in the middle of very unusual treatments.
You need to have agreements with those patients beforehand, where they’re going, who they’re
gonna contact, where they’re gonna stay, contact information there, alternative sites, a number
they can contact you for information, what have you. You just can’t go someplace in a random
evacuation if your kidneys aren’t working. You have to be able to get plugged in to a dialysis
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center in a few days or you’re gonna be one hurting puppy, or if you need to start your cancer
chemotherapy, or something up. So, special risk populations…you need to have special
evacuation plans for them, even if you expect them to evacuate on their own…you need to have
a way to make sure their care is resumed elsewhere without a dangerous interruption. Also, you
must have a way to rally them back together when they come back…and contact you…You give
them websites to go to, all sorts of things. I might add, the Internet was a great way to
communicate with all these folks who are spread all over the place…same thing with your
employees. You should know where they’re evacuating to. They should have a common call
point, a website, things like that. For example, during Gustav, we communicated to everybody
over the web…here’s how we’re gonna find out announcements, where we are, what we’re
doing…”
Respondent 11, Corporate Healthcare Executive:
“I had to reproduce and research every text message, every e-mail, every piece of handwritten document because it’s all contingent upon your reimbursement, it’s all contingent upon
validating what did or didn’t happen, and justifying this interruption coverage to your own
insurance provider. Also, much less through what the feds were gonna reimburse you for, the
state was gonna reimburse you for. And granted, we never used, you know, even with Gustav,
the state’s evacuation resources, we used our own. We paid for our own, so basically, our
reimbursement was a little bit different from the other non-for-profit facilities’ reimbursement in
that we were looking for validation of reimbursement from our insurance companies, for
business interruption, more so than the federal component. . .we have again, our own insurance
department at corporate that handles all that and they are used to handling it because when you
have…hospitals across the country…you’re gonna have disasters…in one way, shape, or

168

form. It may be a different type of disaster but it’s still relatively the same process from the
same point of validation…collection, reimbursement…”
Respondent 12, Facility 9:
“…we had developed some system-wide contracts with disaster response contractors. I
was in contact with them, too, because what they do is they stage what they think may be
necessary for the response. So they’re basically repositioning trucks, you know. With Ike, it
was, you know, moving it up the coast to XXXX and finally up here just outside of the XXXX
area. So one of the things that happened shortly after the landfall, you know, they couldn’t get in
because the XXXX was blocked and also, too, there were roadblocks in the area even for
when the road was clear. So I got a call from the disaster response contractors saying that they
couldn’t get through the roadblock and so I called up the state operations center. They were able
to call on the State Troopers’ cell phone to tell them to let this convoy—we had about twelve
semi-tractor trailers loaded with water pumping equipment, generators, fuel, drinking water,
food, you know, that sort of thing. So they let them through. They ended up doing about a
hundred million dollars worth of work, okay. I can’t speak too much to the insurance, but,
basically XXXX is self-insured, but they do have a catastrophic insurance that they get and I
think that they got it. They put it in place, cause you can imagine it is hard to find insurance for
this area, you know…for the value of the assets and the vulnerability and they had just put in a
catastrophic policy, like that year.
In terms of what are some of the things that went right, of course, the disaster response
contractors, I think, having them available was a very good outcome. It helped to mitigate a lot
of the damage in that they were able to come in and mop out, dry the equipment out, rip out
sheetrock, etc. There was a key lesson learned there, and that is many universities and medical
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schools and so forth aren’t used to dealing with very large claims to FEMA, and dealing with
contractors who are holding out as experts in the field. So, at the time, XXXX really didn’t
have the expertise in documenting a disaster and hence it became a little bit difficult in the
claims process with FEMA. So one of the things we’re kind of taking from that now is working
with the contractors to qualify them. In other words, to make sure that they understand what the
FEMA process is and not just asking them, you know, ‘Do you know what it is?’ but making
sure that they really do. Then, one thing that we’re going to do or trying to put in place now is to
basically write our business rules with each of the candidate contractors. There are sort of
contingency contracts in place…so it’s a question of who you would bring in. It might be
scenario dependent, you know, whether it’s more of a HAZMAT incident, or if it’s mostly, you
know, a flooding incident or whatever. Basically, in the incident command, there is a research
request document, a 213, that’s used and the contractors would understand that unless you have a
signed 213, you’re basically volunteering to do the work because you won’t be paid by us.
That’s good incentive for them to make sure that they’ve got the appropriate documentation for
all the work that they do, which then implies that, you know, there was an incident action plan
approved by the incident commander, so these are the objectives and then these are the tasks that
flow from that. So six months or a year later when FEMA comes by and says, ‘Oh, why did you
do this, or when did you decide to do this?’ We simply go to the 213 number, go back and
you’ve got the documentation that you need. That was kind of a key lesson learned and probably
something that a lot of…institutions really are not familiar with and could get burned.”
Respondent 14, Facility 9:
“…we have several things in our favor. Number one, we’re a system. We belong to a
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system…of institutions…it’s so large with fifteen different components used to working with
FEMA.
You know, things happen in our institutions…The people in hazard mitigation and risk
Management…are pretty well aware of the FEMA issues…had dealt with them, are still dealing
with some of those…the system also has been very willing to bring in consultants and we did
that early after this [Ike]. We brought in that James Lee Witt firm. Of course he’s a former
director…of FEMA. We have some personnel who had been engaged here with a small FEMA
recovery effort and we hired a few, not purposely for this reason, but we had hired a few from
XXXX who had been through the experience with them. It certainly was helpful to have them
on board. In fact, one of those people in finance, one of the more senior managers is leading our
effort to work with FEMA, James Lee Witt and The Office of Risk Management for XXXX. I
certainly can’t argue with the advice that others have given you. It is very helpful to be well
versed in the FEMA process…to have experience with them, because we had the same sorts of
situations where FEMA teams change and the assessment changes. It’s very frustrating.
…there were many discussions occurring in Austin among leadership in XXXX, among
the governor, lieutenant governor and staff members, the members of the legislature…storm
prone for $150 million dollars which is what it’s probably going to take, at least that’s rebuilding
…moving lock, stock and barrel to XXXX. . .and put the medical school where we want in
association with XXXX. It was a huge uphill battle and everybody here knew it. We weren’t
really sure if we were going to be in existence or not until the conclusion of the 2009 legislative
session. So we had a lot of educating to do and we went at it with passion. I think what was
most effective for us is the return on investment argument. First of all, to replace this complex
anywhere, replacement cost of all these buildings is probably somewhere between $5 and $7
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billion dollars, and that may be conservative. To rebuild a complex like this would probably take
10 years particularly when you consider recruiting faculty and the like…So we’re producing 800
health profession students every year who are going out into the workforce…bringing in $150
plus million dollars in research funding from external sources every year. We’re responsible for
30,000 jobs across the state of Texas, at $1.5 billion dollars per year economic business volume
impact on the state. When you start trying to move us that all goes away and you don’t recover it
for at least 10 years and…we are number one in the country in terms of educating underrepresented minorities. The kids tend to go back to the cities and towns where they came
from in Texas, which is where the need is greatest, with the best record of any school…in Texas.
Our kids score highest on their national board exams of all the medical schools in Texas. So, are
you really gonna let that go and run the risk of not restoring it when you can spend that $100 to
$150 million and get the FEMA match and rebuild it historically for the future? And that
argument over a course of time did…hold up…we made it and we’re doing well, and I think we
have a marvelous opportunity to truly storm-proof this place and never again have this sort of
damage. What the architects and the engineers have told me, when we finish all of the
mitigation work and all the repairs and move everything up that a storm the magnitude of Ike or
greater, level five, 160 mile an hour winds and 30 foot storm surge…maximum damage in 2008
dollars is $50 million. It’s still a lot of money, but it’s an insurable loss for an institution this
size. And that’s basically what our insurance coverage was, was…$50 to a $100 million dollars.
Our total loss was closer to $900 million and you add $100 million in mitigation on top of that,
we’re talking about one billion dollars of investment. But again, if you think about the return on
investment, what we do for the state, the business volume impact on the state, the jobs and the
like…actually the billion again generates a return in the next three to four years. So we think the
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economic argument…is strong.”
Themes
The peer debriefer reviewed the meaning units clustered by the researcher. Through
reflective meditation and imaginative variation, they came to agreement on the themes (invariant
horizons) of the respondents’ experiences that had become apparent during intensive study of the
transcripts. The researcher validated the meaning units and their accompanying theme against
the complete record of the transcripts, checking each meaning unit to determine if it could be
categorized into one of the themes while being expressed or by being compatible with the theme.
In other words, the themes were supported by the meaning units (Hathorne, 2006). According to
Moustakas (1994), these themes represented the core elements of the respondents’ experiences.
Table 2.: Themes and descriptions of the lived experiences of the hospital respondents
during and after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav and Ike, in 2005 and 2008, respectively.
Themes

Descriptions

Policymakers/Planners

Perceptions of readiness post-storm; critical
experiences, lessons learned; major changes,
innovations adopted; identification of special needs (dialysis, oxygen, etc.)

Plans, Policies and Procedures

Post-storm impact on future plans, policies and procedures; memoranda of
understanding, funding and grants; evacuation, shelter-in-place decisions
Communication devices; physical plant improvements and modifications;
other protective equipment and supplies; effects of economy, funding
opportunities; reimbursement issues
Additional staff; reassignment of job duties; policies as they relate to
reporting of essential staff; experience of staff; organizational culture;
security
Frequency of training; manual updates and changes

Capital Investment

Human Resources

Training and Drills
Evaluation of Success

Nature and extent of changes in preparedness; quality of response to the
emergency; adequacy of readiness for future emergencies

Composite Thematic Textural-Structural Description
The researcher reviewed each transcript once again to capture the meaning and essence of
the individual respondent’s experience by incorporating the meaning units into identified themes.

173

Figure 3: Thematic Textural-Structural Composite.
The initial step was to construct textural and structural descriptions, followed by
phenomenological reflection, imaginative variation and analysis of the textural and structural
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elements of the experience. Through reanalyzing the data, the researcher was able to summarize
a composite thematic textural-structural description based on the experiences of each respondent
(Hathorne, 2006). The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the composite thematic texturalstructural description.
Hospital Emergency Preparedness
Overall, hospital emergency planning is “all-hazards,” focusing on weather events and
flooding, mass influx of patients (e.g., pandemic flu cases, use of biological agents, casualties
related to terrorist attacks and incendiary events) and mass decontamination of patients.
Respondents involved in this study, due to their close proximity to the coast, were particularly
concerned with preparation for hurricanes and tornadoes.
Policymakers and Planners
Hospitals participating in this study have a Safety Committee charged with emergency
preparedness duties. The committees meet between six and 12 times a year to discuss matters
relevant to improving response to potential disaster scenarios. The Safety Committees must
ensure that numerous and specific elements are included in their planning as mandated by The
Joint Commission (TJC), their national accrediting body. Safety Committees plan and execute
the drills, lead after-action planning, implement policy changes, and make recommendations to
the hospital administration and/or board for the purchase of equipment and facility improvements
that will make their organization’s ability to respond better and their physical plant more
impervious to Mother Nature.
While some respondents felt that the storms of 2005 did not change the way their
organization reacts or plans, most respondents felt that hospitals collectively are better prepared
as a result of their experiences. One obvious improvement would be just that—the “lived
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experience” gained through preparing for and managing through the hurricanes—whether it was
Katrina, Rita, Gustav or Ike. With each successive strike, the hospitals felt their capacity to
handle their operations was enhanced. With multiple storm experiences under their belts, staff
members and leadership have a greater confidence level. One respondent remarked that he felt
his facility was more confident about meeting disaster and crisis head-on, but certainly was not
arrogant about it. This same respondent, whose sentiments were echoed by several others, also
commented that hospitals must be realistic, flexible, improvisational, and self-reliant. The
healthcare market can be difficult to navigate with its complex regulations and reimbursement
schedules that become more so under the duress of crisis. Therefore, realism and flexibility are
important traits to keep in mind when planning and managing in crisis circumstances. That
flexibility, creativity and ability to improvise cannot be underestimated. These characteristics
are critical in an emergency when you need to alter plans, policies and procedures due to the
unique conditions of the situation at hand. Being self-reliant was another quality that
respondents mentioned frequently during the interviews. As they learned during the Katrina
experience, help does not always arrive when promised. Therefore, facilities need to be able to
stand alone for longer periods than previously planned.
To be eligible for accreditation by The Joint Commission, all hospitals are now required
to operate under the auspices of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and/or
Hospital Incident Command System (HICS). This provides a consistent emergency operating
structure with a specific chain of command, allowing the hospital to communicate with external
agencies and Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) with universally understood terminology.
Respondents explained that compliance with NIMS and HICS is required to be eligible for
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reimbursement by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and to obtain other
available government-sponsored grant funds.
Training and drills are important to allow staff to have the opportunity to work through
their plans and make suggestions for adjustments in addition to enabling them to clearly
understand and/or question their particular roles in a disaster. As well, the provision of regular
internal communication was pointed out as a critical need for staff and patients during a crisis
event. You must keep these audiences informed with accurate information to reduce the rumor
mill so that staff can continue to give high quality care.
The significance of training not only within the facility, but within the community and
beyond, even regionally, was discussed. Respondents consistently touted the value of being
strong community partners and having personal relationships within their communities during
good times and especially during a crisis. Knowing law enforcement, political, and community
leaders carries great weight in managing through a disaster. Also important were relationships
with vendors and suppliers and taking time to strengthen those bonds as well as to contract
redundantly in the event one supplier or vendor is not able to provide goods and services as
hoped.
Respondents also spoke of several other essential areas that need consideration in future
disaster planning. Dealing with FEMA has become particularly onerous for most institutions,
particularly those that have been subject to damage. Respondents spoke of the need for facilities
to become well-versed in FEMA rules and regulations, to the point of hiring such expertise
within their organizations. Another suggestion was to initiate relationships with recovery
contractors in advance who are equally familiar with FEMA regulations, so that when the time
comes, your facility is prepared to move quickly to restore operations. Patient tracking and
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development of electronic medical records also was mentioned as a policy area that needs
governmental attention in the future. Triage—applying battlefield techniques to provide help,
equipment and resources to those most apt to survive—and fatality management are other topics
that should be debated and agreed upon.
Finally, higher numbers of physicians, nurses and allied health professionals need indepth training in emergency preparedness and operations. They need to understand the unusual
and often harsh realities that come with managing a disaster of huge proportion, e.g., the storms
of 2005 or the tornadoes of spring 2011. The American Medical Association (AMA) and others
have made training available to healthcare professionals.
Plans, Policies and Procedures
Major changes in plans, policies and procedures have ensued since Hurricane Katrina.
Primary among those has been the elevation of the discussion related to the shelter-in-place
versus evacuation debate. While one respondent claimed a shelter-in-place philosophy no matter
the storm conditions or warnings, other respondents have developed plans for sheltering-in-place
as well as evacuating. Respondents cited the difficulty in making the decision to evacuate
patients and the associated risks with making either decision—to stay or go. The lack of
sufficient staff and transportation resources to completely evacuate multiple healthcare facilities
when time is of the essence is one problem that often was cited. Other key issues include the
benefits of and predicaments associated with initiating contraflow on major highways and
interstates. Although it provides faster egress from the hospital facility, it allows no vehicular
ingress, therefore requiring a much greater number of transport vehicles. Last, but not least,
hospitals must weigh liability issues linked to either staying put or evacuating as well as the
financial ramifications caused as a result of the latter course of action. There are legal
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ramifications for making either decision in the event of patient injuries or deaths sustained as a
result of either course of action.
Louisiana has a new Medical Institution Evacuation Plan (MIEP) post-Katrina that can be
used by facilities as a last resort in evacuating patients on C-130 military planes. Texas has its
HEAT teams to assist with moving patients from place to place. All respondents are using selfreporting mechanisms to inform state authorities of their status as it relates to census, patient
criticality, fuel, water and food stores, generator power, etc. These resources have been taken
into account in current hospital plans and procedures, as has institutionalization of NIMS and
HICS as previously mentioned.
Hospital emergency planners use a “hazard vulnerability analysis” (HVA) to help in
prioritizing the most probable emergency to occur for the particular facility. For example,
hospitals located in the Deep South would be less likely to plan for an ice storm as they would
for a hurricane. Based on the results of the HVAs, hospitals plan and train accordingly.
Business continuity is another area of concern and pre-planning for hospitals. This is not
a new phenomenon, but since Katrina, hospitals are investing more resources in assuring that
their patient and business-level data is backed up appropriately and is housed in a safe and
accessible location. Hospitals are arranging for alternate, remote sites for their Information
Technology and Communications personnel to operate from to ensure continuity of business
operations.
Respondents mentioned mutual aid agreements with hospitals in their locales and beyond.
In several cases, respondents doubted the ability of nearby facilities to assist them in their time of
need, particularly if those facilities were experiencing the same crisis. Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) is another area respondents are paying more attention to, with facilities
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engaging in contractual agreements with multiple suppliers for pharmaceuticals, water, food,
linens and other necessities.
At least one coastal respondent did not have adequate plans for storm surge and facility
flooding. As a result of Katrina, facilities are planning to be self-sustaining for longer periods of
time and investing in increased days of supplies-on-hand that will make them more so in a
flooding event.
Whereas most hospital hurricane plans primarily paid attention to pre-storm activities,
since Katrina it is obvious that facilities must plan for managing post-storm in their facilities as
well. All respondents cited plans and procedures to guide them on reducing their censuses,
canceling elective surgeries and procedures and bringing on essential staff as well as planning for
a team of staff to relieve.
The need for plans to be flexible is, again, a necessity. There are many unknowns that
arise as a result of a crisis or disaster situation, so leadership and staff must be adaptable to the
circumstances that present themselves.
Two other important areas to which hospitals have devoted planning resources since the
storms of 2005 are (1) security and (2) the number of people sheltering in their facilities. Where
security is concerned, many respondents cited the need for having an armed security presence in
their facilities during a crisis. Besides helping to maintain a safe environment under severe
circumstances, security is helpful with implementing lockdown procedures and assisting with
crowd control, if necessary. Hospitals have severely limited the number of family members,
caretakers and pets in their facilities since the tribulations caused by Katrina. In most cases, no
longer are family members of patients or employees allowed to shelter in the hospital. Pets are
also being prohibited. Hospitals have enacted these new plans to greatly reduce the number of
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people they must feed, sleep and make secure during a hurricane, as well as decrease the number
they must evacuate post-storm, if necessary. However, some facilities are making alternate
arrangements for staff family members and pets to ensure that staff are available to return to
work more quickly.
Capital Investment (Facility Hardening)
Hospitals have invested extensively in hardening and mitigating their physical plants
after the hurricanes of the last five years. Additionally, they have invested in technology,
database development and communication devices to improve markedly their response
capabilities. For instance, Louisiana’s aforementioned At-Risk-Registry (ARR) and EMSTAT
were planning databases designed and implemented post-Gustav to assist in monitoring
hospitals’ well-being at any given point in time, pre- and post-disaster.
Hospitals are constructing floodwalls, installing fuel storage tanks, water towers, tanks
and wells. They are also purchasing large-capacity generators to allow themselves to operate at
100%, as well as tents, surge beds, personal protective equipment (PPEs), respirators and
commercial decontamination equipment. In addition, they are acquiring lifeboats, building safe
rooms and overstocking supplies.
Communication was an enormous problem after Hurricane Katrina, and hospitals have
used grant money as well as institutional funds to pay for sophisticated radios, email notification
and satellite phone systems.
The economic hardships of the past several years have taken their toll on hospitals’
ability to make emergency-related capital investments. Clearly, financial success usually equals
better preparation in a healthcare facility. Unfortunately, according to more than one of the
research respondents, the economy has increased hospitals’ bad debt percentages.
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Simultaneously, hospital payor mixes have changed dramatically, in some cases, in hospitals
affected by recent storms, due to large groups of evacuating residents not returning. This means
hospitals are less able to hire new staff and have less money to invest in preparedness.
Exacerbating the situation are reimbursement difficulties created by the slow-moving
bureaucracy that is FEMA.
Human Resources
There have been many human resource implications on hospitals since Hurricane Katrina.
To begin, several respondents articulated the need for building an environment of trust and
teamwork among employees long before a crisis to ensure that operations go as smoothly as
possible when one occurs. The level of employees’ lived experiences, skill and knowledge
during critical times was alluded to several times.
Another trend is that hospitals now, more than ever, have dedicated emergency
management professionals in their facilities, especially the larger hospitals. Smaller institutions
who may not be able to afford this expense are, nonetheless, spending more time and devoting
more resources to training individuals in keeping up with mandated standards and guidelines and
instructing others in the organization about relevant emergency topics. Along those lines, some
respondents mentioned that they have hired or have on contract individuals with deep knowledge
of FEMA regulations and reimbursement rules.
Hospitals have imposed strict guidelines related to working in a crisis. Nearly all
respondents mentioned that they have staffing procedures that take into account personnel who
report during the storm and those who are responsible for relief. If staff do not report to work for
their designated shift, termination is a strong possibility. For those who are storm-riders or relief
personnel, one respondent mentioned the need for assessment of staff’s physical fitness
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according to age and responsibility. When power is out, necessitating numerous trips up and
down flights of stairs carrying equipment and patient care items, this can be an issue. Keeping
staff occupied consistently to help keep their minds off the potential condition of their homes and
worrying about their loved ones was important. Stress, feelings of loss, the importance of rest
and the ability to recharge their batteries were also mentioned by several respondents.
In each state where respondents were interviewed, regional coordinator personnel were
mentioned. These employees are typically paid for by a collective of regional facilities or the
state hospital association. In some cases, the positions are voluntary. In all instances, this
individual(s) is critical to maintaining communication between and among hospitals in a given
region.
Most all respondents pointed out that they have put in place procedures for credentialing
emergency staff. Some facilities, particularly those that are for-profit, have also taken great
pains to provide housing options for employee family members and pets to assure greater
reliability of the employee when needed.
Providing for redundancy of important management positions and line staff positions
during a crisis is extremely important. Respondents have given this considerable thought and
planning and allow various staff to exercise different roles during disaster drills to test their
skills.
Evaluation of Success
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav and Ike have altered the paradigm of how people react
to storms. After Hurricane Katrina, in particular, significantly more emphasis and resources
have been placed on hospital emergency preparedness. TJC has devoted an entire chapter of its
accreditation manual to emergency preparedness, and hospitals must meet more stringent crisis
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management requirements to maintain their accredited status. Not only do hospitals have
responsibility for caring for their inpatient census during a crisis, but as a place of community
help and refuge, they feel a strong sense of responsibility to their communities for treating poststorm injuries and illnesses. As a result, their Emergency Departments often see double, triple
and even quadruple the usual number of visits.
After-action meetings were cited most frequently as a way to evaluate a facility’s
performance during a crisis. Staff come together and discuss things that worked and things that
did not go according to plan. Employees and leadership make suggestions and talk about how to
improve for the future. Interview respondents commonly referred to the need for increased
resources, coordination and planning between facilities and states. This appears to be occurring
with more regularity since Katrina.
Another considerable issue that respondents said must be addressed is special needs
patients, notably dialysis- and oxygen-dependent patients, mental health patients and others with
chronic and rare medical conditions or diseases. For patients requiring dialysis and oxygen, the
federal government must intervene and assist states and providers in making these critical
services available to these populations.
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CHAPTER 5.
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary
Why is studying hospital emergency response so important? Hospitals are places of
refuge for their communities. When all else fails, communities depend on their base
infrastructure of support—police, fire and health. Hospitals embrace their role in the
communities they serve, protecting, preserving and enhancing our quality of life. If hospitals
do not respond quickly and appropriately in an emergency, people can and will die.
After the hurricanes of 2005 one thing was clear: hospitals and healthcare providers
needed to make significant and necessary change in their level of emergency preparedness for
the future. While they have made much progress since 2005, they still have work to do.
During the past 12 months, (five years since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita made
landfall), I have spoken to hospital chief executive officers, hospital emergency planners,
nurses and others knowledgeable about hospital disaster response. A tremendous amount of
good has been accomplished since the storms of 2005, as my study illustrates. Evacuation
procedures and patient tracking systems are remarkably better. Planners are working together
more cohesively within their local jurisdictions and are looking beyond those boundaries to
develop relationships and interact with their regional counterparts. Coordination at the state
level for hospitals is much more improved. Staff have perfected internal operating procedures.
Hospitals have invested millions of dollars into “hardening” their physical plants, building
water tanks and towers, constructing flood walls, installing fuel storage tanks, acquiring bigger
and better generators, contracting for supplies, food, pharmaceuticals and transportation
assets. They have purchased tents, lifeboats, respirators, decontamination and personal
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protective equipment. They have significantly improved their capacity to communicate,
obtaining more powerful, hand-held radios, Internet-based communication systems, more
versatile telephone systems, satellite voice and data capabilities, as well as recruiting volunteer
HAM radio operators. Hospitals are using networks created for their unique, specific needs to
track patient movement and assist in deploying supplies and equipment. On the whole,
hospitals are investing more time and energy into training and drills, making them count and
ensuring redundancy of their operational systems and leadership. Having adopted NIMS,
hospital staff say they have a better operational framework and better knowledge of what to do
and when to do it. Having experienced Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav or Ike firsthand, or
having observed what happened as a result of these storms, hospitals nationwide are thinking
much more seriously and critically about their role in an emergency.
However, more work lies ahead for the nation’s hospital community. According to a
study done by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), “Hospital Preparedness for Emergency
Response: United States, 2008,” “Although nearly all surveyed U.S. hospitals had plans for
responding to mass-casualty events such as earthquakes and chemical spills, gaps and
omissions were common” (Gever, 2011, ¶ 1).
Richard W. Niska, MD, MPH and Iris M. Shimisu, PhD “analyzed responses to the
2008 National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey, which included a supplement on
emergency response preparedness completed by 294 hospitals. The supplement asked for
details on plans for responding to six types of events: epidemic-pandemic disease outbreaks,
bioterror attacks, chemical accidents and attacks, nuclear-radiological events, large explosions
and fires, and major natural disasters” (Gever, 2011, ¶ 2).
“Only about 68% of hospitals had plans for dealing with all six types of events, the
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researchers found. Most often omitted were plans for explosive-incendiary and nuclearradiological events, each missing in roughly 20% of hospitals. On the other hand, more than
95% of hospitals had plans for natural disasters or chemical incidents. Planning was also
often deficient when it came to patient transfer arrangements with other hospitals in cases of
large number of casualties” (Gever, 2011, ¶ 4-6).
Perhaps the most important shortcoming, according to Niska and Shimizu, was a low
rate of special planning for pediatric patients. About half of hospitals also had not delineated
how they would manage special needs populations, such as people with limited mobility,
pregnant women, the blind and those with mental health problems or chronic diseases.
(Gever, 2011). Some of these concerns were highlighted in Japan in spring of 2011 following
the tragic March 11th earthquake and tsunami. Healthcare providers in Japan found that their
biggest challenge was not in treating the direct casualties of these events, but rather in
maintaining care for individuals with chronic diseases (Gever, 2011). “The large-scale
homelessness and disruptions in electric power and transportation meant that patients with
diabetes, renal disease, and similar illness lost access to medications and other treatments”
(Gever, 2011, ¶ 16).
On the other hand, the CDC report also found that hospitals did well in certain aspects
of preparedness, as confirmed through this research. “For example, large majorities of
hospitals had included other local agencies such as health and fire departments in their
planning; developed regional communications systems to track available beds in their
communities; and made plans for continuity of operations or evacuations during emergencies
directly affecting the hospitals themselves” (Gever, 2011, ¶ 17-18).
Another study further highlighted improvements made by hospitals. “More than 76
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percent of hospitals participating in the National Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) met 90
percent or more of all program measures for all-hazards preparedness in 2009, according to a
report released today by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response” (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,
2011, ¶1).
From Hospitals to Healthcare Coalitions: Transforming Health Preparedness and
Response in Our Communities,’ the program’s first state-by-state report, identifies the
advances that states have made in preparing hospitals for all types of disasters. The
report also discusses the next steps the program will take to boost community
resilience (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2011, ¶ 2).
Hospitals meeting preparedness performance measures have dedicated redundant,
interoperable systems in place to communicate between hospitals, public health
agencies and emergency managers. These hospitals can report the number of available
beds to a state, territory or city emergency operations center within 60 minutes of a
request during a disaster. These hospitals also have plans to handle a surge in demand
for hospital services during a disaster, as well as plans for hospital evacuation,
sheltering patients and staff in place during a disaster, and to respond to mass fatalities
(U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2011, ¶ 4-5).
The report suggests that, as an increasing number of hospitals meet performance
measures programs, participants also focus on building coalitions within communities
so that hospitals, government agencies, nongovernment organizations, businesses and
community residents work as a team to prepare for and respond to disasters. The
report recommends that these coalitions involve all populations within communities,
including children, pregnant women, the elderly, and those who are vulnerable in other
ways” (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2011, ¶ 8).

Amid all of the progress, my research has concluded that there is still more to be done,
but not all of it by the hospitals themselves. State and federal governments must continue to
act on behalf of healthcare providers to ensure that this industry, critical to catastrophic
incident response, has the resources it needs to take action when the time comes. We will
have to make bold steps to lift our nation’s hospitals’ emergency preparedness to the next
level.
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What will it take? We need to have a sense of urgency and get serious about reforming
and reorganizing the roles and responsibilities of government agencies in charge of helping the
nation’s hospitals in times of emergency. We need to bring together the right people under the
right leadership at the national level to institute new guiding policy and streamline decisionmaking processes so appropriate help gets where it is needed much faster. We need informed,
empowered stakeholders at the local level, too, to work with their state and regional
counterparts to create a flexible framework for action that will complement what is done at the
national level so progress can benefit all citizens.
We need to institute a system of accountability for actually making change instead of
just talking about it. We need to hold our emergency response organizations and the
individuals who represent them responsible for translating policy into action. We need to
commit the right amount of resources to do the job of moving critically ill patients out of
harm’s way so that our country’s first responders can write better, more specific emergency
response plans. Are we going to allow our sickest, weakest patients to die outdoors on the
tarmac in the summer’s sweltering heat while waiting on a transport plane to move them? The
answer should be “Absolutely not!” This is the United States of America—there is no excuse
for not dedicating the full power of our country’s resources to provide timely, efficient and
proper care for our own in their time of greatest need.
We can no longer be satisfied with the lack of coordination, inefficiency and
duplication of effort that exists in managing our healthcare emergency response. We must
standardize processes, plans, databases and forms. If this country’s complex Medicare and
Social Security programs can operate from a single database, then so can our national hospital
emergency response actions.
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How is it that complicated and ever-changing rules and regulations have prevented
some hospitals—almost six years since Hurricane Katrina—from recovering and restoring
their facilities? How is it that we can allow these same unwieldy rules and regulations to
prevent our nation’s hospitals from obtaining timely access to available grant dollars that will
provide them with the funding to harden their physical plants for the next storm? The dollars
are often out there for the taking, but we need smart, courageous policymakers and politicians
to take a stand and reduce the clumsy and tedious redundancies that severely slow our system
of getting help to those who need it.
Post-Katrina experiences have hospitals so concerned about liability that when facing
an impending hurricane, some of them are simply evacuating all of their patients and shutting
their doors, leaving the post-storm burden of care to others. We have to determine a way to
not only protect our healthcare providers from liability but also to reimburse them properly for
the care they do provide during these critical times. We must find a way to relax the rules in
appropriate ways to allow facilities to do the right thing in taking responsibility for their
communities’ medical care, before, during and after a storm.
Finally, we need to make education of those who will be working in the trenches in our
nation’s healthcare delivery system during an emergency a priority as well as a requirement.
We need to properly fund those initiatives, provide the expertise and technology to make it
accessible to the greatest number and continue to encourage innovation in this important area.
Let this be the time that we move away from the policies of the past and become more
clever about how we approach the future. Let us put intelligent, independent leadership in
place to help make deep, elemental and revolutionary change in realigning our systems and
processes. Let our healthcare providers focus on offering high quality, necessary emergency
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care for patients, as opposed to being mired in bureaucracy and paperwork.
Recommendations
Based on my experience and research, consideration should be given to the following
six areas in order to make fundamental change. Here, I will address each one in turn, and
provide recommendations for each.
Recommendation I: Implement a central policy to guide and assist healthcare
institutions in times of crisis at the state and national levels.
Several hospital and healthcare experts explained that no overarching, centralized
authority exists to assist hospitals’ or healthcare providers’ activities in times of crisis,
especially when the emergency requires federal government involvement. Certainly, hospitals
have plans and procedures and respond to local emergencies when the need arises. But when
the crisis is so large as to require a disaster declaration, with state and federal intervention that
calls for a regional, multi-agency response, things begin to go awry.
The United States, as well as state governments, depend upon numerous emergency
response organizations and agencies—FEMA, National Disaster Medical System (NDMS),
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT), Disaster Medical
Assistance Team (DMAT), Veterans Administration (VA), Army, Navy, National Guard,
American Red Cross, Emergency Transportation Operations, and many others—to help in a
crisis. Each agency has a unique mission, with different ways of communicating, different
protocols to follow, different people to whom they report, different paperwork and database
systems—all of which make it harder for hospitals to effect timely decisions. Coordination of
these agencies can pose any number of issues, with no one individual or organization taking
charge of resolving them.
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Respondents in my research study explained that frequent employee turnover at the
agency level exacerbates an already challenging coordination issue. Hospitals may work for
months with one team who is assisting in mitigation work, when, without warning, another
team takes over. There is often no coordination between the old and new teams, especially
where record-keeping is concerned, with the new team asking for copies of documents that
were already provided to the previous team. Similarly, policies and procedures in place one
day under one individual’s supervision may change on a different day under a different leader,
generating organizational instability and confusion. FEMA itself acknowledges its own
shortcomings. For example, according to the current FEMA inspector general,
FEMA faces numerous challenges in measuring the effectiveness of its efforts to
enhance individual and community preparedness (Adams, 2010, ¶ 2). Specifically,
FEMA should improve coordination at state and local levels, update its information
technology systems, hire experienced employees, and obtain funding necessary to meet
the costs of disaster as well as training agency staff (Adams, 2010, ¶ 2). Retaining
senior staff remains a central concern, as FEMA loses many top officials to other
federal agencies (Adams, 2010, ¶ 3). In light of FEMA’s increased involvement in
routine disasters, coupled with the recent economic downturn, which has resulted in
some state and local governments reducing their emergency management funding, we
remain concerned about whether FEMA has sufficient staff focused on planning and
preparedness efforts (Adams, 2010, ¶ 4).
Another observation has been that the person, or people, in charge of a particular
government agency or unit at the time have more power than the policy in place to guide
action. That person’s politics and/or interpretation of what needs to be done sometimes takes
precedence over policies that were designed and written to direct a situation.
Making matters even more difficult when time is of the essence, computer and
database systems do not interface with one another and definitions of terms are incongruent,
creating additional difficulties in keeping track of data and information and making requests
for specific types of assistance. For example, how one agency defines a “critical” patient may
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be much different than another agency’s viewpoint. Another example of an issue, seemingly
minor, that threw up a red flag was when one state was in the midst of evacuating patients
prior to a hurricane’s landfall. There was confusion on the ground when it was discovered that
the patient manifest spreadsheets provided by the state were incompatible with the military
branch’s records of patients they would be transporting. These are the types of issues can
cause delays that impact the delivery of patient care.
From the interviews I conducted, it appears that those responsible for initiating and
establishing policy at the upper levels of state and federal government, are without
backgrounds or experience in healthcare. Yet, decisions they make have a direct affect on
patients and healthcare providers before, during and after emergency situations. Decisions
made without input or representation from the healthcare community can create inefficiencies,
miscommunication, rework and significantly increased costs. Some of the recovery
suggestions made to a coastal hospital by one agency in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
were absolutely without merit, making it plainly obvious that that agency’s personnel on the
ground clearly had no healthcare expertise.
For these reasons, I believe that we should consider bringing responsibility for
providing governmental emergency medical care, guidance and resources under one
centralized function.
The current mission of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response (ASPR), created post-Katrina, is to
Lead the nation in preventing, preparing for, and responding to the adverse health
effects of public health emergencies and disasters. ASPR focuses on preparedness
planning and response; building federal emergency medical operational capabilities;
countermeasures research, advance development and procurement; and grants to
strengthen the capabilities of hospitals and health care systems in public health
emergencies and medical disasters. The office provides federal support, including
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medical professionals through ASPR’s National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) to
augment state and local capabilities during an emergency or disaster
(http://www.phe.gov/about/aspr/Pages/default.aspx).
The mission of NDMS is to temporarily supplement Federal, Tribal, State and Local
capabilities by funding, organizing, training, equipping, deploying and sustaining a
specialized and focused range of public health medical capabilities
(http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/responders/ndms/Pages/default.aspx).
In my opinion, it would be beneficial to pull all of the health-related emergency
response organizations and agencies under the auspices of the ASPR and have this office
permanently direct all healthcare-related activities during a disaster. This agency can then be
the conduit through which hospitals and healthcare providers obtain aid and assistance,
particularly when evacuation is necessary due to an incoming hurricane. They can serve as
the centralized government entity that provides directives and monitors compliance for the
nation’s hospitals overall but especially to those coastal facilities that frequently find
themselves in need during hurricane season each June through November. Having said this,
the Office of the ASPR must be provided with the requisite authority to not only coordinate
action but to demand action and to enforce that it is occurring among the various levels under
their auspices.
Another aspect of response and recovery that should be considered is the number of
assets the government can commit to an area affected by disaster. Consider for a moment, the
responsibilities of various levels of government during a disaster.
Local governments are responsible for providing for the safety and security of citizens
in advance of a disaster—developing emergency plans, determining evacuation routes
and providing public transportation for those who can’t self-evacuate, as well as
establishing and stocking local shelters with supplies. State government is responsible
for mobilizing the National Guard, pre-positioning assets and supplies, and setting up
the state’s emergency management functions. They are also in charge of requesting
federal support through the formal disaster declaration process. The federal
government is responsible for meeting those requests from the state—before, during
and after a disaster. This includes
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•
•
•
•

providing logistical support for search and rescue,
providing food, water and ice,
establishing disaster centers and processing federal disaster claims,
and
participating in short- and long-term public works projects, such as
debris removal and infrastructure rebuilding
(http://www.dhs.gov/files/gc_1224786766297.shtm).

When facing a hurricane threat, the decision to evacuate is usually made within a 48to 72-hour window of time. In the event full evacuation of a coastal area is required, hospitals
will require federal assistance. Given that, it is critical that enough federal personnel and
transportation assets be made available to move and support a large number of critically ill
patients successfully to a safe region who can accept them. According to sources for this
study, currently the government has not yet dedicated, in writing, enough personnel or
transportation assets to coordinate such an undertaking in a timely fashion (e.g., before a
hurricane makes landfall).
Through my study, it has emerged that the federal government has committed to
moving only 150 patients per day if an evacuation of a coastal city is required. Consider that
the order for evacuation often does not occur until 48-72 hours out from an impending storm.
At the very least, that means moving 300 patients and at the most 450. Are we to believe that
the U.S. government is capable of only this? Surely we can move more than 450 people in a
three-day timeframe. Planes at airports in major coastal cities like New Orleans and Houston
are moving far greater numbers of people in an hour’s time. As it currently stands, there is not
even confirmation of what the government will do in writing. How can hospitals plan
properly when they have no idea how many people they will be able to move? And moving
weakened, critically ill patients is not like moving troops or furniture. This is a risky, highly
complicated job, requiring a number of skilled medical personnel as well as sophisticated
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medical equipment. For example, moving a neonatal intensive care infant requires at least one
specialized nurse and the capability of moving an isolette and other complex lifesaving
technology weighing some five to seven hundred pounds.
I am suggesting that we should make confirmation of federal assets a priority so that
everyone involved—hospital leadership and those responsible for carrying out the task—can
plan appropriately and patient care becomes the foremost concern.
Potential Solutions:
•

•
•

•

Bring people together who have the authority to create, approve and implement an
overarching policy to help healthcare providers in an emergency, disaster or crisis
situation. People who can actually solve the current problem of a system that is too
decentralized. Ensure that the policy is transparent, unambiguous and easy to interpret.
Consider making the office of the ASPR responsible for all healthcare-related
emergency medical response in an emergency.
At the very least, hire people with healthcare experience to consult with agencies, such
as FEMA, to make certain that providers’ needs are clearly and firmly represented.
Consider hiring healthcare administrative retirees who have years of experience
working in hospitals as consultants. These individuals have a wealth of knowledge to
share, and many of them have disaster training and/or experience as well.
Reduce employee turnover that leads to confusion and costly delays.

Recommendation II: Instill a system of accountability, such that recommended
after-action changes are funded, staffed and implemented following a major disaster.
Following Hurricane Katrina, numerous government and agency reports were
published, encompassing the results of after-action meetings all with the purpose of making
improvements so we could avoid a catastrophic episode like Katrina from ever happening
again. Many good ideas were voiced and included in after-action reports, but sometimes these
ideas were not translated into action. I heard more than a few stories of people on the ground
who were desperately trying to act but could not because someone else had not done what they
were supposed to do and no one was held accountable when work was second-rate—in other
words, mediocrity is and was tolerated. Who is responsible for holding others accountable?
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We demanded change after Katrina. Who is making sure that change continues to occur?
According to one of my research respondents, the government said they would have
planes on the ground at a particular time to pick up patients being evacuated out and away
from an incoming storm, but those planes did not show up until hours later, putting a
significant number of already-compromised patients at further risk. Who is held accountable?
When those same patient evacuees were moved to safety, with family members
desperate to know their loved ones’ destination, who is held accountable when another
government agency fails to maintain contact with hundreds of these patients? Who is
responsible for letting families know of their whereabouts?
At the very least, we should consider publishing annually and publicly, similar followup reports on what has been done, what has been spent and what work is still yet to be
completed so that the people of the nation understand what has been accomplished and have
confidence in our abilities to respond to disasters.
Hospitals are operating with very constrained financial resources and overcrowded
Emergency Department facilities today. According to one of my research respondents, many
hospitals today are making barely enough money to cover their operating costs. What will
happen to these hospitals when a disaster occurs? Those who already are struggling with
capacity issues could be stressed well beyond their abilities in a crisis that creates a mass surge
of patients. Healthcare facilities are bearing more of the burden of care, more liability for it,
with less financial incentive to do so. According to one respondent, hospitals in his coastal
state have been cut by double digits on their Medicaid reimbursement, which already was not
covering the cost of care. On the Medicaid program alone, hospitals in this state are at pre1994 Medicaid reimbursement levels, with almost half of the hospitals operating at a negative
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margin on their financial statements. A hospital’s “healthy” financial margins are what fund
emergency preparedness improvements—as well as all of the other continuous upgrades a
hospital must make in equipment and technology.
We must seriously consider funding emergency preparedness initiatives and assets for
healthcare in general and for hospitals specifically to assist them in covering the costs of the
investments they must make in emergency preparedness. When the government does provide
funding in the form of grants, we must make it easier for hospitals to obtain these funds in a
more timely manner. As the graphs in Chapter 2 of this dissertation depicted, the number of
natural disasters and the populations affected by them are only increasing, as was confirmed in
the spring of 2011 with tornadoes that ripped through the southern and mid-western portions
of the United States, not to mention the earthquakes and tsunami that decimated the island of
Japan in March 2011. Our nation’s hospitals want to be ready to heed the call when it
inevitably comes.
Potential Solutions:
•
•
•
•

Increase accountability among those responsible for seeing that after-action plans are
translated into just that—action.
Increase funding to hospitals already severely impacted by a lagging economy and
higher levels of uncompensated care, so that they may invest appropriately in meeting
their goals for emergency preparedness and are ready when the need arises.
Ask for input and feedback from healthcare providers, state hospital associations and
other relevant parties as to what can be done specifically to increase action and
accountability on their behalf where responding to emergencies is concerned.
Create an online blog or listserv, sponsored perhaps by either The Joint Commission or
American Hospital Association, where member hospital personnel can login and make
password-protected posts of tips and lessons learned from their experiences in
managing crises and disasters in their facilities and communities.
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Recommendation III: Standardize plans, procedures, databases, forms, etc. to ensure
consistency and efficiency among multiple agencies and institutions.
Numerous times during my interviews with key hospital leaders, I heard that
bureaucratic requirements, red tape and lack of standardized reporting mechanisms,
terminology, databases, forms, communication and rule sets were all adversely impacting the
ability to assist healthcare providers in an emergency. I heard that local, state and federal
plans and activities are still not being coordinated as well as they could be, creating delays and
adverse implications for the most important item in the mix—the patient. If only there could
be consensus regarding definition of terminology and basic information capture, muchimproved patient tracking, efficiency and reporting would follow.
Again, here is where a centralized healthcare responsibility, like the office of the
ASPR suggested previously, would be of benefit. This agency could take charge of
implementing a standardization plan that would bring everyone together on a common
platform for everything from data management to grant applications. Hospitals could continue
to operate using their internally created plans at the local level and when a disaster situation
exceeded their abilities and resources, then ASPR would be deployed to help.
Another problem respondents cited was that a lot of time is spent creating proprietary
database systems locally, which are not compatible with what the government uses. Why not
work together to create a single database that meets the fundamental needs of all those who
will use it? It will make data reporting and access much easier, as well as these tasks, e. g.,
assessing hospitals’ readiness in terms of supplies, fuel, food and water, census and bed
availability and tracking patients. If Federal Express (FedEx) and the United Parcel Service
(UPS) can do it, certainly the government can assemble individuals who can work with
hospitals to create a dynamic database to combine data management and patient tracking
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modalities.
Finally, one state has standardized its hospitals’ emergency operations plans (EOPs). I
am personally supportive of doing this. Every healthcare facility in that state knows what the
other healthcare facilities are doing, so there is a level of familiarity that exists across regions
and facility types. It would be interesting to study this situation further to determine if it has
been beneficial for the state’s healthcare institutions as far as interoperability, response and
reporting is concerned.
Potential Solutions:
•

•
•

Investigate the possibility of a national database, similar to EMSTAT, that will
monitor individual hospital’s readiness levels as well as assist in patient tracking.
Enlist assistance from successful private sector companies, e.g., FedEx and UPS, to
facilitate creation of the database.
Consider standardized emergency operations plans for state hospitals to increase
knowledge and understanding, as well as to increase adoption of innovative and best
practices.
Create standardized forms across agencies and agree upon standardized rule sets and
terminology that will aid in understanding across the board and improve response and
recovery times.
Recommendation IV: Relax bureaucratic rules and regulations that create
added liability, paperwork and rework for healthcare institutions
during and after emergencies.
Rules and regulations regarding caring for patients in an emergency situation have

become so onerous that those who are in a position to take care of patients are afraid to act to
do so.
Hurricane Katrina and other disasters have created a litigious environment for all of
those providing aid during times of crisis, from shelter operators to hospitals. Everyone is
fearful of being sued for doing too much or too little. Hospitals can face lawsuits for
sheltering patients in-place and putting them at risk within the facility just as they can be sued
for moving a critically ill patient to safer ground in the face of an impending disaster.
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Ideally, most hospitals would rather shelter-in-place if they knew their infrastructure
would make it through the storm and that they could obtain access to needed supplies in the
aftermath. But fear of not being able to do so and the liability of having patients in-house in
an untenable situation strengthens the case for moving patients to an alternate location.
For Hurricane Gustav, Louisiana hospitals were not evacuating their healthy patients
so much as they were evacuating their sickest patients who were the least able to travel and at
the most risk for developing complications in transit. Those patients became even more
fragile during evacuation and some died as a result. Liability is, therefore, an enormous issue
of great concern to healthcare providers.
More work can and should be done to protect hospitals, nurses, physicians, other
healthcare professionals and first responders who are acting in the best interests of the patients
during a crisis. While patients need protection and have a right to expect a certain standard of
care, healthcare providers also need legal protection when taking action to help others in crisis
circumstances.
As previously stated, the formality and tediousness of the rules and regulations created
by government agencies, as well as personnel turnover in those agencies, have made it
increasingly difficult for hospitals to accomplish even the most rudimentary tasks before,
during and after a disaster or emergency situation. For example, it emerged during my
research that representatives of one government agency worked with a hospital trying to
restore its physical plant post-Katrina. These representatives collaborated with hospital staff
and architects over a period of time, and approved the plans. Then the team changed. The
next team did not approve the hospital’s architectural drawings—drawings that cost $250,000.
Although the agency eventually paid for the unused, discarded plans, it was not without a
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struggle not to mention the opportunity costs of lost time, hospital and staff resources and
quality patient care.
Several of the administrators I interviewed advised that hospitals should become
familiar with “the process” of working with governmental agencies after a disaster, getting a
general idea of what the requirements are now so you can avoid hassles later. In particular,
study what you can get reimbursed for and how and know those items for which you will not
be eligible to receive reimbursement.
One respondent explained that even though it is more than five years post-Katrina,
FEMA is still asking for documentation from purchase orders the hospital issued four years
ago. FEMA wants to know who did the work, what the individual’s skill level was and how
many hours he spent on particular aspects of the job. More than one hospital representative I
spoke to has had to add at least one staff member to keep up with the infinitesimal details of
FEMA’s project worksheets. A respondent said that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
can audit a hospital five to eight years after it has completed its mitigation work, so hospitals
must document carefully everything they do and keep meticulous records. The OIG can even
take back money they have awarded a hospital. One hospital representative told me the OIG
took a half million dollars back from his facility after reviewing a project worksheet and
deciding the hospital had been overpaid. This is why record-keeping is so important. In most
institutions, if an auditor came in eight years later to dispute a claim, chances are a hospital
would not remember it, nor would they be able to locate the documentation for it.
As one source put it, “there are lots and lots of hoops to jump through. You need to
manage and keep everything and document everything in triplicate.” Working with the
government is a time- and labor-intensive process. Rules change midstream or are added at
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the last minute, substantially slowing a hospital’s ability to recover. And all the while, the
clock is ticking toward the next storm season or potential emergency.
Potential Solutions:
•
•

•
•
•

Develop regulations and laws to provide guidance, assistance, and protection to
healthcare providers who are struggling with making difficult patient-care decisions in
a highly litigious environment while operating in extremely stressful circumstances.
Improve transition/handoff procedures between personnel of key government agencies
and staff of hospitals who are trying to get back on their feet post-disaster. If and
when agency staff change during a hospital mitigation project, ensure that the plan
approved by the initial on-site team remains unchanged and moves forward according
to previous approvals.
Hire agency representatives who have knowledge of the healthcare industry and the
provision of healthcare to decrease the amount of rework hospitals must do in an effort
to resume operations post-disaster.
Remove redundant procedures and administrative red tape where getting help is
concerned. Simplify processes and ways to obtain the right information the first time.
Decrease the amount of recordkeeping required.
Referring to a previous recommendation, for records that must be maintained, use a
singular database in which to collect recovery-related data and information so that it is
accessible and retrievable by government representatives, hospital staff and others who
need it, when they need it.

Recommendation V: Incentivize healthcare institutions and facilities to do more during
and after a disaster by reimbursing them fairly for care they provide.
According to the National Disaster Management System (NDMS) website,
. . .accredited hospitals, usually over 100 beds in size and located in large U.S.
metropolitan areas, are encouraged to enter into a voluntary agreement with
NDMS. Hospitals agree to commit a number of their acute care beds, subject
to availability, for NDMS patients. Because this is a completely voluntary
program, hospitals may, upon activation of the system, provide more of fewer
beds than the number committed in the agreement. Hospitals that admit NDMS
patients are guaranteed reimbursement at 110% of Medicare rates by the
Federal government (http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/responders/ndms/
Pages/default.aspx).
However, experience has shown that those hospitals who are willing to voluntarily
become a member of NDMS and accept patients evacuating from an affected geographic
region are sometimes not reimbursed for the patient care expenses that they have incurred.
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This was the case after Gustav when hospitals in one southern state were left uncompensated
for millions of dollars of services they provided to patients fleeing the hurricane. While great
efforts were made to obtain reimbursement for those hospitals, those efforts ultimately were
unsuccessful. This creates a situation where hospitals will not participate in NDMS,
potentially requiring evacuating patients to be transported much further, thereby increasing
risk to the patient.
Instead of making it more difficult for hospitals to render aid and assistance in these
circumstances, we should be making it advantageous for them to accept evacuees and to
receive compensation for their care. Why would a hospital that already is fighting for its fiscal
life agree to take the financial and legal responsibility for evacuating patients when they know
they will not receive funds to even cover their costs?
Many hospitals have taken a financial blow due to the United States’ present distressed
economy. Several cannot even afford the minimal matching funds necessary to obtain grant
money offered by the government. For example, a hospital may be able to get money to help
pay for generators or personal protective equipment as long as the hospital is able to pay for a
portion of the cost—let’s say the hospital puts up 5% and the government picks up the
remaining 95% of the cost. Many hospitals simply don’t have that 5% to give, so they lose all
of the free funds available to them.
One respondent told me that both money and human resources are going to continue to
be a challenge for healthcare providers, particularly with looming healthcare reform measures.
This respondent spoke of hospitals that already are reducing staffs and services just to stay
financially viable. Lack of money is not going to enhance any hospital’s emergency
preparedness posture, and hospitals are not going to offer to do anything they cannot be
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reimbursed for in this tough economic climate.
Also, it is difficult for certain categories of special needs patients to obtain medical
care, specifically, those dependent on oxygen as well as those requiring renal dialysis.
According to sources used in this study, hospitals do not provide outpatient dialysis because
the methodology used for reimbursement is much different than for inpatient dialysis,
preventing them from doing so. Many hospitals do offer inpatient dialysis as provided by
private contractors. The independent, free-standing dialysis centers that provide outpatient
dialysis services often shut their operations down during a disaster due to the lack of power
and/or water. It would, therefore, be propitious to seek an alternative way of providing a
waiver program for hospitals to be compensated for providing outpatient dialysis services on
an emergency basis. Additionally, it makes sense to provide dialysis resources to those who
need them in the form of portable dialysis units established within regionally located special
needs shelters. These patients could go there to obtain needed dialyzing, assisting these
patients in obtaining help for their chronic condition.
Oxygen supplies were also of great concern during recent Gulf Coast storms. As
storms approached, durable medical equipment (DME) providers closed due to lack of power
and to heed evacuation directives from local officials. This left many oxygen-dependent
patients unable to secure an adequate supply of oxygen to sustain them throughout the
emergency. We must tackle this problem, which has become a significant issue not only in
coastal states, but throughout the nation when weather-related emergencies affect power
supplies, etc.
Why not create a system where patients can sign for and easily obtain critically needed
oxygen cylinders, as well as a way for cylinders to be returned? Surely we can design a
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method of distribution where patients go to convenient, centralized locations—drug stores or
public health clinics—to make a cash deposit based on the number of cylinders they obtain.
When the emergency is over, patients return the cylinders and obtain a portion of their deposit
back.
Potential Solutions:
•

•
•
•

Investigate what is occurring with NDMS as far as compensating member hospitals for
services provided. In this economy particularly, hospitals have to be confident that
they will receive compensation for services they are rendering to assist others in an
emergency.
Consider establishing an emergency hospital waiver for the provision of outpatient
dialysis services. This will help to improve accessibility to this service for which there
is great demand but few providers.
Offer portable dialysis services in special needs shelters when these are opened due to
an imminent storm or crisis situation.
Establish a system of distributing oxygen cylinders and having them returned to
improve service and reduce associated costs.

Recommendation VI: Assure that more healthcare personnel—physicians, nurses,
administrators and allied health professionals—receive appropriate, current training in
NIMS/HICS and emergency planning and preparedness, pre- and post-event.
Nursing and medical school curricula, as well as dental schools, hospital executive
programs and allied health professional programs must incorporate and require emergency
preparedness training for incoming students. As well, current, working professionals must
receive the latest available information, guidelines and updates on best practices.
Technology has made it much easier to provide this information through
teleconferencing and online webinars, in addition to any on-site training that may include
tabletop scenarios or more realistic, lifelike exercises. The American Medical Association
(AMA) provides such training, and the numbers of those who have availed themselves of their
programming is increasing. We must ensure that practitioners continue to obtain this valuable
preparation and instruction to keep raising the bar of innovation for emergency medical
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preparedness and response.
The South is the perfect location to consider launching a Center for the Study of
Healthcare Emergency Preparedness and Response in conjunction with one of our medical
schools. With significant experiences in preparing and responding to hurricanes, tornadoes,
floods, chemical and oil spills, experts in the South are uniquely primed and equipped to act as
a significant and tested resource of knowledge in this regard. Certainly, we can act as an
exemplar for the nation’s healthcare providers on best practices that have been put to the
ultimate test.
Potential Solutions:
•

•

•

Include emergency preparedness and response training in medical schools, nursing
schools and schools of allied health to ensure that these upcoming healthcare
professionals are able to act once they are licensed and practicing. Make emergency
preparedness and response part of their board examinations.
Similarly, ensure that current, working healthcare administrators, doctors, nurses and
allied health professionals receive adequate training in emergency preparedness and
response and that renewal of their licensure takes this continuing education into
account.
Consider creating a national center for the study of healthcare emergency preparedness
and response that can be the premier source of cutting-edge expertise and best
practices in the field today.
Conclusions
The storms of 2005 and 2008 along the U.S. Gulf of Mexico coastline caused

significant damage, destruction and human suffering. They also revealed tremendous gaps in
our country’s ability to respond effectively to disasters of this nature. This study sought to
determine what progress healthcare providers in the Gulf Coast region had made during the
past five years in terms of their ability to sustain operations at a higher level during the next
crisis or emergency situation.
Through this study, I met numerous healthcare workers and administrators—all
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committed and dedicated to their profession and passionate about making improvements that
will enable them to continue to provide the highest quality of care to the patients they serve. I
discovered a healthcare workforce characterized by teamwork and an innovative, can-do spirit,
willing to serve in any capacity to get the job done. I was repeatedly struck by the flexibility
and improvisational nature of the employees I spoke to in regard to what they accomplished in
preparation for and reaction to recent hurricane disasters. Their incredible stories are an
inspiration.
In conclusion, this study shows that we can never let down our guard. Healthcare
providers must remain vigilant against crisis and disaster and refuse to be complacent no
matter what the cost. Work must continue to improve our policies and processes, streamlining
and reorganizing them for efficacy and ease of use—at the local, regional and federal levels.
Standardization of plans, procedures, databases and forms must happen so that response
organizations can act swiftly, efficiently and consistently. We must invest in the tools and
technology that will allow our nation’s healthcare providers to operate as seamlessly as
possible during a crisis.
We must seek to reduce bureaucracy and paperwork and help to eliminate the fear of
retribution created by our litigious society that prevents many of our healthcare institutions
from being proactive in an emergency. We must also see that hospitals are reimbursed fairly
for care they provide during an emergency, whether at the home institution or at a remote
hospital which has agreed to accept another facility’s patients during time of disaster.
We must ensure that we have strong, able, accountable leaders at the highest levels in
response organizations like FEMA and the Office of the ASPR who will support the nation’s
healthcare providers with materials, equipment and knowledgeable staff who can assist them

208

in their time of greatest need. Hospitals must continue to play a strong role in their local
communities but must also look beyond the borders of their cities and states to collaborate and
seek partnerships with others to whom they can turn for help in the event of a mass casualty
disaster.
Educating our nation’s existing healthcare workers at all levels must continue at a
higher pace and must become a part of the curricula of students in the medical, nursing and
allied health professions. These are the employees who will be leading us into the future of
emergency and crisis preparedness planning and implementation.
Hospitals are at the epicenter of our communities. They are there for us 365 days a
year, 24 hours a day. They contribute to the health and welfare of our nation’s citizens around
the clock, from the smallest neighborhoods to the largest cities. We must pledge our most
fervent support for our healthcare providers—those vitally important resources and places of
safe haven and refuge upon which we all rely in our times of greatest need.
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